MAHĀTĀTPARYA
OF
MAHĀVĀKYAS
AND
OTHER ADVAITA ŚRUTIS

PART - II

OF

ADVAITASIDDHI Versus NYĀYĀMṚTA
AN UP-TO-DATE RE-APPRAISAL

By
Śāstranidhi Dvaita-Vedāntarasajña Madhvamunipriya
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Sri Sri Pejavar Swamiji receives his first lesson from Sri Sri Bhandarakeri Swamiji

DEDICATED

TO

The Two Great Spiritual Luminaries of Modern Times
in the Firmament of Dvaita Vedānta Darśana of
Śrī Madhvācārya

Śri Vidyāmānya Tīrtha Swāmiji
of the Palimār Matha

and

Śri Viśveśa Tīrtha Swāmiji
of the Pejāvara Matha
of Uḍupi

विद्यामान्यगुरुं नत्वा तथा विश्वेशयोगिनम् ।
तयोश्चरणयोः सेऽयमर्प्यते गुरुदक्षिणा ॥

F



ABOUT THE BOOK AND THE AUTHOR

This work of Dr. B. N. K. Sharma, is a continuation of his "*Advaita Siddhi Vs. Nyāyāmṛta—An Up-to-date Re-Appraisal* (1994), wherein, besides the exchange of polemics between the rival schools in their original Sanskrit, he had taken in his stride the adverse criticisms of Dr. K. Narain of the Allahabad University who had re-opened the Philosophical controversy in its modern garb in English, in his "*Critique of the Madhva Refutation of the Śaṅkara School of Vedānta* (1964 and Reprint 1988)

However, Dr. Narain has not chosen to go into the all-important problem of the textual fidelity and the tenability of the Advaita interpretations of the Advaita Śrutis, themselves, called into question by Vyāsatīrtha and his commentator. It is a problem which cannot be shelved or ignored as irrelevant, so long as traditional Advaita and many of its modern exponents still continue to stake an exclusive claim that Śaṅkara Advaita is the sole "Aupaniṣadam Darśanam".

The title of Sharma's book speaks for itself. It raises, for the first time, the question of the

[continued on second flap

ABBREVIATIONS

A.A.	Aitareya Āraṇyaka
Ait. Up.	Aitareya Upaniṣad
A.P.	Āgama Prakaraṇa of Gauḍapāda Kārikas
A-Siddhi	Advaita Siddhi (Śrī Vidya Press Edition, Kumbhakonam)
AV.	Anu-Vyākhyāna (Madhva)
B.	Brahman
B.G.	Bhagavad Gita
B.S.	Brahma Sutras
Bhag.	Bhāgavata Purāṇa
Bṛh. Up.	Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad
C.	Commentary
Chan. Up.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
G.K.	Gaudapāda Kārikas
HDSV	History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature
J.	Jayatīrtha
M.	Madhva
Mahan. Up.	Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad
Mund. Up.	Mundaka Upaniṣad
Nym.	Nyāyāmṛta (of Vyāsatīrtha)
Pan.	Pāṇini Sūtras
R.	Rāmānuja
Raghu.	Raghuvamśa (Kālidāsa)
R.V.	Rg. Veda
S.	Śankara
Svet. Up.	Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad
Tg.	(Nyāyāmṛta) Taranginị of Vyāsa-Rāmācārya
Taitt. Up.	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
VTN.	Viṣṇutatvanirṇaya (Madhva)

PREFACE

Nyāyāmṛta and Advaitasiddhi are the central texts of Dvaita-Advaita dialectics. Sri Vyāsatīrtha has made an extensive review of Advaita thought in Nyāyāmṛta. The Advaita concept of mithyātva is examined in detail and rejected. Dr. B. N. K. Sharma has summarised and critically evaluated the Dvaita-Advaita polemics in the First Volume of his work—Advaita-siddhi and Nyāyāmṛta. In this Second Volume, he has critically reviewed the interpretation of Mahāvākyas offered by Advaitins and presented the Dvaita interpretation with full justification. The Akhandārtha concept is the keynote of Advaita interpretation. Dr. Sharma has clearly shown the untenability of this concept.

For the traditional scholars who have direct access to the original Sanskrit texts of Nyāyāmṛta and Advaita-siddhi, these arguments and counter-arguments are not new. However, for persons who are not familiar with technical terms or exposition of these arguments in Sanskrit, this work is very helpful to understand the exact position of Dvaita and Advaita in respect of the interpretation of Mahāvākyas. Dr. Sharma has examined a dozen Sruti passages that are often relied upon by Advaitins, for bringing out the Advaita and a few other passages that are also taken as supporting passages. He has fully utilised the canons of interpretation to evaluate the respective interpretations.

Nyāyāmṛta is a voluminous work. It is full of arguments and counter-arguments. Dr. Sharma has made a judicious selection of the important arguments. He has added his own critical observations as a modern scholar.

Anandatirtha Pratisthana is very happy to publish this work for the benefit of Research Scholars and advance level students. May Hari Vayu Gurus bless Dr. Sharma.

His Holiness Sri Vishwesha Thirtha Swamiji
Chairman, ANANDA TIRTHA PRATISTHANA
Poornapragna Vidyapeetha, Bangalore-28

Text of the Review of the First Part of this book Advaitasiddhi Vs. Nyāyāmṛta an Up to date Re-Appraisal published in *The Hindu, Madras,* dated Tuesday the 23rd May 1995.

VEDANTA DIALECTICS

ADVAITASIDDHI Vs. NYĀYĀMṚTA — An Up to date Critical Re-Appraisal, Part I by Dr. B.N.K.Sharma, Anandatirtha Pratisthana of the Akhila Bharata Madhva Mahamandal, Katriguppa Main Road, Bangalore-560 028. Rs. 70.

This book of 230 pages fully engages your brain, mind and heart like one of Agatha Christie's novels and you will not be able to put it aside until you go through all its pages. The author of this most absorbing work based essentially on Vyāsatīrtha's *Nyāyāmṛta* is a retired Professor and head of the Department of Sanskrit, Ruparel College, Bombay and a worthy recipient of Sahitya Akademi, President of India and Government of Maharashtra Awards. The publishers have hailed it (with justifiable pride) as a befitting answer from the *Dvaita* side to the "Critique of Madhva Refutation of Sankara School of Vedanta" authored by Dr. K. Narain of Allahabad University in 1964, for every page of this precious publication bears eloquent testimony both to the undoubted scholarship of the author and to the deep strings of his scientific soul to justify the faith of his birth on clear logical grounds, suffusing it all through with a strong scientific temper. Scholars of Advaita Vedanta who have taken lessons in the traditional *Guru-Sishya* system may have answers to some important points raised in the Chapter (XV) "Question of Future Stultifiability of Prathyaksha" and in the Chapter (XIX) "Antinomies involved in the Advaita interpretation of Neha Nanasti-Śruti" but quite a few of them suffer from a handicap and that is their unfamilarity with the language in which this formidable challenge to their agelong faith has been presented. This publication could very well have been entitled "Why I am not an Advaitin" as it is on the same

lines as of Lord Bertrand Russell's "Why I am not a Christian" the only difference being that the British philosopher was born a Christian while this redoubtable critic of Advaita is dedicated to upholding the faith of his birth ! Even while this reviewer's heart is not agreeing with the conclusions of the author, his head bows in reverence to the extra-ordinary vigour of intellect and the impressive sensitiveness of the author in addressing himself to every major aspect of the Advaita Philosophy which he is out to prove either wrong or inadequate. This study is undoubtedly a must for students of Indian systems of philosophy, whatever be the faith of one's birth or choice.

—K. Vedamurthy

FOREWORD


Dr. B. N. K. Sharma is extremely well known (*atyantaprasiddha*) for his systematic exposition of the Dvaita School of Vedānta *Darśana*. He has consistently argued for a view of Brahman as one without a second in the sense of self dependent without a second (Svatantra-advitīya-brahmavāda) through such books as *History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature*, *Philosophy of Sri Madhvācārya* and *Brahmasūtras and Their Principal Commentaries*. The dualism of Professor Sharma is not a Cartesian Dualism of mind and body, nor of Aristotelian form and matter, certainly not of Manichaean good and evil. It is explicitly not the dualism of Advaita Vedānta's this-Worldiness (Vyāvahārika) and noumenon (pāramārthika). Dr. Sharma's Dvaita is a dualism of creator and creature. His is a theology which attempts to preserve creatures—with all our aspirations, cogitations and passions—as reflective of the design and purpose of omnipotent providence. The project unfolds as an inquiry into the purport of the so-called *mahāvākyas* or grand utterances of the Upaniṣads, those few most sacred sentences of Scripture. Dr. Sharma shows that the construction of a monistic system on the foundation of these few sentences is somewhat artificial. He argues further that to relinquish the received view of the mahāvākyas will retrieve for us the entire Veda and give it a fresh significance.

Mahātātparya of Mahāvākyas and Other Advaita Śrutis does not disappoint us in this regard. One will find here an argument consistent with the enduring scholarship of B.N.K. Sharma and the Dvaita school.

But the approach is refreshingly new, even as it remains a model of scriptural exegesis written in philosophical form (śabda pramāṇa). Dr. Sharma admits the prima facie evidence for both Dvaita and Advaita readings of the Upaniṣads, thus seeing the whole Vedānta enterprise as co-operative rather than strictly competitive. His purpose is to show that the sentences prized by Advaita do not in themselves give good reason for constructing a monistic system and indeed can be read in such a way as to preserve the fulness of creator and created in all their reality. His rhetorical strategy is sound and fair, given the commentarial tradition built upon the Upaniṣads and especially the historical Advaita treatment of Dvaita passages.


The general argument has implications for all who are interested in hermeneutics and exegesis, and indeed for anyone whose life is affected or might be affected by devotion through sacred text. The argument depends on several advanced features of Indian poetics and philosophy of rhetoric. A key example which might be taken up here in anticipation is *lakṣaṇā* (metonymy or metaphor).

Lakṣaṇā is applied to the *mahāvākya* '*tat tvam asi*' ('that thou art') by both Dvaita and Advaita exegetes (Chand.Up. VI), but with remarkably different effect. Dr. Sharma argues that the Advaitins reduce the meaning of *tat tvam asi* to almost nil by applying *lakṣaṇā* to both *tat* and *tvam* at the same time *(jahadajahal-lakṣaṇā)*. The *tat* that is Ātman and the *tvam* that is directed toward Uddālaka's son Śvetaketu, are both pared away until nothing remains but the intersection of Nirviśeṣa Brahman, a bare consciousness without any characteristic:



Nirviśeṣa Brahman is marked by the letter '*a*'. The consciousness that is Nirviśeṣa Brahman is the only tenor the metaphorical sentence *tat tvam asi* is allowed to express through Advaita interpretation.

Dvaita interpretation, post-Madhva, performs *lakṣaṇā* on one term at a time *(jahallakṣaṇā)*. This procedure allows the tenor of the metaphor to stand in full and rich complexity. Śvetaketu remains son, student, aspirant; he even remains formerly conceited; but now he is informed and knows that he is informed by the creative power of Brahman *(śakti)*. Brahman, as the referent of the other term in the sentence (the vehicle *tat)*, remains with all godly attributes intact, but is made known for Śvetaketu (and for us) through the common tenor of providence and person:



Brahman is here marked by '*a*' and '*b*', Śvetaketu by '*b*' and '*c*'. The union of their characteristics is

described by Dr. Sharma as patterned after Sanskrit grammatical analysis: Śvetaketu can model himself after Brahman (He is 'of' Brahman: genitive case relation), he knows he is created by Brahman (He is 'from' Brahman: ablative case relation), Brahman lives in Śvetaketu's heart (Brahman is 'in' him: locative case relation), and so on. None of these relations can be gotten by a reductive strategy of simple equivalence.

Dr. Sharma's exegesis is based on the work of Viṣṇudāsa and is more topically representative of the exhaustive exchange of incisive polemics on the subject between the *Nyāyāmṛta* of Vyāsatīrtha and its critique in the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvati and its review in the rejoinder to it in the *Taraṅgiṇi* of Vyāsa-Rāmācarya. I have discussed Viṣṇudāsa's interpretation in my writings, also (*vide e.g., Let the Cow Wander* Hawaii: 1995). Like Dr. Sharma, I have attempted to preserve the rich tenor of the metaphor as implicated by the union of the unique characteristics of son and deity. But Dr. Sharma has shown convincingly that the preservation of these attributes finds a nearer home in the Dvaita commentarial tradition than in the Advaita. One might note, though, that Śaṅkara is more ambivalent than some of his followers in interpreting *tat tvam asi.* In any case, one can get knowledge of neither God nor humanity by reduction of sacred metaphors to mere identity. By drawing deeply and widely on the exegetical tradition of the entire Vedānta, Dr. Sharma aids us in pursuit of knowledge of both God and humanity, and thereby fecundates eschatology and psychology.

Tat tvam asi is an important but single example of the *mahāvākyas* and other *śrutis* discussed in this book. All told, Dr. Sharma provides a cogent argument, while giving us at the same time the all important details of Vedānta exegesis. We will find that relinquishment of the received view of the *mahāvākyas* may retrieve for us the entire Veda and give it fresh significance. This is the greater purport of the exegesis of these famous scriptures, the *mahātātparya* of *mahāvākyas.*

It has now been twenty years since Dr. Karl Potter praised Dr. Sharma's "long and distinguished scholarly career" in the foreword to the third volume of *The Brahmasūtras and Their Principal Commentaries.* At this juncture, we ought not to call it simply longer and more distinguished, although it is both of these. Today, it would seem that we, as readers of this new work, ought to be attentive to the topic and treatment which Dr. Sharma has chosen for this stage of scholarly life. We are grateful for the happy congruence between our thirst for knowledge of divine providence and the scholarly satisfaction of that thirst found herein.

MICHAEL WARREN MYERS
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Washington State University

Pullman, Washington, USA
Christmas Eve, 24 December 1997

॥ पुरोवादः ॥

" तं एवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति " इति श्रुत्युक्तरीत्या परमात्मनः सर्वोत्तमत्वादिमाहात्म्यज्ञानेनैव साम्परायः, तज्ज्ञानं च तत्सृष्टजीवजडात्मकप्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वज्ञानेन विना न भवति ; सर्वाभावे सर्वोत्तमत्वासिद्धेः । यद्यपि जगत्सत्यत्वादिकं प्रत्यक्षगम्यं, तथापि वादिविप्रतिपत्तिपरिहाराय तस्य साधनमत्यावश्यकमापद्यते । तच्च विना अद्वैतपरतया प्रतीयमानानां श्रुतीनां वास्तवार्थज्ञानेन दुःशकमिति तासामेवाद्वैतश्रुतीनां कूलंकषविचार अवर्जनीयः ।

वेदान्तशास्त्रं भारतीयतत्त्वज्ञानपरंपरायाः परां काष्ठां स्पृशति इति सर्वोऽपि प्राच्यपाश्चात्यज्ञानिवर्गः प्रत्येति । तत्र "वेदान्त" पदं वैदिकवाङ्मये केवलं उपनिषदामेव वाचकं इति मन्यमानैरद्वैतिभिः स्वदर्शनस्य "औपनिषदत्वं" अन्येषां द्वैतादिदर्शनानां तदभावश्च प्रतिज्ञायते । परं चित्रमेतत् यत् तैरेव तासामेवोपनिषदां भूयोभागः (उ० जीवेशभेदजगत्सत्यत्वादिप्रतिपादकः) अतत्त्वावेदकः, अद्वैतवाक्यानि परं तत्त्वावेदकानि प्रमाणं तत्रापि "तत्त्वमस्यादिपञ्चषाणि वाक्यानि" महावाक्यानि तेषां चाखण्डार्थपरत्वमेव, न सखण्डार्थप्रतिपादकत्वं, अखण्डार्थत्वं च तत्त्वंपदयोरुभयोरपि विरोधिभागत्यागलक्षणया संसर्गासंगि "चिन्मात्र" परत्वे तात्पर्यवत्त्वम् । एवं परंब्रह्मापि नितरां निर्विशेषम् । ब्रह्मलक्षणत्वेन पठितानां "सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं आनन्दो ब्रह्म" इत्यादिधर्माणां अतद्व्यावृत्तिद्वारा चिन्मात्रे पर्यवसानं इत्येव उपनिषदां सारसर्वस्वं इत्यास्थीयते ।

द्वैतसिद्धान्तिनस्तु सर्वासां श्रुतीनां समकक्षतया समानं स्वतःप्रामाण्यमभ्युपगम्य, जीवजडात्मकप्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्माधीनसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिमत्त्वेन पारमार्थिकसत्यत्वं, पराभिमत "अद्वैत"छायापन्नश्रुतीनां, जीवस्य ब्रह्माधीनत्वतद्गुणसारत्वादिनैव अभेदव्यपदेशो बोद्धव्यः न तु स्वरूपैक्यविवक्षयेति निर्धारयन्ति ।

एतत्सर्वं श्रीमध्वाचार्यैः स्वग्रन्थेषु सम्यक् प्रतिष्ठापितम् । टीकाकारैश्च जयतीर्थमुनिभिः न्यायसुधादिग्रन्थेषु पौष्कल्येन उपपादितं च । अथापि, गच्छता कालेन, षोडशशतकीयैः श्रीमद्व्यासतीर्थैः, निखिलमप्यद्वैतवाङ्मयं स्वशास्त्रं च **एकग्रन्थारूढत्वेन,** कूलंकषविमर्शनेन च **यथासंप्रदायं** विवरीतुं निष्कर्षयितुं च विचारपूर्वकं स्वमतप्रतिष्ठापनार्थं च **न्यायामृताख्यो महान् वादग्रन्थः** निरमायि ।

तदनन्तरभाविना मधुसूदनसरस्वतिना अद्वैतसिद्धान्तसमर्थनाय न्यायामृतस्य प्रत्युत्तररूपेण 'अद्वैतसिद्धि' ग्रन्थः कृतः । तत्प्रत्युत्तररूपेण विपश्चिदपश्चिमेन व्यासरामाचार्येण अद्वैतसिद्धिग्रन्थखण्डनपूर्वकं स्वमूलग्रन्थप्रमेयसमर्थनं कृतम् ।

परंत्वेते त्रयोऽपि ग्रन्थाः तर्कजटिला शास्त्रीयप्रक्रियापरिष्कारादिसंदब्धा पण्डितैरेव वेद्याः सन्ति । अतः ते सर्वे संस्कृतभाषानभिज्ञानां आधुनिकानां अनधीततर्कव्याकरणमीमांसादिशास्त्राणां आंग्लभाषामात्रज्ञानां अद्यतनविश्वविद्यालयप्राध्यापकानां पाश्चात्यतत्वशास्त्रमात्रविश्रान्तानां, अथापि वेदान्तशास्त्रघटकीभूतप्रस्थानत्रयार्थगवेषणे कुतूहलिनां तत्त्वान्वेषिणां दुरधिगमास्तिष्ठन्ति । सत्यप्येवं, बहवस्तादृशा आधुनिकतत्त्वज्ञानवेदिकायां समारूढाः स्वतन्त्रविचारोन्मुखा अपि वर्तमानपरिस्थितौ वातावरणे च बह्वीभिः संस्थाभिः क्रियमाणाद्वैतप्रचारप्रभावितान्तःकरणाः अद्वैतवादमृगतृष्णिकाकृष्टाः उपनिषदां नैजं सिद्धान्तं कदर्थीकुर्वन्तः विपुलैर्ग्रन्थराशिभिः, कदाचित् सांप्रदायिकाद्वैतमतस्थितिमप्यन्यथयन्तः, महाजनानां मनसि इदं वा उपनिषत्तत्वं अदो वेति शङ्कापिशाचिकां कालुष्यं च उत्पादयन्तो दृश्यन्ते ।

तामेतां दुःस्थितिं परिहर्तुं अस्माकं प्रियतमाः पण्डितवर्या डा. बि. एन्. के शर्माणः इतोऽनेकदशकेभ्यः प्रागेव द्वैततत्त्वज्ञानस्य आधुनिकविद्वत्प्रपञ्चे, विश्वविद्यालयेषु च शास्त्रान्तरसमानस्थानताप्राप्त्यै, अध्ययनाध्यापनावकाशकल्पने च कृतभूरिपरिश्रमाः आंग्लवाण्यां बहून् उद्ग्रन्थान्

रचयित्वा कृतकृत्याः सन्ति । एतत्कृतांग्लग्रन्थानां पट्टिकापि अनुबन्धे वर्तते ।

ग्रन्थास्यास्य **"महावाक्यानां महातात्पर्यम्"** इति नामापि विचारप्रचोदकं भाति । यतोऽत्र, इदंप्रथमतया, 'महावाक्यम्' इत्ययं व्यपदेशः दशोपनिषत्सु वा शङ्कराचार्याणां तद्भाष्येषु वा, सूत्रभाष्ये वा तदीयाधिकृतग्रन्थेषु नोपलभ्यते । अतोऽर्वाचीनोऽयं व्यपदेशः। तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यानां **महावाक्यत्वेन रूपेण** न कोऽपि विशेषः । श्रुत्यन्तराणामिव तेषामपि संसर्गमर्यादया सखण्डार्थत्वेनैव यथावकाशं एकपदलक्षणयैव व्याख्या युक्ता इत्यपि विमर्शकानां मुदेऽत्र सूचितमस्ति ।

मूलकोशोपजीवित्वेऽप्यस्य ग्रन्थस्य वैचारिकदृष्ट्या प्रातिस्विकं नावीन्यं स्वमतिप्रभवाभ्यूहादिवैशिष्ट्यमपि विमर्शकानां भायात् ।

तदेतादृशं ग्रन्थरत्नं द्वैतिनोऽद्वैतिनो वा तटस्था वा सावधानमधीत्य विमृश्य च आत्मलाभेन सह ग्रन्थकारस्य महान्तं परिश्रमं सफलीकुर्युः इति सुदृढं विश्वसिनो वयम् ।

आदितः श्री सत्यध्यानश्रीपादैः प्रभाविताः विशिष्य प्रोत्साहिताश्च, द्वैतवेन्दान्तग्रन्थानां विमर्शे बद्धादराः, तेषां आंग्लवाण्या आधुनिकविद्वत्प्रपंचे प्रचारकर्मणि अद्यापि निरता ज्येष्ठाः पण्डितश्रेष्ठा एते श्रीहरिवायुगुरूणां परमानुग्रहपात्रा सहृदयानां मनांस्येवमेव तोषयन्तः पुरुषायुषजीविनः समेधन्ताम् । अस्मदाराध्यश्च श्रीमूलदिग्विजयरामो वेदव्यासश्च भगवान् एतेभ्यः समग्रानुग्रहं कुर्वीयातामित्याशास्य विरमामो वयम् ।

उत्तरादिमठः
बेङ्गळूरु

१०८ श्री सत्यात्मतीर्थश्रीपादाः
श्रीमदुत्तरादिमठाधीशाः

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

Divergences among systems of speculative thought are generally due to ideological predilections which are largely subjective. Systems of Vedantic thought developed in India are however bound by their sworn loyalty to a body of revealed literature which restricts the movement of independent thought and cogitation leaving very little room for original constructive thinking, except thro' circuitous ways of 'interpretations' of Texts, where their conflicting stances threaten to defy attempts at a smooth synthesis. In the circumstances, the task of evolving and developing a consistent and viable system of thought doing full justice to the three primary data of our Experience : Matter, thinking selves and intimations of the existence of a Higher Power over them, borne in upon us in moments of serene and solemn reflection and giving them their proper place in a metaphysical system has not been that easy.

Despite these compulsions of having to philosophise within the four corners of given Textual authorities, intrepid thinkers have grappled with these problems and have left us certain well-defined systems of Vedanta with substantial critical and expository literature representing the widest possible points of departure in metaphysical system-building. These enjoy to this day wide acceptance and appreciation from intellectuals and public esteem in the community at large. The most important of these are those associated with the names of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva. The philosophy of Rāmānuja stands midway between the other two, with its acceptance of an inseparable intra-organic relation of body and Soul of matter souls with Brahman. But it seems possible to subsume in principle the first two categories

of Acit and Cits under a single head of finite reality dependent on Brahman, thus arriving at two broad categories. A further subsumption of the finites under one single category of Brahman seems barred by reason, owing to the logical difficulty and impossibility of making the Independent Real actually transform itself into the other two, without loss of its authentic being and forfeiting its essential unchanging and unchangeable nature *(Avikāro akṣaraḥ* Śuddhaḥ). An illusory transformation *(Vivarta)* of B. into the world of matter and souls, whether entered into voluntarily *(buddhi-pūrvakam)* or involuntarily without being aware of it *(ajñāna-taḥ)*, would be equally unthinkable in an Intelligent self-possessed Being of the stature of the Supreme Brahman.

As the task of philosophising in Vedanta is thus 'determined' in every system by its inexorable loyalty to the body of revealed texts which have come down to us in written form, the acceptance or non-acceptance of the findings of any one of them has to be adjudged on the basis of the faithfulness of its application of recognised principles of Textual Exegesis which are objective in their nature and satisfying their requirements,—rather than on Extra-exegetical considerations,—of which of their findings is the more or the less 'philosophical'—about which opinions are bound to differ.

As Prof. Karl Potter has put it "tho' Advaita looks upon Self-knowledge as *not given* by any Pramāṇa and is an immediate intuition, the precise nature of its content has to be gathered from the Śrutis. Thus, ultimately, Advaita has to look to Scripture and Language as its critical means of proof of the truthfulness of such Anubhava" *(Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies,* Vol. ii, p. 98). This is confirmed by what Śaṅkara himself has to tell us in his Sūtrabhāṣya :

Yathoktam Ṛgvedādi Śāstram pramāṇam asya Brahmaṇo yathāvat svarūpādhigame (i, 1, 3) Brahmātmabhāvasya Śāstram antareṇa anavagamyamānatvāt (i, 1, 4) Upapannam Brahmaṇah Śāstrayonitvam. Śāstrasya ca apauruṣeyatvam prāmāṇyam ca *(Bhāmatī,* i, 1, 3).

"It has often happened in the history of thought", as Dr. Radhakrishnan has observed, "that particular texts have come to be victimised by a dominant line of interpretation which has for long afterwards prevented critics and commentators from venturing to place them in their proper perspective". This may be seen to be the case with the methodology of 'Akhaṇḍārtha' patented by the Dialecticians of the Advaita School to be applied to a particular group of texts like 'Tat Tvam Asi' which they have christened as 'Mahāvākyas'. The manner in which they require these to be interpreted departs widely from the normal way of construing logical propositions resting on their subject-predicate relationship *(uddeśya-vidheyabhāvā)*.

That apart, the term 'Mahāvākya' itself is *not* to be met with in any of the Ten *principal* Upaniṣads commented upon by Śaṅkara himself or in his own commentaries on them or in his Sūtrabhāṣya or G.B. It is evidently a term of Post-Śaṅkara coinage and is not therefore binding on those who do not subscribe to his philosophical pre-suppositions about the identity in essence of Jīvā and Brahman or the unreality of the world of name and form,—the story of whose creation and unfoldment as a result of the exercise of the active Will of the Supreme B. the Sat *(Tad aikṣata* Tat tejo asṛjata) is highlighted in the leading Upaniṣads.

The credentials of the 'Mahāvākyas' thus being rather dubious, they cannot possibly claim any special right to be

*

interpreted in a manner different from other meaningful Verbal prepositions resting on well coordinated subject-predicate relationships of their component parts. The resort to Lakṣaṇā or secondary signification of their parts, if necessary, will have to be restricted to the barest minimum extent needed and not applied wholesale. Besides the incompatibility of the primary senses of the terms for *anvaya*, the claims of Grammar, syntax and conformity with the spirit and the letter of the illustrative materials provided for the clarification of the thesis, in the texts themselves have to be fully satisfied.

Tho' Madhva and Jayatīrtha had gone deeply into these aspects of the problem in their examination of these texts *for the first time* and pointed out the inadequacies of the Advaita interpretations and the need for a more viable interpretation, as suggested by them, their contemporary Advaitins do not seem to have taken note of them in their writings. Following his predecessor Viṣṇudāsācārya of *Vādaratnāvaḷi*-fame, Vyāsatīrtha therefore *reopened* the entire problem *in a very big way* in all its ramifications on a much wider range and sweep of details taking each and every text under dispute systematically and subjecting it to a lynx-eyed scrutiny, exegetical analysis and criticism in an in-depth study of the texts, with an uptodate critical apparatus in the light of the nyāyas of Pūrva-Mīmāmsā and the rules, sanctions and precedents recognised by the Vyākaraṇa Śāstra of Pāṇini and the Mahābhāṣya. After demonstrating the inadequacies of the Advaita interpretation in the light of these relevant factors, he makes out a strong case for accepting the Dvaita interpretation, as the best possible and viable one.

The *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvati joins issues with Vyāsatirtha and puts up its own case in defence of the Akhaṇḍartha-interpretation of the Mahāvākyas and the interpretations of other 'Advaitic' texts. His defence has been re-examined and shown to be inadequate by the *Taraṅgiṇi*, of the Dvaita school in its turn. The present work takes all these materials in its stride and offers its own supplementary comments, reflections and assessment based on fresh facts or relations of facts also.

The modern philosophical world has not so far turned its attention to this subject of Śrutyartha-Vicāra in its strictly Exegetical aspect, in earnest. It seems to have been deterred from doing so by the intricacies of the technical nature of the subject of exegesis and the non-availabity of English translations of the Nyāyāmṛta and the Taraṅgiṇi and perhaps of that part of the A-Siddhi connected with Śrutyarthavicāra. But that does not seem to have cautioned modern scholars who have written and are writing on the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, which is intimately connected with this group of Texts, from expressing grossly one-sided judgments on the subject and taking the same old Advaita interpretations for granted as needing no second look at this distance of time—even after so much has been written and discussed and published and has come down to us regarding the pros and cons of the disputed texts from the veterans of the respective schools.

To my knowledge, this is the first work in English to address itself to this need on the materials put forward by the rival schools, for the benefit of all those interested in the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, *seriously*, to give them full coverage and appraise them in a connected way. I am sure it will be widely welcomed and appreciated as a

long awaited break-through, so necessary for promoting fresh thinking on the basic issue whether Monistic Idealism of a Nirviśeṣa-Brahman or a Theistic Realism in which the three primary data of all human experience get their equitable share is entitled to be accepted as a sound and viable interpretation of the philosophy of the Principal Upaniṣads *as a whole*. Like Śvetaketu of yore, it is now for us to break open the banyan seed and look closer into these texts to find the immanence of the Transcendental Brahman in the world of Matter and spirits.

Various causes and historical circumstances have contributed to the boost the Advaita system has received in the past and is still receiving since the dawn of the nineteenth century. Dvaita philosophy has had to pay a heavy price for its want of initiative in joining the mainstream and marching abreast of the times taking its place of honor alongside of its compeers, as it *had done* in the past from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century, *in the Philosophical India that was*. It cannot blame others now for stealing a march over it or trying to elbow it out. It should come out of its cloisters, shed its touch-me-notism and orthodox obscurantism. It would be a fatal mistake for its leadership to miss the bus again. It should come forward and share its thoughts with the rest of the modern living world, intellectually, spiritually and academically. 'Satyam eva Jayate' does *not* mean that truth needs no publicity in this age of colossal publicity media and the internet.

As one who had watched this sad state of lethargy and indifference on the part of the custodians of Dvaita thought since my College days, I have tried to mend matters and fill a very wide gap, so far as my abilities and resources permitted, during the last over half a century,

contending with many a hurdle. The position is now considerably improved. But there is still a very long long way for Dvaita philosophy to catch up for lost opportunities.

Western scholarship has already moved in a big way with its massive project of an *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* embodying insightful summaries of the classics of various systems of Indian philosophy written by expert scholars both Indian and foreign under the auspices of the *American Institute of Indian Studies* edited by the dynamic Prof. Karl Potter of the Washington University. Three of these Volumes are already in circulation.

The turn of Dvaita Vedanta is sure to come sooner or later. A Volume has been allotted to it years back. Will the present generation of Dvaita scholars, traditional and modern, rise equal to the occasion and mobilise the requisite personnel to seize the opportunity offered to fulfil its obligations to the great Masters and Makers of Dvaita philosophy and enable it to take its place of honor in Global Philosophy? I hope the present work may pave the way for it.

I am deeply grateful to Sri Viśveśa Tīrtha Swamiji for accepting this Volume for publication by the Akhila Bhārata Mādhva Mahāmandal. My thanks are also due to its dynamic President Sri Vishnumurti Yarkaditaya for his lively interest in taking steps to have it well printed and well got up.

Professor Michael Warren Myers, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Washington State University, Pullman has added a new dimension to my work with his perspicacious Foreword for which I thank him most warmly and sincerely. Its impact and repercussions on contemporary academic

thinking and response here and abroad promise to be well worth watching and looking forward to.

My esteemed friend Sri D. S. Krishnachar, Proprietor, Prabha Printing House, Bangalore has given more than professional attention to the good printing and get up of the book, for which I owe him thanks.

His Holiness 108 Sri Satyātma Tīrtha, the young and energetic Head of the Uttaradi Mutt, has been gracious to bestow his blessings on the book with a valuable Foreword in Sanskrit, for which I can only express my Kṛtajñatā to him in the words of the Śruti : *Bhūiṣṭhām te nama uktim vidhema.*

I have done my life's work in this field for over half a century now. I am satisfied with the world-wide interest which my works have roused in academic circles. The ice has been broken. There is a lot more to be achieved to go ahead.

I take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to all those readers known and unknown to me here and elsewhere, who have enjoyed and appreciated my writings and bid them farewell with this Volume.

4/2, Shah Buildings
Bhagat Road, Mumbai-16 — **B. N. K. Sharma**
Sri Madhva-Navami
5th Feb. 1998

INTRODUCTION

I

We have seen in the First Part of this book, in Chapter XIX that the reckless way in which the Nehanānāsti Śruti has been interpreted in the Advaita tradition, in terms of an absolute negation of everything other than B. leads to a self-immolation of the very same Śruti which pronounces the verdict, as well as of the whole body of texts known as Śrutis,—whether Monistic or Dualistic. In the circumstances, it is difficult to comprehend how it could ever be maintained that the Upaniṣads *teach Advaita* as the true philosophy and that therefore it is the true Aupaniṣadam Darśanam. The oneness of B. and its secondless existence are the two sides of the same coin. As such, both of them will have to be treated on a par and vested with the same order of reality in respect of their validity, as uncontradictable. That would spell danger to the principle of Monism, that there is only one real without any adjuncts or extension of its predication. If B's Svaprakāśatva (self-luminosity) does not require the good offices of Śrutis to make it known to us, mortals, Advaita should leave the Śrutis alone and build its system without reference to them on pure reason and speculative grounds, like Buddhism, instead of appealing to the Śrutis at every turn. Having exalted the Upaniṣads to a far higher status than the pre-Upaniṣadic sources (the Vedas) as Para-Vidyā, it is stabbing them in the back to relegate very large parts of the Upaniṣads themselves relating to Cosmology, Eschatology, the post mortem peregrinations of souls, thro' various worlds, the Vidyās pertaining to Guṇopasamhāra in B., the sojourn of the enlightened souls in the world of Hiraṇyagarbha and so on

as not-truth-declaring (atattvāvedaka). As a matter of fact, top-ranking sublime truths about the Supreme-B. have been spelt out in the Pre-Upaniṣadic texts also, which are, sometimes, echoed by the Upaniṣads themselves. The precursor of 'Ekam eva advitīyam' can be seen in the utterance of the Vedic seers :

Tasmād dhā anyan na paraḥ kimchana āsa. 'Ekam sad'. Yas tam na veda kim ṛcā kariṣyati, Etam hyeva Bahvṛcā mahatyukthe mīmāsante . . . . . .

The clue to the ideological resolution of the multiplicity of the gods in the concept of the One Bearer of the names of all the gods, in their highest conno-denotative primary sense, enunciated in the famous text of the Ṛg Veda : *Yo devānām nāmadhā eka eva* has been exemplified by practical implementation in the rituals of the Karmakāṇḍa, in the Tāitt. Br. : Whom they call Indra, Varuṇa, Satya, that 'Thou' we invoke. To them that is Yourself *and* to You this offering (iii, 7, 9, 3).

The elaborate attention paid in the Upaniṣads to the gradual evolution of various Tattvas in succession, their resolution and retraction in the reverse order, the migration of souls up and down thro' various regions and rebirth on earth, the intense sādhanas prescribed for emancipation from bondage of births and deaths have no place or meaning in a world-negating philosophy, if such were the pith of the Upaniṣadic teaching. The doctrine of Mokṣa carries with it only an assurance of no return to Samsāra. It does *not* warrant the assumption that transmigration is unreal.

The synoptic vision of theosophy of the Vedic seers is designed to provide the key to the integration of the Karma and Jñāna Kāṇḍas of the Vedic tradition as an organic

means of realising the supreme goal. This is reflected in one of the cryptic passages of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* :

Mām vidhatte'bhidhatte mām vikalpyopohya ityaham
Ityasyā hṛdayam sākṣān nānyo mad veda kaścana
(xi, 21, 43)

This integral approach is rooted in the Vedic tradition. This comes out from an unguarded statement made by Śaṅkara himself in his B.S.B. iii, 3, 4, where he says "the Veda bears witness to the oneness of all the Vidyās when it says "All the Vedas proclaim the goal of Brahman. The same supreme B. is the subject of meditation and offerings by the Ṛg Vedic priests in the Uktha, of the Adhvaryus in fire and by the Chandogas in the Mahāvrata". The Ukthas, Śastras and Mahāvrata are all parts of the Karmakāṇḍa. Its goal is also the same Brahman, in a much deeper sense than conceded by Śaṅkara—at least according to the Gita and the Āraṇyaka text quoted above.

Following the lead of the above *Ārṣa tradition*, a similar synthesis of Upaniṣadic thought has been presented by Jayatīrtha in his *Nyāyasudhā*. Applying his mind to the seemingly divergent currents of philosophical thought running thro' them, he has ably shown how naturally they could all be seen to fit in, coalesce and converge on one central thesis of the transcendental Majesty of One Supreme Being, from many congruent angles, without in the least breaking the unity of thought into higher and lower levels of teaching,—the former intended for the 'wise ones' and the latter for the consumption of those who are still in the 'empirical domain' of Avidyā or fontal ignorance. His exposition is worth quoting in translation :

"All Vedantic texts proclaim with one voice the Majesty of One Supreme Being as the storehouse of number-

less auspicious attributes and as free from all imperfections *(Niranisṭo niravadyaḥ)*. Of these (1) some represent B. as endowed with such auspicious *positive properties* as consciousness, lordship over creatures, control of beings from within and other excellences (Bṛh.Up. iii, 7, 1). Others (ii) describe It negatively as free from all such blemishes as sin and suffering, liability to material embodiment (Chān.Up. iii, 7, 1). Yet others (iii) speak of It as being beyond the reach of our minds and speech (Kena Up. i, 4–5) in order to bring home to us Its comparative inaccessibility (by human endeavour alone without Its grace). Some others (iv) depict It as *the only One that exists* (Ekam eva) so as to make it clear to us that Man must seek It to the exclusion of all else (Muṇḍ.Up. ii, 2,5). A few more (v) proclaim It as the Self of all *(sarvātmakam)* so that It may be realised as the Ultimate Principle which bestows on the world of matter and souls its essence of being *(sattā)*, consciousness and/or knowability *(pratīti)* and powers of functioning *(pravṛtti)*. Thus do the Śrutis describe Brahman in different ways from a variety of angles all converging on the one mighty purpose and purport *(Mahātātparya)*—of expounding the immanent and transcendental Majesty of Brahman, *as It is in itself* and as It makes Its presence felt in the individual selves and in the world of matter :

Tatra tatra sthito Viṣṇus tattatcchaktīḥ prabodhayan
Eka eva Mahāśaktiḥ kurute sarvam anjasā
Sattvasyaiśa Pravartakaḥ (Śvet.Up. iii, 12)
Pācyāmsca sarvān pariṇāmayed yaḥ (Śvet.Up. V, 5)

energising them from within.

But confused heads, without an authentic tradition to go by, miss this core of Mahātātparya of the Śrutis and Smṛtis running thro' the resplendent variety of complementary insights, vision and approach to the subject of Divine Majesty and substitute in its place their own artificial distinctions of standpoints of higher and lower knowledge of Nirviśeṣa (Nirguṇa) and Saguṇa Brahmans, and of Pāramārthika and Vyāvahārika levels of thought and mutilate the unity of thought-content of the Upaniṣads".

II

In contrast with this panoptic vision of the entire gamut of Vedantic Heritage, the Advaita school has relegated more than three-fourths of the Upaniṣadic corpus as "Lower Knowledge" and picked out some four or five utterances from the entire body of the Principal Upaniṣads and labelled them as 'Mahāvākyas' (great sentences) which alone matter, in the last analysis, such as Tat Tvam asi.

These, taken with such other descriptions of B. as formless, without activity (niṣkriyam) and so on, are regarded as 'Tattvāvedaka' (truth-declaring). The bulk of the contents of the revelations of the Upaniṣads about the activities of the Creator—Brahman, whose will is never thwarted *(Satyasamkalpa* Chān.Up. viii, 7, 1) who impels everything from within (Antaryāmi) and educes the world of name and form from the unmanifested state of Avyakta (Prakṛti) and its triple aspects of Tejo'banna), by a process of triplication (trivṛtkaraṇa) according to the Chān.Up. (vi, 3, 1–3) and produces the evolutionary chain from Ākāśa to Annamaya (Taitt.Up. ii, 1) are all set down as 'lower knowledge,—not qualifying for final release but only for gradual release (Kramamukti) after a long wait and sojourn in the world of the four-faced Hirṇyagarbha, as if the world of Hiraṇyagarbha and sojourn there are real facts and events. This recital about the nature and distinctive

goals of higher and lower knowledge is given by Śaṅkara in the preamble to his commentary on the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa (B.S.B. i, 1, 12):

"We meet in the Upanishads with two different kinds of accounts of B., one in which It is associated with the conditioning adjuncts of name and form as creator of the Universe and another as devoid of all such associations with anything that happens to the world of matter and Souls. All descriptions of B. as the object of Upāsanā and of the Jīvātman as the Upāsaka, given in the Upaniṣads are true only of the state of Ignorance (Avidyā). These Upāsanās are not prescribed as means of attainment of Mokṣa. Some of these like the Pratīkopāsanās are for reaping heavenly rewards and prosperity. Some others are intended for attaining gradual release from Samsāra, like the Daharavidyā. Others like the Udgītha Vidyā contribute to enhancement of efficiency of the rites. The same B. associated with necessary adjuncts is taught for the purpose of Upāsanā. Brahman not admitting of any adjuncts whatever is taught as the only one to be known and realised".

This fundamental difference between the two outlines of the saving truth of the Upaniṣads as a whole envisaged by the Dvaita and the Advaita schools speaks for itself and needs no comment.

III

The concept of 'Mahāvākyas' is itself a fiction. It has no sanction in the texts of the Principal Upaniṣads commented upon by Śaṅkara himself. The term does *not* occur in them or in the principal works of Ś. Obviously, it is a term of Post-Śaṅkara origin derived from his own deductions about the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. As

such, it has no binding force on others who do not subscribe to his views. The earliest references to the term or its near equivalents are probably to be traced to the *Sankṣepa Śārīraka* of Sarvajñātman. Sureśvara's Vārtika also on Brh. Up. does not *use* the term Mahāvākya.

The exaggerated importance given to these Mahāvākyas not only in traditional Advaita but by many modern scholars and writers on Upaniṣadic philosophy may go to boost the glamour of Advaitavāda. But one cannot expect to capitalize on it for all time. I was amused to read in a review of the third Volume of my *Brahmasūtras and Their Commentaries* (B.V.Bhavan, 1978) by Dr. S. P. Dubey of the Jubbulpore Uni. in the *Prabuddha Bhārata* (July 1979) that "the identity texts of the Mahāvākyas cannot be interpreted in a Dualistic manner."

As the credentials of the 'Mahāvākyas' are themselves dubious, no superstructure raised on them can be binding on those who do not subscribe to the concept itself. Apart from it, the method of construing them adopted by the Advaita writers is a law unto themselves. It has nothing in common with the usual way in which sensible propositions expressed thro' syntactic co-ordination of parts yield a properly synthesised purport. But the procedure adopted in construing the Mahāvākya empties the constituent parts or terms of their conno-denotative content, leaving only a very hazy notion of pure consciousness without any specific content. This is called 'Akhaṇḍārtha' or the meaning derived without its constituent parts. Identity texts in regard to Jiva and B. and texts defining Brahman such as Satyam, Jñānam, anantam and ānandam are subjected to the same method.

Viewed in the light of Akhaṇḍārtha, the latter text does not mean that B. is possessed of the august attributes of reality, knowledge and infinitude or bliss, as you and I would be disposed to think. According to Akhaṇḍārtha, the predication simply means that B. stands completely isolated from all that is unreal, ignorant and finite or miserable. That is all. For, to ascribe positive attributes of reality, knowledge and bliss to B., we are told, would make B. a qualified Being (Saviśeṣa) which would belie its Nirviśeṣatva. This Negative way construing a positive predication of the Śruti smacks of the impact of Buddhist Apohavāda, in which a given "thing-in-itself" is its exclusion from all else that it is *not*.

Be that as it may, simple logic requires that B.'s nature cannot be isolated from whatever is asat, ajñānam and having an end *(anta)*, unless it is conceived and is conceivable as being inherently satyam, jñānam anantam and ānandam, in the full sense of those terms. If what is sought to be distinguished from all others is in itself devoid of any positive content or characteristic which is hostile to those from which it is sought to be distinguished, no useful purpose will be served by invoking any number of exclusions *(vyāvṛtti)*. The study of Vedānta is to let us know *what Brahman is* and *not what it is not*. Advaita seems to be afraid of admitting for its Brahman such positive attributes as satyam, jñānam, ānanda, for fear it would disrupt its unity of essence. This is utterly misconceived. *Brahman can take care of itself and its attributes* thro' its own internal dynamics, without the help of Māyā, *which is not made of its essence* and is alien to it.

Maṇḍana Miśra, as a Bhāvādvaitavādi, is not enamoured of the circuitous interpretation of satyam jñānam anantam

Brahma, on the basis of the elimination of their opposites (atad-vyāvṛtti) favored by Sureśvara and Sarvajñātman. Both Maṇḍana and Padmapāda are willing to accommodate consciousness (vijñāna) and/or ānanda as forming part of the *essence of Ātman* tho' the terms themselves are not synonymous in their denotation. In some mysterious way, they prefer to regard them as part of the essence of B. and non-different from Caitanya. Maṇḍana expressly says *Tasmāt svaprakāśa-prakṛṣṭānanda-svabhāvam eva Brahma iti yuktam* that tho' described by two different words : Vijñānam ānandam brahmeti ānandabhedo Vijñānabhedo vā Brahmarūpam iti śabdadvayena avagamyate *(Brahmasiddhi* p. 5).

Maṇḍana's explanation is not convincing. Here there is no parallelism between the degree of relationship of *prakāśa* of the Sun or the Moon to its intensity *(prakarṣa)* where the same entity is referred to by two different terms taken together *prakṛṣta* and *prakāśa* : *(Ekasyaiva sabdadvayopāyatā)* and the relation between Vijñāna and ānanda which are two distinctive properties or states of a sentient being (B). The explanation that this distinction between Vijñāna and ānanda is not a real one, as it is due to the operation of Avidyā : *Avidyā-kalpita-abhidheyabheda)* does great violence to the solemnity with which the Śruti speaks of these attributes in the definition of B. whose knowledge leads to spiritual fulfilment. Since the attributes have been *given* they must be recognised to exist in B. without causing any internal distinction of essence in B. by investing B. or the attributes with an in-built self-linking capacity.

The position of Padmapāda is even more outspoken : Ānando viṣayānubhavo nityatvam ceti *santi* dharmāḥ. Apṛthaktvepi Caitanyāt pṛthag iva avabhāsante. "that the attributes of ānanda, nityatva etc. *do exist in Caitanya*

(Ātman) and that tho' they are *not separate* from it, they appear as if they are separate''.

Padmapāda gives the highest place of honour to ānanda among the attributes of B. Karl Potter, however, opines that ''Śaṅkara is particularly hesitant to attribute this property to it, probably because bliss or pleasure is a temporary state, experience of which requires a body and organs. So, if B. is bliss it must be so in some sense which cannot be translated into empirical analysis. Our happiness has nothing to do with Brahman's bliss. Śaṅkara seems to suggest even the liberated self does not cognise or experience B's bliss'' (*Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. III, p. 76).

All this makes strange reading. As B. is a trans-empirical reality, it proves nothing if it does not admit of *empirical analysis*. That the experience of bliss needs a body and organs is true of consciousness as well, be it a gross body or the liṅgaśarīra. But these are hardly relevant to the state of liberation. Śaṅkara's reluctance to admit Ānandamaya as B. is due to its coming under the class of Kośas. Commenting on Vijñānam, ānandam brahma (Bṛh. Up. iii, 9, 22, 9) Śaṅkara clarifies that B's ānanda is free from attendant pain. It is of the nature of eternal contentment (nitya-tṛpti). Potter's statement that our bliss has nothing to do with B's bliss does not seem to be *well-founded*. For, according to Ś's commentary on Brh.Up. iv, 3, 32 even the worldly bliss of creatures is an iota of *Brahman's bliss* refracted by Avidyā. Since a liberated soul is one with B. according to Ś, there is no possibility of its *not* experiencing the bliss of B. In the opening words of his commentary on B.S. iii, 3, 11 Śaṅkara tells us that the attributes of *blissfulness*, *vijñānaghanatvam*, *sarvātmakatvam* are

referred to in the Śrutis as the *essential attributes* of Brahman : Brahmasvarūpapratipādanaparāsu Śrutiṣu ānandarūpatvam vijñānaghanatvam ityādayo *Brahmadharmāḥ śrūyante.* Such passages seem to have escaped Prof. Potter's attention.

Since the Taitt.Up. in defining B. uses *three different non-synonymous* terms and if these are to be part and parcel of B's inmost essence *(ekarasa)* as Ś. puts it in his commentary on Bṛh.Up. (iii, 9, 28), *there must be some internal mechanism in the constitution of B.* to admit of difference-in-identity, to render the employment of distinctive terms of reference possible and meaningful, without breaking up the unity of essence of B. *That something cannot be foreign to B's nature,* such as Samavāya. Advaita thinkers committed to a Nirviśeṣa-Brahman cannot find any other than Māyā to help them out. Mādhva philosophers find the solution to this problem, which had been agitating the minds of ancient Jewish philosophers like Saadiya and Bahya of how to speak of ''essential attributes'' of God and *not* to impair the simplicity of His essence,—by postulating the existence of 'Svarūpaviśeṣas' in B. (and in the thing-in-itself.) These Svarūpaviśeṣas are self-linking *(svanirvāhaka)* and are themselves identical with the essence of Brahman, as the term 'svarūpaviśeṣa' itself suffices to indicate. With such Svarūpaviśeṣas B. will have to be recognised as a Saviśeṣa-Personality, instead of Nirviśeṣa. *Śaṅkara's ambivalence* in applying Īśvara, Paramesvara and other terms to the highest Brahman, as it suits his convenience, in stealing a march over the Theistic tradition to retain the hold of Kevalādvaita over it by seeming to extend a fraternal embrace to Ṣaṇmatas has opened up a new line of inquiry from scholars like Paul Hacker, Prof. Bradley Mathovsky and Dr. Richard De Smet S. J. to establish that Śaṅkara's

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Para-Brahman is basically a 'Personal-Being'. If their efforts succeed, Ś's Highest Brahman may one day become recognised and accepted as one who is eternally and fully *conscious of His* Divine majesty (Īśvaratva) as the "*I am that I AM*". When that day dawns, it will be a vindication of Madhva's interpretation of the Brh. Up. text—Brahma vā idam agre āsit tad ātmānam eva avet Aham Brahmāsmi iti—in terms of "Brahma api svasvarūpam nityāparokṣajñānena sarvadā jānātyeva. Ata eva sarvadā Paripūrṇam iti"

To revert to our main point, Vimuktātman, author of the *Iṣṭasiddhi* has also gone on record saying that it is needless to resort to secondary signification of the terms satyam jñānam anantam, ānanda in the definition of B. by interpreting them negatively as excluding their opposites *only*, in order to avoid the risk of their being rendered synonymous as applied to a differenceless entity of B. :

Abheda-avirodhād ānandaśabdasya aduḥkhatvam artha *iti cen na*. Amukhyārthatvāt. Nahi mukhye arthe sambhavati, amukhyārtho grāhyaḥ. Ānandaśabdasya mukhyārthatvepi anyanivṛtyarthatvopapatteḥ, na abhedavirodhitvam. Satyādiśabdavat, Tathā hi—Ātmaiva ānandaḥ. Brahmaānandaśabdānām ekārthatvāvagamāt (Text, p. 26–27, ed. by Dr. P. K. Sundaram, Madras, 1980).

But Vimuktātman does not elaborate *how* these three terms are to be applied to the unitary Brahman, allowing their full primary sense to each of them, without prejudice to B's being free from any internal distinctions, as established by the Dharmigrāhaka-pramāṇa of *Ekam eva*. The use of the term 'iha' in the Neha nānāsti text also makes it clear that the negation contemplated refers only to the distinction of these attributes of Brahman, *from itself* and not

their very existence in B. or B's distinction from *the external world*.

Dr. Sundaram too feels "Absence of pain is only a dark emptiness devoid of felicity of perfections. It suggests blankness and bankruptcy of being. The profound depth of existence is not conveyed by denial, but by affirmation, not by "*is not*" but by '*is*' (*op. cit.* pp. 6-7).

But the question which will have to be answered is What is *that* principle which bridges the gulf between the avowed oneness of B. (Ekadhaiva anudraṣṭavyam neha nānāsti kincana) and the admitted presence in B. of reality, transcendental consciousness and bliss infinite, each in its full primary sense (as *Iṣṭasiddhi* insists). Obviously, there must be a connecting link, within the essence of B's own being, which could accomplish this very happy consummation, without dividing these metaphysical attributes from B's being. It would be idle to talk of the undifferentiable unity of B. in and thro' its attributes of satyam, jñānam, ānanda etc predicated by the Upaniṣad, without recognising the existence of "a something"—*a principle of inner harmony*, which will *not* be *alien* to B's being and essence and would thus be able to rationalise the Śruti's reference to them, individually, as satyam. jñānam, ānanda, in non-synonymous terms (as if they are different from its essential being, while *at the same time* emphasising that it should be understood to be one without any breath of internal distinctions). *How is this paradox to be solved?* This elusive principle which is expected to accomplish so much thro' a simple process of *Arthāpatti* (See *NS* 105) *must* 'belong' to B. It cannot be ascribed to Māyā which is *not* Brahman and is outside it and alien to its nature. What is integral to B's essence namely ānanda cannot be fused with B. by any

of thought in

Nāyam ātmā pravacanena labhyo
na medhayā na bahunā śrutena
Yam evaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ
tasyaiṣa ātmā vivṛṇute tanūm svām

and the coming into existence of a pronouncedly Bhakti literature backed by the powerful theory of Avatārs of God in the early and later Purāṇic age like the Viṣṇu and Bhāgavata Purāṇas and above all the Bhagavad Gītā, styled as an '*Upaniṣad*' which propounded a new synthesis of Karma, Jñāna and Bhakti, redefining the concept of Sannyāsa and Nivṛtta Karma in terms of Niṣkāma Karma-yoga. The fervent prayer of the God-intoxicated Bhakta to be allowed to *behold* the most auspicious Form of the Lord *Yat te rūpam Kalyāṇatamam tat te paśyāmi* in the Īśāvāsya Up. comes right from the heart of the repentant spirit (yuyodhyasmad juhurāṇam enaḥ). It shows that the flame of Bhakti was always kept burning in the Upaniṣads.

—B. N. K. Sharma

1. EKAM EVA ADVITĪYAM
(Chān. Up. vi, 2, 1)

'Ekam eva advitīyam' is taken by many to spell out the doctrine of the 'one without the second', the sheet-anchor of Advaita philosophy, from which it takes its name. Vyāsatīrtha has therefore given it top priority in his examination of the Advaita Śrutis. Others discussed by him are Neha nānāsti, Yatra tvasya sarvam ātmaivābhūt, Natu tad dvitīyam asti, Vācārambhaṇam vikārah, Māyāmātram idam dvaitam, Aham brahma asmi, Indro māyābhiḥ, Yasmāt param na aparam asti, Ato anyad ārtam and Tat Tvam Asi.

After scrutinizing the admissibility of the Advaita interpretations of these disputed texts from the point of view of the illustrative examples given in them, if any, and on logical, contextual and grammatical grounds and finding them wanting in probative value, he offers his own alternative interpretations of these texts from the Dvaita point of view and tries to demonstrate their preferability. In his rejoinder to Vyāsatīrtha's findings, Madhusūdana Sarasvati has paid major attention *only* to Tat tvam asi and Aham brahma asmi and has *skipped* the review of Neha nānāsti, Vācārambhaṇam and others, giving cursory attention to Ekam eva advitīyam and two others from Bṛhadāraṇyaka and one or two from Muṇd. Up.

EKAM EVA ADVITĪYAM

The Brh. Up. text: Salila eko draṣṭā advaito bhavati (iv, 3, 32) is closely parallel to the Chāndogya text. Vyāsatīrtha therefore focuses attention on *both* at the outset. The former refers to the One Supreme Being, without a second, reposing in its own right in the vast expanse of

waters of the Universal Deluge, during Mahāpralaya, described in such solemn and inspiring accents in the famous Nāsadīya Sūkta of the Ṛg Veda (X, 129). The words of the Brh. Up. 'Salila eko draṣṭā advaitaḥ' has its striking parallel here in Salilam Sarvam ā idam, *ānid avātam svadhayā tad ekam* (X, 129, 2 bc). The reference to 'Salila' in Brh. Up. iv, 3, 2 is an unmistakable pointer to the context of Mahāpralaya, before the commencement of world creation, when the entire cosmos lay submerged in the waters of the Deluge, with Mūla-Prakṛti (Tamas) in its nucleal form and the One Lord of all creation, resting there, breathing windless by His own power (svadhayā) without an equal (anyat) or a superior (paraḥ).

This close parallelism between these two texts inclines us to construe the term 'salila' used in the Brh. Up. text in its locative sense rather than in the nominative without its profound overtones recalling the awesome grandeur of Mahāpralaya. The word 'agre' (in the beginning) occurring in the Chān. Up. text (vi, 2, 1) *Sad eva idamagra āsīt ekam eva advitīyam* is also a pointer to the period before Creation. This can be seen from the succeeding sentence referring to that Brahman (Sat) making up its mind to grow forth and generate 'Tad aikṣata bahu syām prajāyeya' and producing Tejas, Ap and Annam, the primal substances.

We shall be missing much of the solemnity and mystic wonder of Mahāpralaya and original creation thereafter by shutting our eyes to the depth of thought conveyed by the term 'salile' and seeing in it *nothing more than a poetic embellishment.* It will be no compliment to the Nirviśeṣa Brahman of Advaita to describe it as 'made transparent like water' *(salilavat svacchīkṛtaḥ)*, with the lurking

implication of the 'Cvi-pratyaya'. Be that as it may, there can be no two opinions on the point that the word 'agre' here refers to the period before Creation, the period of Mahāpralaya, when there was water, water everywhere with nobody to drink! A parallel passage from Ait. Up. '*Ātmā vā idam eka eva agra āsīt, nānyat kimcana miṣat* has been interpreted by Śankara himself as meaning 'before creation' (Sṛṣṭeḥ pūrvam) in a temporal sense. That same text again makes it clear that other beginningless entities (anādi) like Avidyā, Karma, Jīvas etc. tho' existing in a dormant state, were *not* '*active*' (vyāpāravat). All this adds up to the fact that certain other principles and entities like Tamas, Kāla, Karma, Jīvas existed in a state of suspended animation at the time of Mahāpralaya. They cannot therefore be said to have been absolutely non-existent in essence. All these facts, taken together, would make it clear that the description of Sad Brahman as One without a Second 'advitīyam' will have to be properly construed in the sense of being without an equal or a higher principle (then, as now). Neither *Ekam* eva nor *advitīyam* can therefore be construed in the sense that there was, or is, at any time, no principle or entity other than B. The context itself speaks for the existence of Time (then). It is also beyond doubt that the waters of Pralaya co-existed with Brahman. Creation in Vedanta is neither *de novo* nor *ex nihilo.* The eternal existence of Time, even in the state of Mahāpralaya is affirmed by the use of the term 'tadānīm' (then) in the very first line of the Nāsadīya Sūkta. It starts with a series of negations *Nāsad āsīn no sadāsīt tadānīm* but posits the existence of (1) the waters of the Deluge and (2) of Tamas (Mūla-Prakṛti) in its nucleal form (gūḍham). If the surface sense of words is all that

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is needed to get at the import of Scriptures of remote antiquity, the entire ancillary sciences of Mīmāmsā and Vyākaraṇa and collateral texts of the Epics and Purāṇas and constructive logic will have no *locus standi* as interpretive and exegetical aids.

Anya evaikadeśena śāstrasyārthaḥ pratīyate
Anyaśca paripūrṇena samastāngopasamhṛtau
(Kumārila)

The interpretation of Ekam eva advitīyam in terms of the Supreme Being having no equal or higher in status and authority has the clearest and warmest support from the Upaniṣads and the Purāṇas alike.

Na tatsamaścābhyadhikaśca dṛśyate (Śvet.Up. vi, 18)
Saptārdhagarbhā bhuvanasya reto Viṣṇostiṣṭhanti
pradiśā (ṚV. i, 164, 36)
Ekaś Śāstā na dvitīyosti Śāstā (Mbh. II, 51, 8)
Dravyam karma ca kālaśca svabhāvo Jīva eva ca
Yadanugrahatas *santi* na santi yadupekṣayā
(Bhāg. ii, 10, 12)

If downright negation of both being and nonbeing had been intended in the opening line of Nāsadīya Sūkta, it will contradict the affirmation of the existence of Time *(tadānīm)* in X, 129, 1 and above all of the One breathing windless by Itself (X, 129, 2 b). Indeed, the Supreme Being 'Tad ekam' cannot be dismissed as neither 'Sat' nor 'Asat', in the commonly accepted meanings of those terms. The Gīta too after making a categorical statement Na abhāvo vidyate sataḥ (ii, 16) cannot be expected to say of its Brahman: Na sat tan nāsad ucyate (xiii, 13). This must show that the words used in the Gīta (and the Ṛg Veda) have to be understood in a 'Pickwickian sense' as defined by Webster's New International Dictionary of

the English Language p. 1857 London, 1953). Madhva's identification of this sense of Sat and Asat as Mūrta and Amūrta on the authority of "tad etan mūrtam yad anyad Vāyośca antarikṣācca atha amūrtam Vāyuśca antarikṣaṁ ca (Brh.Up. ii, 3, 2–3) deserves attention.

Advaitasiddhi is not prepared to accept this good suggestion. It contends that these meanings of Sat and Asat are *not* widely accepted ones: *Nahi bhūte sadasacchabdau prasiddhau* kimtu pāramārthikatva-apāramārthikatvayor eva. Prasiddhaparatvasambhave aprasiddhaparatāyā ayuktatvāt (i, p, 179). According to Madhusūdana Sat and Asat are primarily understood in the sense of what is absolutely real and what is not so. He also insists that the temporal adverb 'tadānīm' in the first line must be disconnected from it and connected only with the second line with Rajas and Vyoma, because they are not *always non-existent* (na sadā anastitvam). But then, the temporal adverb is 'given' in and with the first line and has *a right* to remain there, without prejudice to its being connected with subsequent lines, if need be. Its shifting to the second line will *not* benefit the Advaita point of view in any way, as the context of the Hymn as a whole is a settled one of the Pre-Creation stage. If then, the Sad in the first line should refer to what is deemed to be Pāramārthika in the Advaita sense, the Negation of such a Sat in the opening line would tend to negate *even* the Advaita Brahman. That would conflict with the statement in the Verse 2 cd. that other than and beyond the one breathing windless by itself there was no other higher. The only way to avoid such an Apasiddhānta would be to construe the 'offending' word Sat in the first line in a sense other than its 'prasiddhārtha' (of the Advaita). The meaning suggested by

Madhva, *for the first time among Vedic commentators,* meets the situation admirably, preventing the conflict from arising at all. It would also enable the Supreme B. described as breathing windless by Itself to emerge as a self-evident truth, without being *obliged* to court the help of *some other Śrutis elsewhere* to come to its rescue and establish that it is *not also Anirvacanīya*, as Madhusūdana's devious way of dealing with Sat and Asat in the first line exposes him: 'Śrutyantara-avirodhāya Sad ekam Brahma sadā āsīt, na sadasadvilakṣaṇam ityartha-*paryavasānāt* (I, p, 179). This is indeed a case of *Śiroveṣṭa-prāṇāyāma.*

Justifying his stand that the temporal adverb *tadānīm* should be connected with Rajas and Vyoma in the second line: *rajoniṣedhādāveva tadanvayāt,* he explains that this is necessary because they are *not existent always*—Nahi Rajahprabhṛtīnām *sarvadā anastitvam.* If this means they are only impermanent and do not exist *always*, but only for some time, they cannot be dubbed as 'Mithyā', within the meaning of being the counterpositive of a negation in essence *(svarūpeṇa)* with reference to all the three periods of time, as A-Siddhi has defined Mithyātva (See Part I, p, 31). In that case, Madhusūdana will have to agree with Vyāsatīrtha's finding that the fundamental difference between Brahman and the world would only consist in B.'s unchanging existence *for all time* and the changeful and impermanent existence of the world in space and time and *not* in the real existence of B. (satyatva) and the imagined existence of the world: Brahma kālatrayepi Sat. Viyadādi ca kadācideva iti Nityatva-anityatvābhyām eva vaiṣamyam, Natu satyatva-*mithyātvābhyām* (Nym. p. 39, See Part I, Pref. xxii)

Where a Vedic text like Nāsad āsīn no Sadāsīt defies easy walk over, it would be wiser and safer to be guided by the help given by an authentic work of the same standing than to go by the beaten track of the layman's usage. There is an actual ruling on this point in the Mīmāmsā Śāstra: Śāstrasthā vā tannimittatvāt. It would be sheer obstinacy to reject the help of such a *respectable authority as the Brh. Up.* passage in this case. The Vedic injunction Ājyais stuvate provides an instance in point.

Some modern scholars are touchy about Dvaita philosophers appealing for corroboration of their distinctive interpretations of Śrutis to citations from the Epic and Purāṇas. But such a procedure has actually been *advised* in the canonical tradition, as may be seen even from Śankara's example in the Sūtrabhāṣya.

II

Coming to Ekam eva advitīyam, we find at the very outset that the words 'ekam eva' and 'advitīyam' are *sandwiched* between 'agre' (denoting a period of time) viz. before the beginning of Creation and 'īkṣaṇam' or B.'s taking a look and deciding to educe the world of name and form *(nāmarūpavyākaraṇa)*—acts which are absolutely incompatible with a *Nirviśeṣa-Brahman* without any attributes of its own, with nothing at all existing besides itself. As such, it cannot *take thought* or grow forth, become many and generate Tejas, Ap, Anna etc. as we are told (Chān. Up. vi, 2, 3). No act of willing, thinking, growing forth or educing name and form (trivṛtkaraṇa) is possible or thinkable in regard to this pure Being without a will or any attributes.

That apart, all schools of Vedānta are committed to the doctrine of intrinsic self-validity of Pramāṇas. Hence,

what is predicated by a Dualistic text must be entitled to the same right of self-validity in respect of its statements such as 'The wise self-existing Being created many things to last for eternal years (Īśa. 8). He brings to maturity whatever is fit to ripen (Śvet. V, 5). 'I make Prakṛti, and the world of the moving and the stationary' (Gīta x, 10) which speak of the reality of the created world. The existence of Matter in its unmanifested form (avyakta) during Pralaya, of time from time immemorial, the residual Karmas of Jīvas carried over from previous Kalpas for the embodiment of the Jīvas and the Jīvas themselves to be embodied according to their respective Karmas are all referred to (Kaṭha. ii, 2, 7; Brh. iv, 4, 2).

All these have to be accepted as *axiomatic truths.* Śankara himself in his Bhāṣya on B.S. i, 4, 3 is *obliged* to concede the existence of an unmanifested state of the universe (avyakta-avasthā) as dependent on B. because "it is necessary and meaningful to do so (*arthavatī hi sā*) as otherwise, the creative activity of B. cannot be explained and made intelligible. This unmanifested state or Prāgavasthā of the world is said to be the 'Śakti' (power) of B. called by various names as Māyā, Avyakta and so on, abiding in B. (Parameśvarāśrayā)". Hence, there is no possibility of doing away with this Avyakta or Bījaśakti as B.'s potential energy. It would thus break up its Nirviśeṣatva. If B. should really be Nirviśeṣa and without internal distinctions (svagatabheda) in the sense of 'Ekam' and *yet have this Bījaśakti abiding in it,* there must be an in-built mechanism in its being to accommodate such a nuance, which would in turn make it Sa-viśeṣa. There is no escaping this, *however one may try.*

If, however, it is argued that the Dualistic texts describing B. coexisting with Time and nucleal Avyakta, from which name and form are to be educed, to enable the Jīva to become embodied and the references to agre, īkṣaṇam and nāmarūpavyākarṇam are *somehow* to be construed in a Lākṣaṇika sense; or downgraded as Non-truth-declaring statements; or else dismissed as devoid of validity, because of their being opposed to the non-dualistic texts, there is nothing to prevent the Dualist philosopher from returning the compliment to his adversary. It has already been shown in Part I Chap. xvi that the Apacchedanyāya of the Pūrvamīmāmsā cannot be pressed into service to override the validity of the Dualistic texts. Even supposing that the 'offending' *agre* is overridden by applying the Apacchedanyāya, it cannot undo the reference to the acts of īkṣaṇam (seeing) by the One and educing name and form mentioned *subsequent* to the words *Ekam eva advitīyam* !

Nor can the reference to *agre* and the acts of seeing and educing name and form by the Sat be explained away as statements made by way of *recapitulation of what is already known* about it and therefore falling outside the scope of the main Tātparya of the statement 'Ekam eva advitīyam'. For, there is absolutely no possibility of these facts about Brahman's seeing and educing name and form from Avyakta *being already known* thro' other sources of information about B.'s exercising its will to educe name and form. *The Śrutis are the only source of authentic information* about B.'s doings. This rules out the possibility of the plea of recapitulation *(anuvāda).* The Dualistic texts have therefore to be recognised as originative and not merely recapitulative. This should make it clear that the supposedly

Monistic texts like Ekam eva advitīyam are caught between the tongs of the Dualistic statements 'agre' *before* and īkṣaṇam and nāmarūpavyākaraṇam *after*. They have therefore to be construed in such a way as would be in consonance with *their* spirit and intention. How this is possible and feasible will be clear from what follows in due course.

Advaitins themselves have explained 'Ekam eva advitīyam' as follows: All that is comprehended by the term 'this' (idam) viz. the world of the senses was one with B, the Sat, as an indivisible whole with it, before creation :

Yāvat kincid bhaved etad idamśabdoditam Jagat
Idam sarvam purā sṛṣṭer ekam eva advitīyakam |

" It was all one with Sat, existing as Sat, participating in its essence." Such a description cannot possibly mean that it was potentially non-existent '*as* Sat'. If it means it had no existence *apart from Brahman*, such a statement would be tantamount to a significant negation (*saviśeṣanīṣedha*). According to norms of Logic, a qualified injunction or a proscription is to be restricted in its application to the qualifying adjunct alone, when its extension to the substantive is barred by contradiction (Saviśeṣaṇe vidhiniṣedhau viśeṣaṇam, upasamkrāmataḥ). The proscription : " The Sacrificer who has taken his purificatory bath shall *not* be clad in torn or dirty garments" prohibits only the wearing of unclean and dirty clothes. It does not forbid him from wearing any clothes and going about naked instead ! Thus, the statement that the world during Pralaya had no existence *apart from B.* cannot possibly mean, that it did *not* exist at all. It can very well mean that it was dependent on B. even in its unmanifested state (in a less

cognisable form than afterwards) without prejudice to the fact that it is *always* dependent on B. for its being and becoming :

Idam hi Viśvam Bhagavān ivetaro yato jagatsthāna-nirodhasambhavāḥ (*Bhāg.* i, 5, 20).

The other meaning of the Advaita school that the world is superimposed on B. as the snake on the rope and as such has no existence *apart* from B. leads to many insurmountable difficulties in clarifying *the how of it* or who but B. itself can be the victim of the superimposition. Śankara himself gives up the attempt at explanation saying that creation itself is *not intended* to be seriously taught as a fact or an event which actually takes place.

Naceyam paramārthaviṣayā sṛṣṭiśrutiḥ. Avidyākalpita-nāmarūpavyavahāragocaratvāt ityetad api naiva vismartavyam (BSB ii, 1, 33)

Such is the short shrift given to Brahman's īkṣaṇam, growing forth and educing name and form described so solemnly in the Chān. Up. in Śankara's philosophy.

Be that as it may, according to Grammar and Lexicon, the authorised meanings of 'ekam' are many, such as otherness from something else, primacy of the given, its independence of initiative, number, being the same everywhere and so on, as can be verified from the quotes given by Vyāsatīrtha from the Mahābhāṣya, Kaiyaṭa and Amarakośa, with recorded examples from literature. These are meaningfully applicable to B. which by its nature and attributes is *other than* the Jīvas, has primacy over all, independence of initiative and remains the same in and thro' all its manifestations, avatārs and is the Inner controling principle (antaryāmi) everywhere.

Mamāntarātmā tava ca ye cānye dehasamsthitāḥ
(Mbh. xii, 361, 4)

Pratidṛśam iva naikadhārkam ekam samadhigatosmi
vidhūtabhedamohaḥ (*Bhāg*. 1, 9, 42)

The references following the description of B. as seeing and educing name and form out of Tejobanna to enable Jīvas to acquire suitable bodies, mind and organs to put forth necessary efforts for their betterment are sufficient to establish the reality of the actual differences that distinguish them from B. 'Ekam' thus bears testimony to B.'s uniqueness, lordship, uniformity of presence everywhere and is not opposed to the existence of any second *under its sway*.

III
ADVITĪYAM

Coming to the expression 'Advitīyam', the meaning of unreality (mithyātva) of the universe read into 'ekam eva' or 'advitīyam' cannot be accepted as the expressed sense of these terms, unlike the meanings of otherness, independence, being without an equal or superior, given to them in the Dualistic interpretation. At best they can be *extracted* from them as *derived* meanings, thro' circuitous ways. But Advaitins themselves have taken the stand that a derived sense (ārthikārtha) cannot be accepted as participating in the 'import' (tātparya) of the sentence as a whole, as we have already seen in respect of the role of Vyāvṛtti in Akhaṇḍārtha.

The authorised official interpretation of Ekam eva advitīyam is:

Vṛkṣasya svagato bhedaḥ patrapuṣpaphalādibhiḥ
Vṛkṣāntarāt sajātīyo vijātīyas śilādibhiḥ
Tathā Sadvastuno bhedatrayam prāptam niṣidhyate
Eka-avadhāraṇa-dvaitaniṣedhais tribhiḥ kramāt.

A tree is different from its branches, leaves, fruits and flowers. It is also distinguished from other trees of the same kind and from human beings, animals and stones, which belong to different categories. By ekam eva advitīyam all these three kinds of difference are negated of the One Sat (1) internal distinctions in the being of Sat by the term 'ekam' (2) difference from other thinking selves like Jīvas by the emphatic particle 'eva' (after ekam) and difference from all material things in the world (jaḍa) by the term 'advitīyam'.

But then, what can the 'internal distinctions' in the being of Brahman possibly be? They must of course be no other than its metaphysical attributes of satyam, jñānam, ānanda and others such as being Satyasankalpa, Satyakāma, Sarveśvara etc. spoken of in the Upaniṣads. The Śvet.Up. refers to the august attributes of power, knowledge and activity as its intrinsic attributes (*svābhāvikī*) which militates against their being brought about by 'Upādhis' (external media). Anyway, the negation of internal distinctions between substance and attributes (Dharma-dharmibheda) would amount to a significant negation only, as can be gathered from the use of the word 'iha' (here, *in B.*) in the famous text—Ekadhaiva anudraṣṭavyam Neha nānāsti kincana. (Br.Up. iv, 4, 20) and the collateral text from the Katha.—*Evam dharmān pṛthak paśyan tāneva anuvidhāvati* (ii, 2, 14) meaning one who looks upon these attributes (dharmān) as separate from B. goes down the precipice like rain water from a hill top. Even the arresting description of B. as 'nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvam' should tell us what B. is by itself and in itself and not

what it is *not*[1]. The trouble taken by Advaita to castrate Brahman of its vital essence of Satyam, jñānam, ānanda etc. by Akhaṇḍārtha surgery, is an unfortunate exercise in futility taking them to the brink of Apohavāda. Intellectual sophistry cannot go beyond Akhaṇḍārtha in suffocating Brahman with a number of negative attributes, without a single positive one to breathe. When one reads the thrilling sonorous definition of B. as Satyam, jñānam, anantam Brahma in Taitt. Up. with the assurance that the knower of such a B. reaches it, one hardly suspects that such a beautiful definition can be twisted beyond recognition into so many negatives and exclusions only. No wonder even a sincere Advaitin like Dr. P. K. Sundaram cries off the roundabout way of construing Satyam, jñānam . . . " as absence of existence, absence of ignorance and absence of pain and suffering" as dark emptiness, a blankness and a bankruptcy of being. The profound depth of existence is not conveyed by denial but by affirmation, not by 'is not' but by 'is'. A reality which is said to be real of the reals and 'Pūrṇa' cannot be an 'essenceless vacuum' (Ed. of *Iṣṭasiddhi* Tr. pp, 6–7).

The Dvaita school also subscribes warmly to the position that there cannot be any internal distinctions in the constitution of B. But its metaphysical attributes must be infinite. There can be no Infinite Brahman without them. But they do not and cannot divide B. from themselves or break up its unity of essence. 'Nahi svenaiva sva-vān' may be good empirical logic. But unlike in empirical

1. Yāvān aham yathābhāvo Yadrūpaguṇakarmakaḥ
Tathaiva tattvavijñānām astu te Madanugrahāt
(*Bhāg.* ii, 9, 31)
Yāvān yaścāsmi tattvataḥ (Gita 18, 55)

logic, the fulness and splendor of B.'s being has no analogy in empirical trifles. What is not possible elsewhere is possible in B. It has to be rationalised thro' its inscrutable powers (*acintyādbhutaśakti*) reflected in such descriptions of B. as Aṇor aṇiyān mahato mahīyān (Kaṭha. 1, 2, 20) Ātmani caivam vicitrāśca hi (B.S. ii, 1, 28). Śankara himself quotes from Mbh. :

Acintyāḥ khalu ye bhāvā na tāms tarkeṇa yojayet
Prakṛtibhyaḥ param yattu tad acintyasya vaibhavam ||
(ii, 2, 27)

Such statements in the Scriptures are not empty verbal platitudes. The most sublime description of B. is 'Pūrṇa'. Pūrṇatva is not an empty abstraction or an essenceless vacuum. There *must be* an in-built mechanism in the constitution of B. which permits the Śrutis speaking of its attributes as though they are distinct from it. It is a distinction of reference without involving a distinction of essence. If you want to stick a label on it, the Dvaita school has suggested an ideal name for it : 'Svarūpa-viśeṣas' of the thing in itself, self-explained and self-linking in its operation, without depending on another link to link it and that again with another, *ad infinitum*. It has been aptly and succinctly defined by Madhva, the first Indian Philosopher to postulate it as an ontological concept :

Bhedahīne tvaparyāyaśabdāntaraniyāmakaḥ
Viṣeṣo nāma kathitas so asti vastuṣvaśeṣataḥ[2]

2. For a detailed exposition of the concept of Viśeṣa and the wisdom of accepting it as a Sarvatantrasiddhānta, see my *Philosophy of Madhvācārya* Chap. VII (Motital Banarsidass 1986.)

Given that Brahman is only ONE in spite of its numberless attributes, we arive at Svarūpaviśeṣas by Śrauta-Arthāpatti. Neither is lost.

IV

The long and short of it is that as the Advaitin himself has interpreted the term 'eka' in the sense of negating only the internal distinctions in B., it should follow that it will *not* be competent to establish that the world is Mithyā, as the jaḍaprapañca cannot be an integral part of B. qualifying for inclusion as an intrinsic attribute *(svagata)* of B. The only other hope would lie with 'advitīyam'. This is a compound capable of being analysed into a Karmadhāraya (appositional) or a Bahuvrīhi. Tho' Advaita has construed it as a Bahuvrīhi, the Karmadhāraya construction is entitled to precedence by virtue of Samāsaprābalya. Vyāsatīrtha therefore concentrates on its incompetence to establish the Mithyātva of the world at some length. In the light of the points raised in that connection the substance of Bahuvrīhi construction involving absolute negation of every second entity besides B. stands automatically disposed of. Thus, irrespective of the way in which 'advitīyam' is split, the thesis of the unreality of the world is shown to be *ultra vires*.

A Karmadhāraya construction would carry the Advaitin nowhere. If the negative particle 'na' in A-dvitīyam is construed in a privative sense *(paryudāsa)* meaning 'non-second', it may establish that B. is either the first or the third, which is irrelevant to the world's mithyātva. If the negative (a-) is construed with a finite verb taken to be understood for purposes of syntactic connection (anvaya) in terms of a Prasajya-pratiṣedha (na vidyate vijātīyam yasya tat), we will be left with two separate propositions

on our hands, out of a single sentence (Ekam eva advitīyam) (1) that B. is One only and (2) there is no second entity in existence (dvitīyam nāsti). That would involve the defect of splitting a single proposition into two, which is forbidden, when it is possible to construe it as one: *Sambhavatyekavākyatve vākyabhedo na yujyate.*

However, in the absolute negation of the existence of any second, the absence of such a second to B. will have to be postulated as the purport of the proposition. Absence of a second to B. as a fact would itself pose a 'second' to B. and falsify the first proposition that B. is without a second. Statements of the Śruti are as a rule self-valid. It would deprive Ekam eva advitīyam of its self-validity, if it should readmit the reality of absence of *any second.* Here, the A-Siddhi explains that the validity of the knowledge of the absence of a second (dvitīyābhāva) is not contemplated as participating in the import of the main proposition (tātparya), tho' its presentation as the secondary purport (avāntaratātparya) may be reconciled *somehow* (yathā kathamcit). This does not go beyond the mere play of words. A-Siddhi's contention that dvitīyābhāva, if admitted to be real *(tāttvika)*, can be taken to be non-different from Brahman *(tāttvikatve Brahma-anatirekāt)* is equally futile; for B's nature is un-conditioned *(nirupādhika)* while absence of a second or secondlessness (dvitīyābhāva) by its very nature is conditioned and cannot be the same as the Śuddha-Brahman.

'Sad eva somya idamagra āsit' has its parallel in Ait. Up. i, 1 *Ātmā vā idamagre āsit. Nānyat kincana miṣat.* In the beginning, Ātman alone existed. Nothing else whatever *winked*, was active. *(vyāpāravat)* as rendered by S. This qualified negation in a parallel text makes it necessary

to restrict the negation of any second in the Chān. Up. text to negation of any sign of activity on the part of things which existed in Pralaya, such as Avyakta, the Jīvas and their Karmas, instead of an unqualified and absolute negation of everything second (dvitīyamātra-abhāva). Otherwise, the use of the term 'agre' would be not only superfluous but contradictory. If the negation is to be construed in terms of a Prāgabhāva (anterior non-existence), the existence of such a Prāgabhāva of Anādi-Avidyā, Anādi-Jīvas and their past Karmas even in the state of Pralaya would create a deadlock. Śankara himself in his B.S.B. ii, 1, 35, admitting the anāditva of Samsāra admits the nucleal existence of Karma prior to creation: *Anādau Samsāre bijānkurvad hetuhetumadbhāvena Karmaṇaḥ Sargavaiṣamyasya ca pravṛttir na virudhyate.* The Mādhavīya Bhāṣya on RV. X, 129, 4 *Kāmas tadagre samavartata manaso retaḥ prathamam yad āsīt* reads: Pūrvakalpārjitam yat Karma tadapyāsīt. Agre Sṛṣṭyavasthāyāḥ pūrvam Parameśvarasya manasi kāmas samavartata sisṛkṣā ajāyata. Manasas sārabhūtam praṇibhir manasā kriyamāṇam prathamam Pūrvakalpapārjitam Karma yat tadapyāsit, Evam svechayā anādi Karmavaśāt sato satyabhūtasya Prapañcasya bandhum nirmātāram Sarveśvaram Yogino ajānan.

This puts the lid on it that Jīvas, their previous Karmas and Kāla exist in Pralaya, under the ken of the Supreme Power, according to the authoritative Vedic tradition. The famous utterance 'Dhātā yathāpūrvam akalpayat' (R.V. X 190. 3) confirms this.

As for 'advitīyam', we have the authority of the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patanjali to construe 'dvitīya' (second) in the sense of an accessory (sāhāya). Patanjali quotes from an ancient Kāvya (now lost) 'He followed the Pāṇḍava

brother with his sword for a second' (asidvitīyaḥ). As the existence of these accessories in Creation such as Kāla, Karma, Jīvas and their powers to function are all dependent on the eternal will of the Lord, His independence is not compromised in any way by His making use of them.[1] This is implicit in the text of the Bhāgavata ii, 10, 12 cited earlier. It is in this sense the Supreme is said to be capable of doing, not doing or doing otherwise, as it pleaseth Him. We have to abide by these facts in interpreting 'advitīyam' as acting without depending in principle on the accessories as a matter of necessity:

Viṣayāviṣayau jñātva tathotsargāpavādayoḥ
Bādhābādhau vivektavyau na tu sāmānyadarśanāt
(Kumārila)

That apart, it is proper to concede that the term 'dvitīya' is best understood to denote another of the same class as the 'given one' (prakṛtasamāna). This principle has been enunciated in the *Mahābhāṣya* "When we say we should get a 'second' to this cow, we go in for another cow and not for a horse or an ass!" This principle of interpretation has been warmly upheld by Śankara himself in his c. on the Guhādhikaraṇa (B.S. i, 2, 11), quoting the Mahābhāṣya. The Dualist philosopher is therefore in honorable company in following this principle and rejecting the interpretation of 'dvitīya' in 'advitīyam' used in the Chān. Up. as negating everything else but Brahman *(dvitīyamātraniṣedha)*. From the Advaita point of view, if everything coming under the category of a second (other than B.) were to be negated by the term advitīyam, such a negation would necessarily extend to everything else but

1. Sahakāribhir ārambhe na svātantryam vihanyate
Tatsadbhāvapravṛtyośca svādhīnatvavyavasthiteḥ ||

Brahman, automatically, at one sweep. So much so that there will be no need at all to employ separate words like 'eka' and 'eva' to rule out (i) difference from others of the same or (ii) from a different class. We can thus reduce the proposition to a single term 'advitīyam' as being self-sufficient and dispense with the preceding 'Ekam eva'. If, in order to avoid surplusage, the term 'dvitīya' is restricted to refer to entities of a different category only (vijātīya) that would still be in conflict with the use of the term 'agre' referring to Time, so much so that ultimately the expression 'dvitīya' will have to be restricted to convey absence of any equal to or higher than B. Such an interpretation will also have the warm support of other Śruti and Smṛti texts like Śvet. Up. vi, 8 and Gīta xi, 43 cited earlier.

Finally, Vyāsatīrtha quotes from Yāmuna's *Siddhitraya* a piquant summing up of his refutation of the Advaita interpretation of Ekam eva advitīyam after his debate with an Advaita adversary in the court of Chola King Parāntaka :

Yathā Colanṛpas samrāḍ Advitīyo'sti bhūtale
Iti tattulyanṛpatinivāraṇaparam vacaḥ
Natu tat-putratadbhṛtyakalatrādinivārakam

When it is said our Chola Emperor is One without a second, in the world, it only rules out the existence of any other ruler equal to him, but not the existence of his son, his staff or his Queen !

Putting the essentials of the Dvaita interpretation of the text in a nutshell, Vyāsatīrtha writes "B. is described as Ekam eva" in that It has no Peer or Superior. The relation between B. and Its countless attributes is one of Saviśeṣābheda. The emphatic particle 'eva' rules out both absolute difference between them advocated by

thinkers like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and difference-cum-identity (bhedābheda) between them advocated by some other thinkers. If, however, Sajātīya-vijātīya and Svagata bheda as such are to be ruled out, by the three terms vijātīyabheda will come under the category of the Superior (adhika), Sajātīya under the equal (Sama) and Svagata-bheda under 'eva'.

2. NEHA NĀNĀSTI KIÑCANA

(Kaṭha. Up. ii, 1, 10)

Advaita holds that 'Iha nānā kiñcana nāsti' negates the very existence of the objective world of name and form (*nānākiñcanaśabditaviśiṣṭaprapañcamātraniṣedha*), in the same locus of its experience (*iha*) viz. Brahman, the substrate of its superimposition.

It will be seen that this interpretation of the Kaṭha text coincides with that of the last part of 'Ekam eva...' on the issue of the ontological status of this very absence of a second and is detrimental to the interest of Monism, irrespective of whether the said absence of a second is treated as real or is also taken to be negated likewise. (See Part I, Chap. XIX).

Vyāsatīrtha points out that the term 'Nānā' can as well convey the abstract sense of 'difference' with special reference to internal distinctions between B. and its metaphysical attributes of satyam, jñānam, ānanda etc. The use of the substantive form of the word in its abstract sense (bhāvapradhāno nirdeśaḥ) is common enough in Sanskrit literary idiom and has its precedents in Pāṇini's grammar 'Dvaikayor dvivacanaikavacane' (i, 4, 22). The word Muktopasṛpya is used in B.S. i, 3, 2, for 'Muktopasṛpyatva' (not to speak of the use of *bhoktrāpatti* in the sense of bhoktṛtvapatti in ii, 1, 13 (according to S) and 'nānā' for 'Nānātva in S.BSB. on ii, 3, 43 again). The absence of the abstract suffix (tva-pratyaya) is not an insuperable difficulty in opting for a different interpretation, if the other one is found to be unsustainable, as in the present case, as we shall be seeing.

The Dvaita school therefore takes 'nānā' here in its abstract sense of *nānātva* which means difference or distinction. It explains that in Brahman (*iha*) there is no internal distinction of substance and attributes of satya, jñāna, ānanda etc. mentioned in the definition of B. We have seen earlier the Advaita school *also* accepts that there is no internal distinction in B. on account of the predication of these attributes. The only difference is that the Advaita chooses to *read this idea into* the expression 'Ekam' itself in Ekam eva advitīyam, while the Dvaita school finds the idea emphasised by the particle 'eva'. However, both are agreed that there are no internal distinctions in B.'s being.

But the expression 'internal distinctions' pertaining to B. can only refer to distinctions due to the presence of non-synonymous attributes like jñāna, ānanda, satyatva, in its being. The absence of such distinctions despite the *presence of these attributes* must be gracefully accepted, in deference to the Śrutis. There can be no other internal distinction within the Being of B. save those which may be taken to be caused by these attributes. Even the Advaita school cannot think of bringing the conscious selves within the scope of 'internal distinctions' in B. For B.'s non-difference from jīvas as conscious selves has already been established by the Advaita interpretation of 'Eva' in terms of sajātīyabheda-abhāva, while absence of difference from jaḍas has been established by the term advitīyam.

In the circumstances, there is no alternative to accepting that Svagatabheda 'internal distinctions' can only stand for distinctions caused by the attributes. The Jīvātmans are not on a par with ānanda and other attributes of B. as modes or Viśeṣaṇas, as they are for Rāmānuja. The

problem is *not* about the presence or the reality of these attributes of satyam, jñānam etc. but of *how* they are present (santi dharmāḥ) as Padmapāda puts it, without breaking up the essence of B. As the Śruti speaks of B. as the wonder of wonders (B.S. ii, 1, 29) Āścaryavat paśyati (Gita ii, 29) and Śvet. Up. vi, 8, we can only ascribe it to the inscrutable powers of B. its Acintyādbhutaśakti. Obviously, a Nirviśeṣa Brahman cannot afford to possess such powers. That is *its problem, not ours*.

The Dvaita interpretation of Neha nānāsti therefore, seems to be the more natural and reasonable one. Śankara himself says " we can only abide by what the Scriptures say, we cannot question them ". But then, if Advaita accepts the existence of jñāna, ānanda in B., irrespective of their being 'attributes' or the essence of B., its 'Brahman' cannot still be regarded as Nirviśeṣa. One thing is however certain. Since Satyam jñānam ānanda are, by all accounts, 'non-empirical', they cannot be swept away from B. as 'conjured up by empirical thought' and postulated of B. as some are prone to suggest.

Vyāsatīrtha points out that the Grammarian Kaiyaṭa states that *nānā* has the direct sense of *pṛthaktva* (separateness or difference). This supports the position that jñāna, ānanda, etc. are 'given' as existing in B. and cannot be ontologically separated from its being.

We read in (Kaṭha ii, i, 10): The same B. which exists in *this* world exists in the *other* world also. One who sees (makes) the slightest distinction between them goes from death to death. This censure must naturally have B. for its referrent and the counterpositive of the difference censured *(Svagata-svapratiyogikabheda)*. In other words, the reference must be to the absence of any difference *in B.*

caused by its difference of location *(sthānabheda)* falling under the category of internal difference. The reader may find an entire adhikaraṇa devoted to this topic in Madhva's B.S.B. in Na sthānatopi (iii, 2, 11), vide my *BSPC* Vol. III, pp. 88–93.

It cannot be contended that there is really no need to raise the question of internal distinctions in B. due to its attributes, as there are no plausible grounds in support of it. *It is not so.* Our cosmic system is not the only one in existence. There are several like it, as Scientists have established. As the efficient cause of the origination, sustenance and regulation of so many worlds and cosmic systems, on the analogy of colossal projects calling for collaboration of many to establish and to monitor them, immature minds may be toying with the idea of *several Creators*. The Śrutis too here and there speak of manifold forms of B. *as if* they are different from one another; Anyontara ātmā manomayaḥ, Prāṇamayaḥ etc. *(Taitt.Up.* II, 2). Some thinkers hold that substance and its attributes are different and this may be extended to the attributes of Brahman as they have been referred to in non-synonymous terms. If they are all of one essence how have they managed to avoid getting lost into one another? These are legitimate questions and a solution is expected from the Śrutis.

If the absence of internal distinctions is to be arrived at only on the basis of perception and not on logical or other grounds, Advaita will have no justification to go in for Akhaṇḍārtha of texts defining B.,—as neither B. nor its attributes are open to human perception. Advaitins themselves have put forward syllogisms such as—Consciousness is undifferenced, because it is Consciousness and its diversifications are not manifested except by the intervention of

intercepting media *Anubhūtir na nānā anubhūtitvāt Upādhibhedam antareṇa avibhāvyamānabhedatvād)*.

Every act of negation presupposes existence of a basic difference between the subject of negation (uddeśya) and the predicate (vidheya). There must be a similar difference between the negation and the substrate (B) not to speak of the difference between the negation and the negated: Negation as pure and simple without reference to relata is inconceivable.

Difference is writ large on the statements of the Kaṭha texts preceding and following the disputed text: "What is here is the same as there and what is there is the same as here and whoever makes a difference goes to death." The text which *precedes* this is "Whence the Sun rises and where it goes to rest, in Him all the gods are rooted. None can go beyond Him." (ii, 1, 9). What *follows* is "The Supreme Person of the size of the thumb is stationed in the Centre of the Self. In Him all the gods rest. He is Lord of the past and the future" (ii, 1, 12). Hedged in between texts bespeaking the existence of differences is the Bṛh. Up. text: Neha nānāsti kiñcana (iv, 4, 19) preceded by "In Him the five principles and Ākāśa are rooted. He is the life of Prāṇa, the light of the eye, ear of the ear, mind of the mind" (iv, 4,17-18), *followed* by "In the space within the heart is the Controller of all, Lord of all, ruler of all. He is the bridge that keeps the worlds apart, from colliding" (iv, 4, 22). The Nehanānāsti text sandwiched between such pronouncements can never bear the interpretation put on it that all the worlds, heaven and earth, the Sun and the starry heavens above so solemnly referred to in these passages are all of them negated as non-existent (mithyā).

As a matter of fact, the words *nānā* and *vinā* which are synonymous, are grammatically derived from the Sūtra Vinañbhyām nānāñau na saha (Paṇ. V, 2, 7). Vinā is derived from vi-nā and nānā from nañ-nāñ, both in the sense of *not* existing together or jointly (that is to say existing separately or independently of one another). They signify 'pṛthagbhāva' separateness or difference, as the Mahābhāṣya and Kāśikā explain the terms. Accordingly, when the Kaṭha or the Bṛh. Up. text says "*Iha* nānā nāsti", even supposing the reference is to the world of name and form (as the Advaita interpretation would have it), the purport of the proposition would be that the world does not exist *separately from or independently of* B. but always under its control, guidance and energisation, as dinned into our ears by any number of Śrutis and Smṛtis. Similar statements can be found using the words *vinā* or *nānā* elsewhere:

Nānā Viṣṇum mokṣado nāsti (q. in c. on Amarakośa)

'Na tad asti vinā yat syān mayā bhūtam carācaram'

(Gita X, 39)

Even if 'nānā' is construed in its substantive sense of what is different (nānābhūtam) it can only refer to B.'s attributes of jñāna, ānanda, etc. by virtue of juxtaposition with the pronominal 'kimcana'. The latter would naturally refer back to other similar concurrent details pertaining to the subject of the proposition (B) as in the case of the ruling in regard to the pounding of the grains *(vrīhīn avahanti)* where the grains to be pounded are confined to the four handfuls already consecrated and not to those in the store room. In less technical terms, the statement "Here, in Brahman there does not exist any difference—" (Kaṭha ii, 1, 11) has been clarified as pertaining to its attributes in ii, 1, 14 which reads: "Evam dharmān pṛthak paśyan

tān evānuvidhāvati". We have seen that the term 'dharma' is not used in the Upaniṣads in its Buddhistic sense but only in the sense of 'attributes' (See Bṛh.Up. iv, 5, 14). The terms of reference clearly show that the negation of attributes is only a significant negation of their separate existence from B. and not their absolute one. A negation or a contradiction is also subject to restriction, in part, of its scope, where such partial restriction would suffice to meet the requirements of the data :

Ekadeśāpavādena kalpyamāne ca bādhake
Na sarvabādhanam yuktam iti nyāyavidas sthitāḥ

The proposition—B's attributes do *not* exist *apart* from or separately from its being has necessarily to mean that they *do exist inseparably from B.* constituting its essence. Denial of separate existence does not entail their non-existence. The statement—Smoke does not exist without fire—does not make smoke non-existent *(mithyā)*.

The use of the particle 'iva' in 'nānā iva' (paśyati) is to include within the scope of the censure the kindred position that the attributes may be regarded as partly different and partly identical *(bheda-abheda)* with B. It cannot possibly mean that one who sees the world of name and form 'as if' it were different from B. goes to damnation. By implication, it would mean that the world is really different from B. and the one who misses it and looks upon it to be 'as if different' is ill-informed! Such an interpretation is likely to recoil on the Advaita position.

3. YATRA TVASYA SARVAM ĀTMAIVA ABHŪT

(Bṛh. Up. ii, 4, 14)

This discourse of Yājñavalkya, the famous Upaniṣadic philosopher, to his enlightened wife Maitreyi occurs in two allied versions in Bṛh.Up. ii, 4 and v, 5 with similar setting and expository material, with one very important variation. Both maintain the same sustained eloquence and rhetorical effect.

Yājñavalkya prefaces his discourse emphasising that earthly life, possessions and attachments should be attuned to knowledge of B. as the source of all being and becoming and benefactions of the world of matter and souls, here and in the hereafter. The fulfilment of human life and aspirations is the attainment of immortality. Its nature is vividly portrayed. No commentator or modern scholar has explained how or why two parallel versions of the same discourse have found their way into the text of the Bṛh.Up.

In both the versions we come across Yājñvalkya's declaration that there is no individual consciousness left after one's final death *(pretya)*. Such a disastrous prospect, which reminds us of the icy nature of Buddhistic Nirvāṇa, unnerves Maitreyi, who asks for a clarification

Sensing her genuine apprehensions about the nature of the goal spelt out by him, so tersely and yet so enigmatically, Yājñavalkya proceeds to allay her apprehensions and comes out with an argumentative clarification of what he was driving at. His clarification is couched in the form of an unmistakable *reductio ad absurdum.* "Where there is anything like a duality, then (and then only) can one see another, know another, smell or taste another and so on. Where, on the other hand, the self is all that there is,

by what and whom can it see, know or smell another? By what should it know that one by which it knows all this? Nay, by what should it know the knower himself?"

The crux of the problem here is: Is this declaration "Na pretya samjñā asti" and its clarification in three parts intended to affirm that Immortality is a state of the sole existence of only one single pure undifferenced subject-objectless 'Consciousness', which is or can be nobody's in particular (as there is no duality of beings left any more there) and the logical corollary that would follow that in the last analysis there is no scope or possibility of any knowledge of any other being or entity outside this subject-objectless experience and last that this self cannot also know or be aware of its own existence or being,—(as the 'Advaita' interpretation would have us believe); or whether there is *any possibility* of a different interpretation in which the freed souls can rest assured of *not* being deprived of their self-awareness and experience of their own blissful nature and fellowship with other blessed ones and communion with the Supreme Being, which will do justice to human aspirations and statements favoring such a conclusion in the Śrutis themselves.

The Dvaita school draws quite a different conclusion from the Advaitic position from the clarification given by Yājñavalkya by construing his declaration in three parts—not as embodying a leading question tending to confirm *the loss of individual consciousness and other-consciousness* and fellowship, as a statement of facts (vastusthitikathanam) as understood by Śankara but as embodying a *reductio ad absurdum* designed to *expose the untenability of three contrary philosophical positions* on the subject of the state of immortality and liberation, which later crystallised themselves in

the body-politic of Indian philosophy, as Buddhistic Nihilism Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Māyāvāda Advaita.

The substance of the Dvaita interpretation is this—The Jīvātmans freed from their cycle of births and deaths, leaving behind all dross and impurities of Karma and ignorance of their true nature and of their true relation to the Supreme Being, emerge in their pristine purity (svena rūpeṇa) with complete self-awareness (as self-luminous beings) and experience the bliss of their self-hood (svarūpānanda) now fully manifested by the grace of the Supreme Brahman. They have ample opportunities there for fellowship with other freed souls, communion with the Supreme Being and for such trans-empirical diversions as they choose to have, by way of self-expression.

The Rāmānuja school also has sufficient scope for the released souls to render service to the Supreme, spontaneously and for fellowship with other blessed ones. But somehow, Rāmānuja has *not* taken note of these aspects of his philosophy *in this context*, probably because he had *not* written any commentary on the Upaniṣad as a whole. He seems however to identify the Vijñātā referred to by Yājñavalkya with the Supreme Being which makes it identical with the 'Yena' in the second question of Yājñavalkya. His explanation of "Vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt" that the Jīva cannot know the Supreme Being *without Upāsanā*, is out of context, as it is relevant only to the state of bondage, which has been left behind. Tho' Cit and Acit in Rāmānuja's system are inseperable adjuncts of B., he also speaks of B. as being quite *distinct in essence* from both (Svetara-samasta-vilakṣaṇa) which would be incompatible with the negation of any second apart from B. *in principle*, under the terms of *Yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati*. The question

of the *independent existence of Cit and Acit* has nothing to do with their *existence* as such.

Divergence of philosophical outlook among speculative systems of philosophy usually rest on ideological predilections which are mostly subjective. They have to be thrashed out on their logical merits and metaphysical satisfyingness. Vedantic thought is however irretrievably bound by its *textual tradition.* Its speculations, by and large, are guided, if not totally governed, by written texts which have come down as binding authorities. In discussing the admissibility or otherwise, of the interpretations of these texts relied upon by the Advaita school (regarded as Tattvāvedaka and which are the subjects of dispute between the Dvaita and the Advaita schools (and not the 'Dvaita texts' about whose expressed sense and tenor the Advaita school has no quarrel,—as they are *not an issue)*, we have therefore to be guided primarily by the requirements and compulsions of exegetical rules and principles. It *will not do* to forget this basic criterion in assessing the acceptability of either of these interpretations and *intrude* extra-exegetical considerations of which of them is more philosophical or less than the other, about which opinions may conceivably vary. This aspect of the matter is, more often than not, *forgotten by modern scholars* both Indian and foreign, who have tried to probe the Upaniṣadic heritage.

II

Śaṅkara himself admits that the Yājñavalkya Kāṇḍa of the Bṛh. Up. is 'Tarka-pradhāna'. Evidently, this means much more than that "logical arguments are advanced to support Scriptural texts" (Radhakrishnan, *Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 28). In logical parlance 'Tarka' stands for a

particular method of argumentation known as *reductio ad absurdum* or Prasanga (aniṣṭaprasanjanam) by which the proof of the falsity of a principle is given by producing a logical consequence of it which is absurd or is opposed to all established Pramāṇas. It is a potent accessory in testing the correctness of one's hypotheses or assumptions.

Śaṅkara assumes that Maitreyi's bewilderment which makes her ask for a clarification of her husband's downright assertion 'Na pretya samjñā asti' arises from the contradiction she sees between Yājñavalkya's earlier description of Ātman as a mass of consciousness (prajñānaghana) inside and out and his subsequent statement that there is no consciousness left after release (na pretya samjñā asti). And this patent contradiction is removed, says Śaṅkara, by pointing out to her that his earlier statement comparing the self who is Prajñānaghana to a lump of salt saturated with saltishness inside and outside is true of it *on this side of Samsāra*, while at the time of release, when empirical consciousness is liquidated, like a lump of salt thrown into the water, there is no more individual consciousness which naturally nullifies all possibility of all sorts of empirical activity of knowing, tasting, enjoying anything external, in a state of undifferenced subject-objectless consciousness which is release, where there is no other being or entity to be known, felt or enjoyed; nor any question of knowing the knower or a supreme Being who is no other than the self.

But the misfit of the explanation is that there is no basis at all in the text of the Upaniṣad for S's assumption that Maitreyi's trouble was due to the conflict she found between the earlier and the later statements of her husband. For, in that case, we should naturally expect her to pin him down, by quoting and confronting him with *his two statements*

in question and demand an explanation. But she does nothing of the kind. Instead, she quotes and pinpoints *only* his second statement about the cessation of consciousness in release, with an unmistakable *quote mark* 'iti' and an 'atraiva' (only here) to make her point double sure: "*Atraiva* mā mohāntam āpipat na pretya samjñā asti iti". This rules out the possibility of S's assumption that the contradiction she felt was on account of the conflicting attributes *(viruddhadharma)* pertaining to the self as fancied by her. *Here lies the gravamen of her complaint* as pointed out by Madhva in his characteristically laconic way in his VTN, whose significance has been brought out by Jayatīrtha: Tathā sati Atraiva mā bhagavān mohāntam āpipat 'Vijñānaghana iti, Na pretya samjñā asti *iti ca vākyadvayopādānaprasangāt*. Vyāghātasya ubhayāśritatvāt. Ekasyaiva tu vākyasya upādānāt tadviṣaya eva doṣodbhāvanam iti jñāyate. Na ca anyo abhiprāyo dṛśyata iti uktābhiprāya eva idam' (VTN–ṭīka)

It is a wonder so patent a gap in S's argument has not been realised by any of the modern scholars who have written on the subject. Anyway, this clinches the issue that it is *not* the contradiction between the earlier and the subsequent statements of her husband that upset Maitreyi's equanimity, but something inherent in the icy nature of the goal held out by him which, if true, would reduce the self to an essenceless vacuum and empty the goal of immortality on which he himself had waxed so eloquent in his preamble, of its most cherished value axiologically of being the highest Puruṣārtha: Tad *etat preyaḥ putrād preyas sarvasmād antarataram yad ayam ātmā* (Brh.Up. 1, 4, 8). Ātmānastu kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati.

Yājñavalkya himself could hardly have been so dense as *not* to understand the reason for Maitreyi's consternation. Internal evidence also shows that Yājñavalkya firmly believed that there is absolutely no cessation of the inherent powers of the seeing of the Seer, the hearing of the Hearer, the thinking of the Thinker, as he himself comes out with a series of such statements as above (Brh.Up. iv, 3, 23–30) about the indestructible nature of Ātman's powers of cognition of various kinds which are all part of his essential nature. Nay, even in his clarification of the released state he does not mince matters. He asserts with all the force at his command: Verily, this Ātman is imperishable (which incidentally shows he had understood that it was one of the grounds of her apprehensions) and *his attributes also cannot be plucked out (anucchitti-dharmā)*. Such an emphatic declaration coming from Yājñavalkya in the allied version in Brh.Up. iv, 5, 14 can hardly be taken to come from the lips of a philosopher who held a Nihilistic view of the released state or one in which the self itself ceases to exist or *is deprived* of its intrinsic attributes of knowledge, bliss etc. As for the existence of a Supreme Being, in the released state, the answer is contained in the very terms of the question put by Yājñavalkya: *Yena idam sarvam vijānāti tam kena vijānīyāt?*

In view of these serious difficulties involved in accepting the Advaita interpretations of the answers to the three questions asked by Yājñavalkya, by way of clarification of his own words, the only alternative left is to treat his posers as a logical *tour de force*, in keeping with his flair for dialectics, to enable the truth to emerge of its own accord, by means of a deft *reductio ad absurdum* to enable level-headed persons to take a balanced view of the true nature of the goal of Man's immortality.

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III

Vyāsatīrtha's review of the two allied versions treats them as a co-ordinated whole with necessary mutual exchange and adjustment of additions and omissions (Samānārthakasarvamantrodāharaṇam. Yatra yāvān amśo nāsti tāvān upasamharaṇīyaḥ—Tg.)

The substance of the discourse according to the Dvaita interpretation is: Just as a lump of salt saturated with saltishness inside and out, cast into the sea finds lodgement there (after getting rid of its solidity and admixtures) in the great receptacle of the waters already there in the Sea, even so, the released souls which are all of them the essence of knowledge and bliss, inside and out, rest in the illimitable fathomless (anantam, apāram) Brahman. Here in view of the earlier statement in the Upaniṣad (ii, 4, 11) 'Samudra' in this context is to be understood as the sole receptacle and resting place of all waters. And as waters themselves cannot be the resting place of waters, it would be proper to construe the term 'Samudra' here, in the sense of the great cavity or receptacle of the waters of the Sea, rather than as the collection of the water as such. On the same analogy, the Supreme being is to be understood as the final resting place *(ekāyana)* of all the released souls, past and present. The waters of the rivers, while they mingle with those already there in the Sea, find their resting place in the same receptacle. Even so, the released souls join those already released and resting, in the Supreme (cf. *Āṇim na rathyam* amṛtā adhitasthuḥ (ṚV i, 35, 6c), B.S. (1, 3, 2) and Gita (xiv, 2) There is no question of their *becoming identical* with the others or with the Supreme Being which provides them their resting place.

After defining the correct position of what happens to the released souls in Mokṣa, in this way, Yājñavalkya turns to clarify what exactly he means by his brief statement "Na pretya samjña asti", by disabusing the impression which his words had created in the mind of his wife that he was advocating a position akin to Buddhist Śūnyavāda, in which the 'self' of Skandhas becomes extinct. He also takes the opportunity to dispose of two other philosophical theories, which, while claiming to believe in the continued existence of the self in release, either reduce it virtually to the position of an insentient like a stick or a stone, by divesting it of all special properties (viśeṣaguṇoccheda); or else to a bare undifferenced state of subject-objectless consciousness, without any second in existence and without any intrinsic attributes of its own and which besides is neither aware of its own existence or blissfulness nor of any other being (none of which also exists).

The later version of Brh. Up. iv, 5 carries a more pointed rejection of the first and the second views of the released state, than the first in ii, 4. It is in iv, 5 we come across the first *categorical affirmation of Yājñavalkya* that the Ātman *survives in release* and does *not* cease to exist or become extinct. "Verily, the self is imperishable *(avināsi* ayam ātmā)." This is followed by another *equally categorical affirmation* that his attributes too are *equally imperishable,* indestructible: *anucchitti-dharmā.* These two statements of Yājñavalkya enable us to understand his earlier seemingly disconcerting pronouncement "Na pretya samjña asti" in a more accommodative and reassuring sense that there will be no room for empirical knowledge in the state of release, without affecting the full manifestation of the self's svarūpa jñāna (intrinsic knowledge) of its own being and attributes

of bliss etc. which are part of its being. The Dvaita school also understands Yājñavalkya's statement "Na pretya samjñā asti" only in this sense that there is no possibility of 'Vṛtti-jñāna' engendered by physical mind (antaḥkaraṇa), body and sense organs there. This point has been clearly brought out in Rāghavendratīrtha's gloss on VTN-ṭīkā :

> Pretya ityasya Muktasya iti. Samjñā ityasya artho Vṛttijñānam iti (*Bhāvadīpa* p. 76).

Here, Śaṅkara speaks of the loss of two kinds of Viśeṣa-vijñāna in the released state, one pertaining to Avidyā-viṣaya and another Viśeṣavijñāna pertaining to Vidyāviṣaya, after release (B.S.B. i, 4, 22). The latter evidently refers to the impossibility, in his view, of knowing anything, as the Ātman is all that exists and he cannot know himself, being of the nature of subject-object-less consciousness: Vijñātāram kena vijānīyāt. Punaśca viṣayābhāvepi Ātmānam vijānīyāt ityāśankya Vijñātāram kena vijānīyāt iti niṣiddham (i, 4, 22). This leads us to Ś.'s conception of the released state as one of pure subject-objectless consciousness (Nirviśeṣa-Caitanya-mātra-avasthānam). It is not clear how such an answer to the question "Vijñātāram kena vijānīyāt" is in any way different from the other prospect of Ātman's ceasing to exist altogether (*ātmanāśa*). Even the individual self in the state of bondage is admitted to be able to have a brief intuitive experience of its own bliss in Suṣupti. Sureśvara too speaks of it in his Vārtika on the Bṛh. Up. Bhāṣya :

> Asti bhogaḥ suṣuptepi tathā ca ānandabhug yataḥ
> Aiśvaro vātra bhogo'sti sarvasthānābhimānataḥ
> (p. 1566)

Conditions in the released state must be more propitious than in the empirical, dominated by Avidyā. If you ask

what is the difficulty in accepting that Ātman is competent to know himself in the released state, Ś.'s answer would be that such an admission would lead to an infinite regress of knowing, a logical fallacy or else a grammatical stumbling block of 'Kartṛkarmavirodha'. Yet, he himself under Kaṭha i, 2, 9 agrees that the knowledge of Ātman can neither be produced by reasoning nor *upset by it*. (See also Bṛh. Up. i, 4, 10 which says "B alone existed in the beginning and It knew Itself to be Brahman". It is only by a very devious interpretation that Ś. overcomes this difficulty. (See under 'AHAM BRAHMĀSMI'). The possibility of B. (Ātman) knowing itself is admitted by many texts: Ātmanyevātmānam paśyet (Bṛh. Up. iv, 4, 23) Ātmā vā draṣṭavyaḥ (ii, 4, 5), Svayam eva ātmanā ātmānam vettha tvam Puruṣottama (Gīta x, 15).

As a matter of fact, in his own earlier discourse to King Janaka (IV, 3) noted for its highest pitch of eloquence, Y. describes the Svayamjyotiṣṭva of Ātman in the state of Suṣupti which, Radhakrishnan quoting Śaṅkara on iv, 3, 22. says "is a *state beyond the empirical distinctions* (Avidyā kāmakarmavinirmuktaḥ). He declares "Verily, there is no cessation of the seeing of the seer, no cessation of the smelling of the smeller, knowing of the knower and so on. This is the highest goal, the greatest bliss" (iv, 3, 23–30),

The above clearly testifies to the fact that the self never forfeits its intrinsic powers of seeing, knowing and enjoying the bliss of selfhood (irrespective of the existence of external objects). This means its powers are inseparable from its being and endure as long as the Ātman itself lasts. As Ātman is by hypothesis avināśī, (indestructible) its attributes must be equally so. To sustain this, it must, by

hypothesis, be taken to be equipped with suitable 'Svarūpendriyas' constituted of the very essence of its Caitanya *Yakṣānurūpo baliḥ* as Doctors of Advaita Vedānta declare, when it suits them.

Thus, after a careful examination of all these facts, the Dvaita school has thought it fit to *abandon* Śaṅkara's interpretation of Yājñavalkya's clarification in three parts *as a statement of facts* (vastusthitikathanam) as the answers given lead to disastrous results, dealing a death blow to the most cherished values of human aspirations not only to be free but free to be able to enjoy the fruits of hard-earned freedom. To deny this would be to stifle the voice of reason and revelation alike.

It therefore comes to the conclusion that Yājñavalkya's clarifications are best construed in terms of a *reductio ad absurdum* which will help disclose the truth in quite a different perspective, guaranteeing the survival of the released soul, its blissful self-awareness, fellowship with other blessed ones and communion with the Supreme Being and ample scope for self expression thro' trans-empirical diversions open to it, as can be gathered from references in the Chan. Up. (viii, 12, 3); Taitt. Up. (iii, 10, 5).

It is commonly assumed that the use of the indeclinable particle 'iva' (translated into 'as if' or 'as it were',) in Yājñavalkya's words "Yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati" confirms that all duality is a myth 'mithyā', superimposed and that as such it makes the Dvaita interpretation of the survival of any kind of distinctions and dualities untenable. This presumption and the conclusion drawn from it are both misplaced. It must be borne in mind that according to the Dvaita interpretation 'iva' is used to sustain the unimpeded application of the *reductio ad absurdum from*

the strict Advaitic position, according to which there is no real duality anywhere and all duality is only a myth, an 'as if'. From the Monistic angle, the term 'dvaitam iva' may either be taken to mean absence of Dvaita (dvaita-abhāva) or 'something like' or 'something resembling duality' (upamārtha). In the former case, the drift of Yājñavalkya's argument from the vantage of the *reductio ad absurdum* posed by him would be "*where there is an absence of duality* one sees another, smells another . . ." which will be absurd, wanting in Vyāpti and cannot therefore be used effectively to sustain the Viparyayaparyavasāna, to discomfit the adversary, who will be the Dualist. No Viparyayaparyavasāna can be made unless the Vyāpti is acceptable to both the parties . . . Thus the first alternative suffers from a handicap and cannot be put forward in all seriousness. If on the other hand, 'iva' is taken to signify 'something like or resembling duality' (dvaitam-iva) (the sense of negation of duality being implicit), it must be clarified if *that something like or resembling duality* is itself to be regarded as real or not real in its term. The former would be inconsistent with the Monist position that all duality is a myth. In the latter case, such an unreality cannot be dignified with a predicate 'is' (bhavati) in Yatra dvaitam iva *bhavati*.[1] Thus, the use of 'iva' in either of these senses, would turn out to be a misfit in Yājñavalkya's clarification, if his intention had been to establish the absence or cessation of all duality in the released state. As Ś does not treat Yājñavalkya's clarification as resting on a *reductio ad absurdum* and takes it as meant purely as a statement of facts (vastusthitikathanam),

1. We should expect here either Dvaitam iva *syāt* or *bhavet*.

there is absolutely no need at all from *his* point of view, for Yājñavalkya to have introduced the misfitting 'iva' in the argument. Since we are all agreed that one can see another, smell another and so on, only when there is a second, a duality, the argument that, where there is no duality in release there can be no room for any such dualistic experiences at all, would be impregnable. The intrusion of 'iva' *complicates matters, for the Advaita.* On the other hand, the presence of 'iva' admirably fits in with the requirements of a *reductio ad absurdum* contemplated by Yājñavalkya (according to the Dvaita interpretation), as it is intended to expose the untenability of the Monist position, *from the point of view of its own admission* and hypothesis that all duality is a myth, an 'as if'. It is such an admission that is made the basis of the *reductio ad absurdum*, by the *astute* dialectician that Yājñavalkya is, by all accounts. It has been admitted that Yājñavalkya Kāṇḍa is 'Tarkapradhāna'. *Dvaitam iva ityatra Ivaśabdastu Dvaitasya Paramate mithyātvāt, Pararītyaiva āpādanīyatvāt* (Nym).

From the Dvaita point of view, the particle 'iva' is meant to suggest that unless there is (at least) *a modicum of duality* one cannot see another, smell another etc. And this can be very effectively used in support of a *reductio ad absurdum* to demonstrate the survival of the released selves in Mokṣa, their relation to the Supreme Being and scope for self-expression. The use of 'iva' in the sense of a modicum *(alpārtha iva śabdaḥ)* is illustrated by Madhva with a citation from a literary work, where a man who had been on starvation diet for days says on being given a square meal *"Daśarātrair bhuktam iva na samyak svalpabhojanāt"*. This can be compared with a similar use of the particle 'api' cited by Pāṇini (i, 4, 96)

Yājñavalkya's clarification viewed in the light of the *reductio ad absurdum* scotches the pessimistic view of the released state, where the self is no longer in a position to be aware of his own existence or of other freed souls or the bliss of his own selfhood. It lets the truth emerge of its own accord from the implementation of the *reductio ad absurdum*. However, not satisfied with this subtle way, he comes out in his *second version with a more positive declaration* (1) that the self is imperishable (avināśī) and (2) that his attributes too are equally so *(anucchitti dharmā)*. The first establishes personal identity and immortality or survival of the self in Mokṣa. If the self should *cease to be* in release, the immortality about which Yājñavalkya has been holding forth to such great length, would be meaningless. Śaṅkara is not therefore justified in interpreting it as "not open to change or modification (avikriya)". This is secondary and depends on the certainty of its continued existence. Priority has therefore to be given to the self's actual survival. In any case, as a Bahuvrīhi construction is indispensable in respect of both *avināśī* and *anucchitti-dharmā*, both absence of change or modification and absence of extinction can suitably be expressed thro' a single word '*anucchittiḥ*' as a Bahuvrīhi. As Yājñavalkya makes a special reference to 'dharma' in anucchittidharmā, which, however according to Śaṅkara, has no reference to attributes of the self, '*anucchhittiḥ*' would suffice to express what Śaṅkara wishes to be conveyed and the term 'dharma' could have been dropped by Yājñavalkya. Its *retention in the text* shows that it is intended to make a separate mention of the 'attributes' of the Self also. As 'ātma-svarūpa' has been taken care of by the first term (avināśī), the other term following is expected to say something

within the Vedic fold. "Save the self, Save yourself" must have been the slogan to beat back the waves of Nairātmyavāda In any case, one must have the self to start with. In this grave predicament, it was possible that the call to 'Ātmavāda' was the rallying point for the resurgence of the Vedic faith. And the result was an overemphasis on Ātmavāda at the cost of relegating the Supreme Brahman, to a secondary place, meant for purposes of Upāsanā only, as a booster: *Brahmadṛṣṭirutkarṣāt*. But, while the restoration of Ātman to his rightful place in philosophy was a step in the right direction, it ought *not* to have been allowed to eclipse or usurp the place of Brahman. The hopes expressed in this behalf:

Ityāha nāstikyanirākariṣṇur
Ātmāstitām Bhāṣyakṛdatra yuktyā
Drḍhatvaṁ etadviṣayaprabodhaḥ
Prayāti Vedānta niṣevaṇena

was *not realised* until centuries later. The Seeker having been restored to his rightful place, the 'sought' must also get back his place of honor. While keeping close to the intimacy between the two, neither should be allowed to annul the other. Each should be given his rightful place in the economy of thought.

That is what Dvaita philosophy has attempted to do and has achieved by its *reinterpretation of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, whose core of thought had come to suffer a distortion at the hands of early Revivalists of Ātmavāda, knowingly or unknowingly. There is no harm in studying the Pratyagātman and the Paramātman with particular reference to each one's context and milieu. But in contexts where the two are brought into closest intimacy of being, as in the states or dream, suṣupti and release, where the

dividing lines may often tend to get thinner and blurred or even overlap due to mystic idiom of self-abasement or emotional fervor when words fail to keep pace and become obscure or ambiguous, a bifocal approach to the experience recorded, in keeping with the dominant and active role of the Supreme and the passive submissive one of the embodied self would be of decided advantage in getting to the rock bottom of the true relationship between the seeker and the sought.

It is precisely for this reason that Madhva makes use of the bifocal approach to the present context of the Jyotir-Brāhmaṇa, to get at the inner meaning of such statements as 'Svapno bhūtvā' (becoming a dream) 'Samānas san ubhau lokāvanusancarati' he traverses both the worlds without involvement, 'Asanga' (unattached) in describing the movements of the dreamer and 'sa hi *Kartā*' (He is the Creator).

All these foregoing statements as they stand worded are incompatible with the passive and subordinate role of the embodied self and definitely untrue of him, as we know it from other sources. 'Svapno bhūtvā' makes no sense taken at its face-value and applied to the embodied self. It gives a very satisfactory sense if it is construed as a suppressed causative usage, pointing to the dominant role of the 'Prājña'-Ātmā who *makes* the embodied self go *into the dream* or the Suṣupti states as we are informed in the *Mantra* quoted by the Upaniṣad itself in elucidation of the respective roles of the embodied self and the Creator of the dream world. The dream and suṣupti are not the only states to which the embodied selves are exposed in life. Yājñavalkya himself speaks of two wider worlds in which the scene of their activities is placed, of which the

dream and Suṣupti form a small part. The dream state is called Sandhya standing in between the waking and the dreamless. The two larger worlds of which all these three are parts are the earthly regions and the heavenly ones, including the hells in which embodied selves are, in some cases, obliged to stay (idam ca paralokasthānam ca). The statement "He traverses both the worlds is true of the larger worlds also—these latter involving a sojourn for longer duration to work out the fruits of Karma on earth. This is admitted by Yājñavalkya himself: Tam vidyā-karmaṇī samanvārabhete pūrvaprajñā ca (iv, 4, 2). How then could the same Yājñavalkya maintain that the embodied self traverses the two worlds (from dream to suṣupti) without being involved in the Karma-āśayas or the residual impressions of its Karma? Śaṅkara himself admits in his c. on the Kṛtātyaya-adhikaraṇa of (B.S. iii, 1, 8) that the residual Karma *pursues* the embodied self into the next life. Yājñavalkya himself in (Bṛh. Up. iii, 2, 13) holds an *in camera* talk with Ārtabhāga in reply to his question as to what survives of a dead man, after his speech, mind, blood, body and all get merged in their respective sources and answers that it is 'Karma' which connects him with his future life: Puṇyena karmaṇā puṇyo bhavati pāpaḥ pāpena (iii, 2, 13). Can we seriously maintain then that this Karma is not in any way responsible for what awaits one in his dreams and suṣupti? That certain experiences in our dreams lead to positive reactions or results then and there is admitted by S. himself in B.S.B. iii, 2, 4. How then could the statement *Sa samānas san ubhau lokāvanusancarati* apply to the embodied self?

These innumerable difficulties can be satisfactorily resolved only by construing such texts by interpreting the verbs in their suppressed causative senses *(antarṇītaṇijanta)* which is a recognised exegetical principle. Many examples of such literary usage can be met with in received literature. Some examples have been quoted by Madhva in his c. on Bṛh. Up.

Tadetan me vijānīhi yathāham mandadhīr Hare
Sukham budhyeya durbodham yeṣām
bhavadanugrahāt (Bhāg. III, 25, 30)
Kṛtvā vivāham tu Kurupravīrāḥ (Mbh. V, 1, 1)
Anasūyā tathaiva Atreḥ jajñe putrān akalmaṣān
(Bhag. IV, 1, 15)

Jajñe bahujñam paramābhyudāram
Draṣṭus cakṣuṣo nāsti jihvā

to which may be added: Adhīhi bhagavo Brahmeti (Taitt. Up. iii, 1). While we have grammatical sanction and precedents in respect of *antarṇītaṇik*, the same cannot be said of construing a word like 'Śārīram' (Bṛh. Up. iv, 3, 11) as Śarīram.

Janaka's question "Who is this Ātman" would be uncalled for, if it is about the embodied self, as everybody knows his own self as his Ātman of whom he is always conscious . . . The statement: He moves about the two worlds without being affected in the least by the impact as he is 'Asanga' is *not true* of the embodied self as we have already seen. Such experiences of the Jīva cannot be dismissed as unreal. The description 'becoming a dream' (svapno bhūtvā) must be understood to mean becoming the inducer of the dream, as applied to the Supreme. Even according to others, the embodied self does not 'become the dream'. Words like 'being born'

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(jāyamānaḥ, mriyamāṇaḥ) have to be construed as suppressed causals. The same self passing thro' successive states cannot be deemed to be different, even from a Vyāvahārika angle. Hence, the Śārīra Ātman and the One who leads him to the dream state and back again to waking or to Suṣupti further, must indeed be different from him as so clearly described by the Brh. Up. Svapnena śārīram (iv, 3, 11)

Coming to the text of the Jyotir-Brāhmaṇa, we find a bifocal approach writ large on the wording referring to the active and the passive roles of the Supreme and the embodied selves in the *mantra* quoted in support by the text of the Upaniṣad itself with the words : *Tad ete lokā bhavanti* : as follows :

"Uniting the embodied self (śārīram) with dream, the Golden Person, the Supreme Immaculate (eka Hamsaḥ). Himself keeping wide awake (asuptaḥ) perceives (abhicākaśīti (the dreaming and the half asleep ones). Taking the embodied Self, subject to pleasure and pain (śukram), He the Golden Person restores the dreamer to his starting point. *He is the Creator*" (iv. 3, 10).

This Mantra provides ample evidence and clues to the proper understanding of the various experiences of the embodied Self in the different states to which it is exposed under the guidance and initiative of the Supreme Being called 'the Golden Person' (Hiraṇmayaḥ Puruṣaḥ) or the 'Prājña' (lit. the Wise One) subsequently (iv, 3, 21). This necessitates a bifocal approach to the active and the passive roles of the Supreme and the embodied. On the contrary, if the scenes and the objects in the dream experienced by the self are its own creations, by its own power, we should expect to have only the pleasantest of dreams at our will

and pleasure. Similarly in the case of deep sleep. We cannot have the happy repose of Suṣupti as and when we like. Nor is there any assurance that we shall return to the waking state always. Cases of persons passing away in their sleep are not unknown. The dispensations of dream and deep sleep are obviously *not in our hands.*

Coming to details of the wording : the term Śārīra is used in the text. Primarily and grammatically it means only the embodied self (the self in the body by force of Karma and not at its own pleasure). But this established meaning does not suit Śaṅkara's purpose here. He cannot also concede that the Golden Person is the Supreme Being. Such an admission would cut at the root of his non-dualism. He therefore elects to construe the word Śārīra to mean the 'physical body' (śarīram) which *defies grammar and language alike.* It is also against the internal evidence of the Brh.Up. from within the same Brāhmaṇa where the very same word Śārīra-Ātmā (the self in the body) is found used in iv, 3, 35 describing how the Śārīra-Ātmā mounted by the "Prājña-Ātmā, moves up to his death, breathing heavily when about to expire". Again, in the description of deep sleep Yājñavalkya speaks of the embodied self (ayam Puruṣaḥ) as being in the embrace of the Prājña-Ātman, where he is aware of nothing else inside or out (iv, 3, 21). This particular context forms the subject of a special adhikaraṇa in Brahmasūtra i, 3, 42, where the Sūtrakāra declares unequivocally that in both the states of suṣupti and final exit from the physical body (utkrānti) the self of the Jñāni remains different from the Supreme Being which leads it to its destination. Here Śaṅkara himself renders the term 'Puruṣa' (which etymologically also means one who sleeps in the

'body) and 'Prājña' as the Lord: Puruṣas Śārīraḥ. Prājñaḥ Parameśvaraḥ (BSB. I, 3, 42)

While Śaṅkara unhesitatingly renders Śārīra in iv, 3, 11 as the physical body, Radhakrishnan makes a feeble attempt to soften it by translating it as "what belongs to the body viz., the senses". But he forgets that the Mind which is one of the sense organs is *not moribund* in the dream state. There is a similar difficulty in regard to the Golden Person. According to Śaṅkara, whom Radhakrishan echoes, this Golden Person is *not* the Parameśvara and therefore different from the embodied self. He is the self's own true and natural Being as distinguished from its embodied aspect (paramārthena svābhāvikena pareṇa jyotirātmanā svena ātmanā). Radhakrishnan says ditto to it. But mere difference of states thro' which the self passes cannot make self implicated in them 'different' beings. This point has been raised by Madhva as we have seen. Even the pure self of Śaṅkara is an indeterminate being and cannot be identified with the 'Golden Person' or as a 'Puruṣa' (*puri śete*). That apart, the pure self or Śuddha-Caitanya of Śaṅkara's philosophy is nowhere referred to in the Upaniṣads as a 'Golden Person'. But this term is found applied to the Supreme Brahman in Chān. Up. i, 6, 6 as the Person residing in the Sun. The same text from the Chān. Up. figures as Viṣayavākya discussed in the Antara-adhikaraṇa of the B.S. i, 1, 20 according to Śaṅkara. Here, after refuting the Pūrvapakṣa that the Golden Person referred to in the Śruti may be some individual self of high eminence, Śaṅkara establishes the Siddhānta that the Golden Person is no other than 'the eternal Parameśvara' (nityasiddaḥ Parameśvaraḥ). Being present in the Sun would of course make this person a qualified being (viśiṣṭa) which cannot be identified with

the pure self or Śuddha-Caitanya. The point is that having committed himself in his Sūtrabhāṣya to the identity of the Golden Person with Parameśvara, he cannot be permitted to resile from that position, when it suits him to do so as here in Bṛh.Up. iv, 3, 11.

According to him Yājñavalkya's discourse covers only the three major states of waking, dream and suṣupti and natural death (iv, 3, 35–38). This restriction conflicts with Yājñavalkya's rapturous description of *Brahmaloka just before* (iv, 3, 32) and immediately *after* the closing part of the recital iv, 3, 33 of the 'Beatific Calculus' of *ānanda*, rising in an order of 100% from that of the 'Perfect Man' (manuṣyāṇām rāddhaḥ) and ending with the world of Hiraṇyagarbha.

It is very important to note that the beings in the world of Hiraṇyagarbha in the released state, as described in paragraph 33, are also, like the other liberated souls in the ascending scale, all of them qualified by the three epithets of *śrotriya*, *avrijina* and *akāmahata*, severally, without exception. This Beatific Calculus terminates in the world of Brahmā *(atah param gaṇitanivṛttiḥ)*, which means the beatitude *(ānanda)* beyond the world of Hiraṇyagarbha is always at its constant summit, which can be true only of the state of release for the blessed.

What is even more important to note is that Yājñavalkya after completing this recital of the Beatific Calculus terminating with the world of Brahmā, makes it a point to refer *once again* to the highest Brahmaloka in paragraph 33 itself within the framework of the Calculus, complete with all the three qualifying epithets, as the highest unit in the scale: *Sa eko Brahmalokaḥ ānandaḥ.* This is immediately followed by reference to *another Brahmaloka again*, carefully

demarcated from the immediately *preceding one* by an 'atha', to indicate the commencement of a fresh topic (Prakaraṇa-viccheda). Thus in all, "Brahmaloka is referred to *three times*, first in paragraph 32 and twice in paragraph 33. The description in paragraph 32 uses a string of *superlatives*, as "the highest goal, the highest treasure and the highest bliss" *(paramā gatiḥ, paramā sampad, paramo lokah, parama ānadaḥ)*. It is at the end of this that the Upaniṣad adds that "Other beings there (in that state) subsist on a tiny drop as it were of the boundless ānanda here *(Etasyaiva ānandasya anyāni bhūtāni mātrām upajīvanti)*. These beings there in that state must obviously be the denizens of the *same highest world* and as such *released ones*; tho' it is equally true that those in Samsāra too depend equally on the Supreme for the enjoyment of their fragmentary bliss (Ānandāddhyeva khalvimāni bhūtāni jayante, Esa hyeva ānandayāti (Taitt. Up. iii, 6).

The Beatific Calculus wedged in between these two references to the highest goal of 'Brahmaloka' must also be referred to the same state and not to the 'phenomenal state' (Samsārāvasthā). This conclusion is backed by the uniform use of the three epithets śrotriya, avṛjina and akāmahata, which in their primary sense are incapable of being applied to those still in Samsāra. In keeping with the context in which they are used, they have to be taken in their plenary sense. Śrotriya cannot simply mean here a person who has learnt the Vedas by rote, but one who has attained the fulfilment of his Vedic wisdom (prāpta-śrutiphala) which is Mokṣa (Gita II, 52). Absolute sinlessness *(avṛjinatva)* and absolute eradication of all desires *(akāmahatatva)* are possible only in the released state and for the released only:

Yadā sarve pramucyante kāmā ye'sya hṛdi sthitāḥ
Atha martyo amṛto bhavati (Muṇḍ. Up. ii, 4, 14)
Viṣayā vinivartante nirāhārasya dehinaḥ
Rasavarjam rasopyasya Param dṛṣṭvā nivartate
(Gita II, 59)

There is thus sufficient internal evidence in Brh. Up. iv, 3, that that it covers the released state *also*.

The question of the precise nature of the subject matter of iv, 3, 35–38 calls for an examination, as there is sharp difference of opinion on the point. Śaṅkara takes it as dealing throughout with the phenomenon of natural death of the embodied self and its return to rebirth. Madhva feels that while paragraph 35 is partly applicable to normal death in the usual course, the last three paragraphs (36–38) have reference only to the journey towards the released state, having regard to the picturesque description of the King of the country being received with royal honours on the way to his capital. The King is the 'Prājña-Ātman', the Supreme Being, leading the released soul to the world of the greatest bliss.

It is worth noting in this connection that the word maraṇam (death) applies in Upaniṣadic parlance both to death in the usual way, in the usual sense of the word *(pratimaraṇam)* and to final death *(ātyantikamaraṇam)*. The latter use can be seen in *maraṇam mā anuprākṣiḥ* (Kath. Up. i, 1, 25) and *maraṇam prāpya* (ii, 2, 6) and *pretya* (Brh. Up. ii, 4, 12). On both the occasions, the embodied self, according to the Upaniṣads, departs from the body, mounted by the Supreme Being (Prājñena ātmanā anvārūḍhaḥ). The first kind of this departure, to make clear the dependence of the Jīva on Brahman, is described by Yājñavalkya in iv, 3, 35 with the illustration of a cart

carrying travellers, leaving the passengers at their appointed destinations. The next three sections would thus stand naturally connected with death antecedent to final release, when it is ushered into the world of Mokṣa by the Puruṣo Mānavaḥ (Chān. Up. v, 10, 2) who leads it to Brahman. Sa enān Brahma gamayati. The spectacular description of the grand reception accorded to the King on his way to his capital by officers and subjects, on the way, refers to the homage paid by the Arcirādidevatās to the Supreme Being leading the self to Mokṣa. Such an illustration would be out of place, if the embodied self is just on its way *back to rebirth* in the mortal world. Viewed in this perspective, the words "aṇimānam nyeti, aṇimānam nigacchati" (iv, 3, 36) will be seen to refer to the enlightened self preparing to reach the Supreme Being referred to here by the word 'aṇimā' (the subtle one, the subtlest of the subtle) (aṇor aṇīyān). The Chān. Up. (vi, 12, 2) in the famous discourse of Uddālaka identifies this 'aṇiman' with the Supreme being (Sa ya eṣo aṇimā aitadātmyam idam sarvam). The reference to the embodied self passing out of its body on account of old age or sickness need not stand in the way of the above identification as sickness and old age are not the necessary preconditions of a knower of Brahman getting released. Nor is thinning of the body or its shrinking. Sometimes the body may get bloated and swollen too. Yājñavalkya himself answering a question of Ārtabhāga whether when a liberated sage dies, do his vital airs move up from him or not, says "They are gathered together in him. His body swells up, he is inflated and thus inflated dies" (iii, 2, 11). The thinning of the body is not therefore a necessary precondition of the Jñānin's death. His self has to pass thro' the Suṣumnānāḍi in its

utkrānti to attain immortality (Katha. Up. ii, 3, 16), and B.S. iv, 2, 17). The Suṣumnānāḍi itself, leading upwards from the heart to the skull is surrounded by others called 'hitāḥ', which are as fine as a hair divided a thousandfold. They are so thin 'tāvatā aṇimnā tiṣṭhanti (iv, 3, 20). Even supposing that thinning of the body is referred to by the words *aṇimānam nyeti jarayā upatapatā vā* (either by old age or illness) the other statement following it *aṇimānam nigacchati* being a vain repetition of harping on the same thing, could more meaningfully be understood to refer to the Jñānin's nearing the Supreme Being, the 'aṇimā' in its highest sense (B.S. Tad avyaktam, āha hi). It would be a poor compliment to Yājñavalkya's maturity of understanding and responsiveness to Janaka's insistent request to be enlightened about 'Vimokṣa' (ata ūrdhvam vimokṣāaiva brūhi (iv, 3, 33) "Sir, tell me about Mokṣa, that he should revert to and dilate on the topic of return to rebirth *and conclude with it* It will be doing poor justice to the greatest Brahmiṣṭha of the Upaniṣadic age. We have therefore every reason to *disagree* with Śaṅkara that the last three sections have no bearing on the description of the journey to Mokṣa. Even the concluding words of section 37, "Idam Brahma āyāti, Idam āgacchati" should suffice to make it clear that the context is of the state of final release, when the released self (Muktajīvasvarūpa) follows the Supreme Brahman (Idam Brahma). This repetition of the words "Idam Brahma āyāti Idam āgacchati" cannot be deemed to be intended to show special interest (ādara). In such cases the idiom requires the use of the same words twice without change of form as in '*Aho darśanīyā, Aho darśanīyā*' (Look, she is beautiful, She is beautiful).

NATU TAD DVITĪYAM ASTI TATO'NYAD VIBHAKTAM YAT PASYET

This text cannot possibly be intended to negate wholesale all duality and plurality involving the entire world of name and form and the thinking selves and their difference with the Supreme B. Such a negation would be in violent conflict with the entire background of factual material on which Yājñavalkya's discourse is based.

Without the existence of a real external world and thinking selves therein their three states of dreaming, waking and dreamless-sleep and return to the waking state again, the interlocutors questioning Yājñavalkya, the Sun, the Moon, the stars, the heart and the Nādis of the Devas, Pitṛs and Gandharvas, the mango and the Pipal trees, the King and the courtiers, the whole discourse would be a Painting without a canvas, colours, brush and a Painter (Bhittim vinā Citraracanā).

We have already seen in the Maitreyi Brāhmaṇa that the Negation of duality so far as the world of matter and Souls is concerned cannot be read into Yājñavalkya's discourse there,—all the more so in view of his own awesome eloquent exposition of the Antaryāmi-Brahman indwelling in the whole gamut of Cosmic life (Brh. Up. iii, 7, 3–30). A Philosopher of Yājñavalkya's standing cannot be expected or made to change his views and tunes like a Chameleon from time to time. It is time modern scholars and students of the Upaniṣads give serious thought to this aspect of the problem. We need a more stable and consistent approach to understand the effusive and somewhat enigmatic argumentation of Yājñavalkya here which falls into three parts, as in the case of his clarification to

Maitreyi. These three parts are schematically connected with the general proposition: *Ātmaiva asya Jyotiḥ Eko Draṣṭā Advaito bhavati.*

1. (Tad) Yad dvaitam na paśyati paśyan vai na paśyati.
2. (Yato) Draṣṭur dṛṣṭer viparilopo na vidyate.
3. (Tasmāt) Natu tasmād dvitīyam asti tato anyad vibhaktam yat (tat) paśyet.

The thesis here is: The Supreme B. is the one and only Independent Light, Seer and Knower of all finite reality on which the latter depends for all its activities of knowing and functioning: Ātmanaiva jyotiṣo āste, palyate, karma kurute, vipalyeti (iv, 3, 4).

The counter-thesis is: There is or can be some other Equal or Superior Light and Knower of all (draṣṭā). This contention is thrown out by the first step in the argument that what the (given) One Independent Light of all does *not perceive* (Yad vai tan na paśyati) *does not, cannot exist;* for that Independent Light perceives all as they exist. Ergo, what It does not see does not and cannot exist in reality. For the all-knowing One never forfeits Its capacity to know correctly: Nahi draṣṭur dṛṣṭerviparilopo vidyate). Hence, the conclusion follows: Whatever that Universal Light does not perceive, does not exist.

Following Madhva, Vyāsatirtha clarifies that the Negation of duality (dvaitam) in "Yad dvaitam na paśyati paśyan vai tan na paśyati, avināśitvāt na tu tad dvitīyam asti tato anyad vibhaktam yat paśyet (Brh. Up. iv, 3) is not directed against either the plurality of the thinking selves and their difference from the Supreme B. or the multiplicity of 'tattvas' in the world of name and form.

This point is clear from the context here which relates to the Jīvātman's state of Suṣupti where he is said to become united with the Supreme Reality: Yatraitat svapiti nāma Satā somya tadā sampanno bhavati (Chān. Up. vi, 8, 1). According to the Bṛh. Up. also, the Jīva in his deep sleep enters a group of Nāḍis in the heart. These are of many colors white, red, blue, green and yellow and are fine as a hair split a thousandfold. While lodged in the Suṣumnānādi, the Jīva is said to become locked in the embrace of Prājña-Ātman (the Supreme B.) in a blissful state, like a lover in the arms of his beloved (iv, 3, 21).

The Brahmasūtra: Tadabhāvo nāḍīṣu tacchruter ātmani ha (iii, 2, 7) and Suṣuptyutkrāntyor bhedena (i, 3, 42) read together make it clear that the Supreme Being is also present in the Nāḍi at the time in its three Forms of Āptakāma, Ātmakāma and Akāma, in different colors, making the Jīva happy.

These details taken together establish that it is only because of his close contact with the Supreme present in the Nāḍi in Suṣupti that Jīva is able to experience the bliss of his self hood, before being brought back to the waking state. It should be kept in mind that according to the Bṛh. Up. the dreaming and the dreamless states deal with the active and the passive states of the Lord and the Jīvas, as has been made clear in the introductory part of this Chapter.

The Chan. Up. tells us that this Supreme Being residing in the heart of the Jivas bears, for that very reason, the name of 'Hṛdayam' Ṣa vā Eṣa ātmā Hṛdi. Tasya etad eva niruktam 'Hṛdayam' iti (viii. 3, 3), As this Supreme Being has been officially designated as 'Hṛdayam' on good Upaniṣadic authority, it would not only be proper

but more meaningful to construe the sentence "Tīrṇo hi tadā sarvān śokān Hṛdayasya bhavati" to mean having freed himself from all sorrows the Jīva now belongs to (is closest to) the Brahman designated as 'Hṛdayam'. For as all sorrows originate in the heart and affect it, it would be both pointless and superfluous to qualify them with the adjunct ('of the heart') 'Hṛdayasya', not to speak of the inversion of the normal prose order of 'Hṛdayasya śokān' into Śokān Hṛdayasya'. The statement He then becomes free from all sorrows would be self-complete and the words 'Hṛdayasya bhavati' can stand by itself meaning 'He then belongs to or gets closest to Hṛdaya-Brahman.'

The ascription of three different Forms (rūpa) to B. in the Nāḍis with different colors (Asya idam rūpam) and genitive forms like Śuklasya, nīlasya etc referring to its colors are bound to give room for an objection here. For in the Upaniṣadic tradition, Brahman is of unitary nature and essence. It is Ekam *eva* and Ekadhaiva anudraṣṭavyam neha nānāsti kiñcana,—without any internal distinctions whatsoever, in its being and constitution. Will not then, the ascription of three different forms (rūpas) to it lead to a break up of His unity of nature and essence? It is *this* question which according to the Dvaita tradition of interpretation is taken up and answered in the paragraph: "Yad dvaitam na paśyati . . . "

In this set-up the subject of the opening sentence: "Yad dvaitam na paśyati" is the Supreme B. itself which had been designated as 'Hṛdayam' in the closing words of the immediately preceding sentence. *That* Brahman is the Perceiver and the non-Perceiver which is being spoken of. It is competent to perceive correctly and know all things as they are in reality in their proper perspective: for it

never forfeits its capacity to know correctly. Paśyan vai na paśyati na hi draṣṭur dṛṣṭer viparilopo vidyate. This Unerring Perceiver of all manifesting Himself in three different forms of Āptakāma, Ātmakāma and Akāma in the Nāḍi during Suṣupti of the Jīvas *does perceive* these various Forms of His own self; but He does *not* perceive them *as different from His own being and essence.* This is rendered possible by the inner dynamics of His own nature of Svarūpa-Viśeṣas. The difficulties raised in regard to the dualistic references involving the Supreme Perceiver are thus smoothly resolved.

It will thus be seen that the question of the reality of the world of name and form and the plurality of the selves and their difference from the Supreme B. are not at all the issue before us here in regard to the text: "Yad dvaitam na paśyati paśyan vai tan na paśyati" etc. as it is entirely out of context.

The attempt to enlist it to establish the Mithyātva of the world of matter and souls is thus out of place. The series of categorical assertions made in this connection in the text of Brh.Up. iv, 3, 23–30 such as "there is no *cessation* of the *seeing* of the Seer, the *smelling* of the Smeller, the *touching* of the Toucher, the *thinking* of the Thinker, the *knowing* of the Knower are incompatible with the Monistic conception of Ātman or Brahman as 'pure consciousness—'Dṛk' in which there is no place for a 'See-er', a 'Know-er', 'Smell-er', a 'touch-er' (Jñātṛ, mantṛ, vijatṛ, spraṣtr, rasayitṛ, or for the acts of dṛśti, śruti, mati, spṛśti and so on. These run against the grain of pure consciousness of kevala 'Dṛk'.

The Dvaita interpretation is entirely free from such difficulties and textual inconsistencies in interpretation.

5. VĀCĀRAMBHAṆAM VIKĀRO NĀMADHEYAM

The next 'Advaita Śruti' taken by Vyāsatīrtha for discussion is the famous Vācārambhaṇa Śruti (Chan. Up. vi, 1, 4). Here Uddālaka instructs his errant son Śvetaketu on the need to get down to the kernel of the teachings of the Vedas, instead of going away satisfied with their outer shell. The purpose of Vedic study is to get at the saving truth embodied in them—the primacy of the One Supreme Sat (Brahman) as the source of the being, becoming and functioning of all finite reality comprising the world of matter and spirits in and thro' all states of their life and career. Such knowledge alone is competent to complete and fulfil all other knowledge of the 'Apara-tattvas' (secondary principles) which also form part of the teachings of the Vedic corpus: Dve vidye veditavye parā ca aparā ca. Atha Parā yayā Tad akṣaram adhigamyate (Mund. Up. i, 1, 5). Tam evaikam jānatha Ātmānam, Anyā vāco vimuncatha (Mund. Up. ii, 2, 5). Vidvāmso ṛṣayaḥ Kāvaṣeyā āhuḥ Kimarthā vayam yakṣyāmahe kimarthā vayam adhyeṣyāmaha iti (A.A. iii. 2, 6). Etam hyeva Bahvṛcā mahatyukthe mīmāsante etam Chandogā Mahāvrate (A.A. iii, 2, 3). Yas tam na veda kim ṛcā kariṣyati (Ṛ.V. i, 164, 39) Sthāṇur ayam bhārahāraḥ kilabhūt adhītya vedam na vijānāti yo'rtham (Nirukta).

Śvetaketu had been wasting his early days without studying the Vedas, as was expected of the scion of a family of Brahmavids. Admonished by his father, he goes to his Gurukula and returns after an intensive study of the Vedic lore for twelve years. But his massive learning had turned

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his head. He was highly conceited with his attainments, little realising that all his erudition was the gift of Providence: Mattas smṛtir jñānam apohanam ca (Gita xv, 15).

The terms in which the Upaniṣad describes his demeanour when he comes to meet his father are revealing: Sarvān vedān adhītya mahāmanā anūcānamānī *stabdha eyaya* (vi, 1, 2). He did not care even to salute his Sire. A look at the son's face was enough to tell the father what had gone wrong with the young man. He therefore puts him a searching question to awaken him to a sense of reality. "Have you, my son, gained by your study of the Vedas that knowledge by which all that has so far been unheard becomes heard, all that has not been understood becomes understood and all that has not been known becomes known?" On receiving an answer in the negative, the father proceeds to initiate him into Divine Majesty. He begins with the recital of Cosmic Creation and impresses on his son how all created beings in the Universe have their root, abode and support in the one Supreme: *Sanmūlās sarvāḥ prajās sadāyatanās satpratiṣṭhāḥ.* Śvetaketu's case is typical of the common man of the world, who has strayed from the Creator and has come to associate with his own self complete independence of initiative in his dealings with the world, which at best is only a half-truth. There lies the significance of the parable.

The lengthy account of the process of Creation at the very outset *underlines* the metaphysical dependence of all finite reality including the selves on the Unseen Power behind the Cosmos: *Tadvaśatvajñāpanārtham Sṛṣṭ yuktiḥ* as Madhva puts it. Even the routine division of the Vedas into Karma, Jñāna and Devatā Kāṇḍas can be synthesised as contributory to Brahmavidyā on the lines of *Yad 'eva' vidyayā*

karoti śraddhayā upaniṣadā tad eva vīryavattaram bhavati (Chan. Up. i, 1, 10).

If this contextual background to Uddālaka's upadeśa is to have any bearing on how we are to understand its substance and purpose, it cannot possibly be such as could persuade us into believing in all conscience that Cosmic creation is a myth and Man's life in the world and his endeavors to utilise his God-given gifts and opportunities to raise himself from darkness to light and from death to immortality are all mere illusions—a superimposition on the One Sat, due to beginningless Ignorance (Avidyā) into which he has somehow fallen and that the remedy lies in his shaking himself free from it by learning to look upon himself as one with the ONE Sat and give up his sense of individuality and get lost in the Sat.

Yet, such is the purport of Uddālaka's teaching according to orthodox Advaita tradition spelt out by Maṇḍana Miśra in his *Brahmasiddhi:* the creation texts are *not* to be construed as referring to any real creation. Their only purpose is to instil an understanding of the sole reality of the One Self. Hence, they should be construed in accordance with that purport and *not* in conflict with it. If the principles of Tejas, Āpaḥ and Annam and their creation referred to in the beginning are to be accepted as real facts, it would lead to a break up of the opening proposition about the sole reality of one single Ātman into two[1] by affirming both the reality of the Ātman and the reality of Tejas, Āpaḥ and Annam and their further

1. Sargaśrutir api na sargaparā. Kim tarhi Ekātmatattvapratipattipradhānā. Atas tadanuguṇatayaiva tāṣām arthavyavasthāpanam. Na tu tadvirodhena. Tatra yadi Aptejahprabhṛtitattvasargah Satyatayā nirṇīyeta Vākyabhedas syāt. *(op.cit.* p.25)

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development. Such a splitting up of a single proposition into two is not permissible, as a rule. Śaṅkara also has held that the Creation texts are *not* to be taken at their word (B.S.B. i, 4, 14).

But this does not seem to have prevented Maṇḍana from proclaiming later in his work that the uniform awareness of the *esse* of Brahman as the underlying reality of each and every entity in the world superimposed on it (ghaṭas san paṭas san) comes to everyone of us daily thro' every act of objective experience thro' sensations produced by the senses thro' contact with names and forms. Fundamentally then, all awareness of existents is actually awareness of the *esse* of Brahman. Pleasurable sensations likewise are the fleeting impress of the bliss which is of the nature of B. as the only real that is: *Brahmaṇo vyatirekeṇa pratyetavyasya abhāvāt Sarvapratyayavedyam Brahmarūpam* (Maṇḍana)

Having admitted so much, Maṇḍana asks himself: What then is the purport and subject matter of Śrutis : Kim tarhi śabdena pratipādyate? and he answers the complete dissolution of the (illusory) world:

Prapañcasya pravilayas Śabdena pratipādyate

These two statements of Maṇḍana (1) that Creation texts have for their purport the establishment of the sole existence of Ātman and (2) his present statement that the subject matter of the Śrutis is the dissolution of the Universe are bound to lead to a Vākyabheda, which he has been so anxious to avoid earlier, if creation texts are admitted to speak of real Creation.

II

There need really be no fear of Vākyabheda in accepting Creation texts and Creation to be real and true, if the

Monistic predilection is laid aside to explore the possibility of finding a more consistent explanation with the given data without seeking to whittle them down. The acceptance of the primacy (prādhānya) of knowledge of the One Supreme and its being without an equal or a higher (a-dvitīya)[2] conceived as the Author of real Creation and sustenance of the Universe can very well provide a master key to the correct understanding of the promissory statement of Ekavijñanena sarvavijñānam.

Such primacy of the knowledge of the Supreme as the abiding source of the being, becoming and functioning of all else in finite reality (Svetara-samasta-sattāpratītipravṛtti-nimittam) their *ratio essendi* and *cognocsendi* has the warm support of many Śruti and Smṛti texts:

Ya ātmani tiṣṭhan ātmānam antaro yamayati
(Bṛh.Up. iii, 7, 22)
Antar bahiśca tat sarvam vyāpya Nārāyaṇas sthitaḥ
(Puruṣa Sūkta)
Viśvataḥ paramam nityam (Mah N.Up. xi, 2)
Dravyam karma ca kālasca svabhāvo Jīva eva ca
Yadanugrahatas santi na santi yadupekṣayā
(Bhāg. ii, 10, 12)
Dyubhvādyāyatanam svaśabdāt (B.S. i, 3, 1)

III

The monistic position that the purport of the Śrutis is the One Ātman understood in the narrow sense of the Pratyagātman falsely implicated in Samsāra thro' beginningless Nescience is itself based on an unproved assumption

2. This point has already been dealt with in the earlier discussion on the Ekam eva advitīyam text.

that the term Ātman is used in the Upaniṣads in all momentous contexts of Creation and Liberation, only for the Pratyagātman as the real subject of philosopical quest and realisation: Ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye sarve Vedāntā ārabhyante. It is on this unconfirmed belief and unproved assumption—*Ātmā ca Brahma*" that Śaṅkara has built his edifice at the beginning of his Sūtrabhāṣya. I have shown the hollowness of this assumption with ample evidence of relevant contexts from the Upaniṣads themselves and Śaṅkara's comments on them in the Introduction to my book 'Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad from Madhva's Perspective' (1988).

The Sūtrakāra himself starts his quest with 'Brahman' as the subject and *not* with 'Pratyagātman'. He defines his Jijñāsya-Brahman advisedly as the Creator of the Universe, its Sustainer etc. In the Dyubhvādyāyatana-adhikaraṇa (i, 3, 1) the primary sense of the word 'Ātman' occurring in the Upaniṣads has once for all been established as restricted to the Supreme B. as *distinguished from* the Pratyagātman (Prāṇabhṛcca). This ruling of the Sūtrakāra should apply with equal force to the interpretation of B.S. iv, 1, 3 also, where the same term 'Ātman' is used once again. And Śaṅkara himself in his Bhāṣya on i, 3, 1 does not demur to the Sūtrakāra's ruling. If the vagueness surrounding the use of the word Ātman to mean the Jīvātman too, at times, as in Śvet.Up. i, 2, d and at other times to mean the Supreme Being is set at rest, there will be no difficulty in realising that uniformly it is the *never-embodied* Supreme Brahman that is accepted as the subject of inquiry and realisation in texts like 'Ātma va are draṣṭayas śrotavyo mantavyaḥ' while the Pratyagātman is always the Seeker and *not the Sought*.

Viewed from this realistice context of *Tad aikṣata*, the Creation texts would smoothly fall into their proper places, bearing eloquent testimony to the unspeakable majesty of the One Supreme, which by its free and independent will brings into being a stupendous Universe such as ours, whose multiplicity and colorfulness have always excited the wonder and the admiration of saints, philosophers and scientists and the Vedic poets themselves. Laying aside his acosmism for the nonce, Śaṅkara himself goes into raptures over the vast intelligence and power of the mighty Being which has brought into being a wonderful world which defies imagination (BSB. i, 1, 2). Less rhetorical is Madhva's findings:

Bahucitrajagad bahudhā karaṇāt
Paraśaktir anantaguṇāḥ Paramaḥ *(Dvādaśa Stotra)*

As the world is the environment provided for Man's spiritual advancement, it would be gross ingratitude on his part to dismiss it as an illusion and make the benign Creator of the Universe a Deceptive Magician: Māyāmatram hyetat Paramātmano avasthātrayātmana avasthānam rajvā iva sarpādibhāvena (S.BSB. ii, 1, 9).

IV

Unlike Maṇḍana, Sureśvara looks upon knowledge of the purport of the Advaita Śrutis in terms of the identity of the Ātman and Brahman to be a self-sufficient direct means of final realisation.

Tattvamasyādivākyārthasamyagdhījanmamātrataḥ
Avidyāstamayo Mokṣas sā samsāra udāhṛtaḥ.

This view is known as Śabdāparokṣa, direct vision of B. thro' verbal testimony. But Maṇḍana argues a strong case for going beyond mere Vākyārthajñāna of the identity

texts, on the need for intensive meditation on the purport *(prasamkhyāna)* as the true means of Sākṣātkāra, taking his stand on texts like *Vijñāya prajñām kurvīta, Sa kratum kurvīta* and others. According to Maṇḍana, the knowledge obtained by churning the Śāstrārtha based on the identity texts is mediate (parokṣa) and what emerges after it has passed thro' the furnace of meditation is the means of actual Sākṣātkara. Mere rumination upon Vākyārtha is not sufficient.

In spite of this crucial difference of opinion between these veterans of Advaita on the place and importance of the identity texts, it will be seen that the Śruti still remains with them as the unalloyed and only source of knowledge of the highest truth: *Brahmātmabhāvasya Śāstram antareṇa anavagamyamānatvāt* (S.B.S.B. i, 1, 4). It should follow from this that there is no possibility whatever of realising B. thro' the fleeting glimpses of awarenes sof B.'s *esse* coming from the sensations of nāmarūpa (sarvapratyaya).

This should clinch the issue that one has necessarily to go beyond the kind of awareness of B. thro' sensations. Anyway, awareness of B. thro' awareness of a pot is not the same as Brahmasākṣātkāra, as it is in its *unconditioned nature, which is what is contemplated by the term Ekavijñāna.*

In the final analysis then, it must be the direct knowledge of B. obtained thro' the Apauruṣeya Śrutis alone that will have to be accepted as the Saving knowledge. As Karl Potter puts it "The Advaita looks upon self-knowledge as not given by any Pramāṇas and is an immediate intuition. Still, the precise nature of its content has to be gathered from the Śrutis; with or without Prasankhyāna. Thus, ultimately, Advaita has to look to Scripture or language as its critical means of proof of the truthfulness of such Anubhava".—*Encyclopedia of I. Philosophies,* Vol. II, Page 98

It is thus the Śrutis which hold the fortress and as Śruti is a body of Texts, they must be interpreted, first and foremost on the basis of Exegetical criteria. Even the knowledge of the unreality of phenomena (to be made out thro' Scripture) has to be known as an indubitable fact only on the authority of the words of the Śruti. If, instead, inference of the falsity of the world (Viśvamithyātvānumāna) can deliver the goods straightaway, independently of the Śruti, there would be no need at all for Advaita to depend upon texts like 'Neha nānāsti or Vācārambhaṇam' or make so much ado about the 'Mahāvākyas'.

If we abide by Maṇḍana's finding that creation texts do *not* intend to speak of real creation of the Tattvas in question, the act of creation must be deemed to be an illusion. The difficulty in accepting such a conclusion is that an illusory projection is always unpremeditated and involuntary. But the Śruti here assures us that the One Sat *took thought (tad aikṣata)* before making the first move. This makes it clear that it was an act of free will exercised in all seriousness. First of all, it *willed* the coming up of Tejas, then Ap and lastly of Annam and then subjected them to a process of triplication (trivṛtkaraṇa). All this is verily impossible to think of in a Nirviśeṣa Brahman that the One Sat is taken to be (Ekam eva). We cannot also smuggle a duplicate Saguṇa Brahman for the purpose *in between* the first stage of bare existence of the One Sat and the next one of its taking thought *(tad aikṣata)* to send forth Tejas and others in succession. For, according to the text of the Upaniṣad, the act of taking thought *(īkṣaṇam)* and sending forth Tejas, ap and anna are both performed by one and the same Sat[3] and *not* by a substitute or by proxy.

3. When fighting the Sānkhya under B.S. i, 1, 5 S. insists

The One Sat being by definition Vijñānam ānandam by nature (svabhāva) cannot have hypnotised itself into becoming a Saguṇa Brahman to launch an illusory creation into being. The rebuttal that an illusory projection cannot be conceived without a substrate (B) can be countered by another that no illusion is ever premeditated or voluntarily entered into.

Śaṅkara takes the stand that all changes and transformation is illusory. Hence Trivṛtkaraṇa, Nāmarūpavyākaraṇa are all in the same boat. Such a conclusion is derived from the proposition *Vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam* that all change and modification of a substance into its products is mere verbal utterance existing only in name (vāgalambana-mātram, nāmaiva kevalam Na vikāro nāma Vastvasti paramārthataḥ)

Prima facie, it would be difficult to believe that the Supreme B., which is described in the Śrutis as Satyakāma, Satyasaṅkalpa (Chān.Up. ciii, 7, 1) and which for that very reason should be competent to will and create a real world and sustain it, would ever be satisfied with creating an illusory one and lording over it (See Śvet.Up. vi, 8).

Akṣmās satyasṛṣṭau hi mithyāsṛṣṭim vitsavate
Sarvāparokṣadṛg Viṣṇuḥ katham tām īhate Hariḥ.

The Śrutis tell us that the All-Wise intelligent Creator (Kavir maniṣī) has brought about real creations lasting for thousands of years (Īśa.Up. 8)

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that ikṣaṇam must be understood in its primary sense because of the use of the word Ātman in the context of the Sadvidyā. In the present case also in the Ait.Up. i, 1, the same word ātman and īkṣaṇam have been used in the Śruti in the Sṛṣti-prakaraṇa, which cannot be side-lined to an 'Upahita-Brahman'.

Advaita draws its conclusion that all change and modification of substances into their products are unreal (anṛtam) mere verbal utterances, from the promissory statement Ekavijñānena sarva vijñānam (knowing the many by knowing the One), which is followed by three illustrations one clod of clay and all that is made of clay, one nugget of gold and all that is made of gold and a pair of nail scissors and all that is made of iron. A close look at the *wording* of the illustrations *as we have the pairs named* fails to support any material cause and effect relation between them. The words 'one clod of clay', 'one nugget of gold' and all that are made of clay or gold and the words 'pinda' and 'maṇi' and 'sarvam' forbid any material cause and effect relation among them. To sustain such a relation, the reading will have to be drastically revised and cut down to "*Mṛdā vijñatayā mṛṇmayam vijñātam syāt*. Lohena vijñātena lohamayam vijñātam bhavati", as a causal relation can only be posited in general terms between clay and its products and not between one clod of clay and *all* that is made of clay. Logic is a hard task master and will not tolerate such blundering. Worse is the case of the third illustration and its wording. Nail-scissors is itself a product and not the cause of any other product. Its inclusion in terms of Upādāna Kāraṇatva in respect of the world, ostensibly read into B.S. i, 4, 27 in Śaṅkara's Sūtrbhāṣya (and in the given context of the Chān.Up.) is thus a serious misfit. That apart, Ekavijñāna of Brahman from the Advaita point of view must necessarily be in terms of Unconditioned Brahman, the Sanmātram, which is of the nature of Śuddha-Caitanya (Vijñānam ānandam). As Śuddha-Caitanya cannot undergo any change or modification into the nature of the world (which is Jaḍa) it can never be treated as the

material cause of the world (Prakṛtiśca). The difficulty cannot be circumvented by explaining that it is not the Śuddha-Brahman in its unconditioned state that is regarded as the material cause of the Universe, but only as associated with Avidyā:

Asya dvaitendrajālasya yad upādānakāraṇam
Ajñānam tadupāśritya Brahma kāraṇamucyate *(Sureśvara)*

This explanation is not only beside the point but is sure to lead to fresh difficulties. As Ajñāna conjointly with B. is the material cause, 'Ekavijñāna' will have to include 'Ajñāna' also within the body of the cause (Kāraṇaśarīra) as an integral part of 'the one to be known'. In that case, Avidyā or Ajñāna will have to be promoted from its 'heyakoti' (to be discarded) where it belongs, to the 'Jñeya-koti' (worthy of being known) *along with Brahman*. Moreover, as 'Ajñāna' is by hypothesis unoriginated and exists in Pralaya too, in seed form, it cannot be a 'modification' of B. and will have to stand outside the circle of 'the all' to be known by knowing the One. The result would be that the promise of 'Ekavijñānena Sarvavijñānam' will *exclude* knowledge of Avidyā as falling outside the scope of Eka-vijñāna (as such vijñāna would only include the transformations of B. within its scope). Thus Ekavijñāna when achieved will not be all-inclusive, not complete and all-embracing, as it would have to exclude Avidyā.

The additional words eka, maṇi, piṇḍa and sarvam introduced in the Upaniṣad cannot be dismissed as a slip of the tongue or a terminological inexactitude, when a more purposeful and satisfactory relation based on broad resemblance, primary and other grounds can be found to sustain the *wording* of the illustrations *as they stand given*, as we shall see.

Śaṅkara has attempted to overcome the difficulty created by the third illustration by making the term 'nail-scissors' stand for its causal stuff of black iron 'Kṛṣṇāyasa' by extension of reference (upalakṣaṇa). But extension is generally from one particular to another or from cause to effect as in Gobiḥ śrīṇīta matsaram. . . .apart from the violation of the primary sense of 'Nakhanikṛntana'.

There will be no such difficulty if the point of view of the examples is divorced from material cause and effect relation in favour of a more viable one of resemblance and primacy. The third example can be seen to be suggestive of a Kaimutyanyāya indicating how when even the knowledge of a comparatively small thing like a pair of nail-scissors can lead to the knowledge of many other things made of the same stuff, knowledge of majesty of B. can easily be understood to be fully competent to enable us to know what is worth knowing about the world, which when compared with B. is so insignificant (like nail-scissors) and is so completely dependent on it for its very existence and functioning.

Thus, while the three examples present three different angles of approach in the Dvaita interpretation, they are merely multiplied in the Advaita interpretation, harping on the same idea:

Anekadṛṣṭāntopādānam dārṣṭāntikabhedānugamārtham(S).

The Upaniṣads do not generally multiply illustrations without sufficient reason. Vide S. on Muṇḍ.Up. i, 1, 7 Anekadṛṣṭāntopādānam sukhāvabodhārtham which deserves to be contrasted with

Atyalpepi hi vijñate sadṛśe tādṛśam bahu Jñāyate nakhakṛntanyā kimu Viṣṇor bahor jñānāt atyalpam Jagat

ityādinā sādṛśya-prādhānya-kaimutya-jñāpanārthatayā Mṛt-piṇḍa lohanakhanikṛntanarūpa-dṛṣṭāntatraye Vivakṣābheda uktaḥ (Rāghavendra, VTN.Tīka-gloss. p. 69 b)

There can be no two opinions that all the three examples have to stand or fall together. The complete break down of the third *as it is worded* and without emendation, is sufficient to rule out the Upādāna-Upādeya-bhāva relation between B. and the world, apart from its incompatibility with a Nirviśeṣa Brahman, which must be the content of Ekavijñāna.

In the last analysis then, Advaita has to opt for Vivartavāda and it has naturally thought it fit to switch on to it, in the supplementary part of the text: Vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam Mṛttiketyeva satyam, as the Siddhānta.

Unhappily, it is a case of '*Ito Vyāghra itas taṭī*' *here.* Vivarta explanation relying on the Vācārambhaṇa Śruti would annul the promissory statement as it stands worded, that by knowing the One, the unknown, unheard and the ununderstood *come to be known* (aśrutam śrutam bhavati). But according to the terms of Vivartavāda right knowledge of the substrate *(adhiṣṭhāna)* of the superimposed, as in the case of the rope and the snake, would automatically *put an end* to the appearance of the snake. One will thus be left with the knowledge of the substrate *alone*. That will *not* be the same as the promise held out that by knowing the one all *unknowns become known*. It would be a travesty of reasoning to say that after a person recovers from his illusion he knows or perceives the snake or the silver anymore; *Nahi śuktijño rajatajña ityucyate Virodhāt toyor jñānayoḥ.* S. himself says Ekavijñāna *sublates* the knowledge of the many; *Eka-vijñānena nānātvajñānam apanudyate* (BSB ii, 1, 14).

Commenting on Ś's Bhāṣya on B.S. i, 1, 4, 27, of which the Vācārambhaṇa Śruti is the Viṣayavākya, the *Bhāmati* has proffered an explanation that the illustration of clay and its modifications are *not* to be understood as examples of *real modifications*, but only as illusory transformations *(vivarta)*, like the rope appearing as a snake: Iyam copādānapariṇāmādi-bhāṣā. Na vikārābhiprāyeṇa api tu Yathā sarpasyopādānam rajjuḥ, Evam Brahma Jagadupādānam draṣṭavyam. Vācaspati proceeds to clarify that when the rope is known, the truth about the serpent is known; for, that is the truth of the snake: Rajvām jñātāyām Bhujanga-tattvam jñātam bhavati. *Sā hi tasya tattvam.*

The long and short of Vācaspati's explanation will be that when the Sat is known (Ekavijñāna) only the Sat will be known. That would be a mere truism and a tautology. Under the terms of Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam what is contemplated is the knowledge of all that have hitherto *remained unknown*, unheard and ununderstood (Note the words aśrutam, amatam, avijñātam) and *not the superimposed ones.*

That apart, what is meant by "the truth of a given thing" must necessarily be either its unique essence of being or its intrinsic attributes by which it is distinguished from others, in its unconditioned state. Being or becoming the substrate of a superimposed knowledge of the object or its attributes is *not and cannot be* the true nature of the object in question. When the Advaitin defines truth (or satyam) as abādhitam (uncontradicted), it is in agreement with the realistic position that satyam or to be real is to be unsuperimposed and to be object of correct knowledge (anāropitam pramitiviṣayaḥ).

If we agree with Vācaspati's explanation, we may have to accept (contrary to facts) that infinite bliss and

shellness which are the essence of Brahman and the shell, respectively, will cease to be 'the truth' of B. and the shell, as neither of them can ever become the subject of superimposition of ānanda or shellness upon them, as they are the essential properties of them and superimposition is always of an extraneous object or a property. By the same token, the Advaita theory of Error may have to be replaced by the admission Yathārtham sarvavijñānam, on the analogy of *Rajvām jñātāyām Bhujangatattvam jñātam bhavati. Sā hi tasya tattvam.*

We may now turn to the details of the first part of the Vācārambhaṇa text itself. The first two words construed with the predicate (Vikāraḥ) are well adapted to give a different meaning and suggest a different line of thought, from a realistic angle, without forcing us to taking the liberty of adding the particle 'mātram' to 'Vācārambhaṇam' and 'kevalam to 'nāmadheyam' in the text (as in Śaṅkara's construction).

It is expected of commentators that they should give reasons for making an addition or emendation of a given text or part thereof. So far as we know, no modern scholar or writer on the Upaniṣads has noticed this point or offered any explanation for the additions made in the Advaita interpretation.

It cannot be that the addition or emendation is warranted by the logic of the argument leading to the acceptance of the theory of the unreality of 'effects'. Firstly, it is open to question whether the modifications of substances into their products are merely verbal utterances and nothing more concrete. The changes undergone may be temporary, have a beginning and an end, from one state to another. Matter is known to be subject to change

from solidity to liquidity and gaseity. The states are real enough and last as long as they endure. Anṛtam is the opposite of ṛtam which comes from the root ṛ-gatau, to move or remaining the same as before. The changes of the human body from childhood to old age and death and the reduction of the body to ashes after cremation are not unreal or mere names. The names answer to certain states of being and development. The physical world is a changing reality and Brahman is an unchanging real. If whatever is made of words (vācārambhaṇam) is to be deemed to be 'mithyā' (unreal), what happens to the great literatures of the world and the writings of saints, philosophers and poets? The word 'Vācārambhaṇam' by itself cannot mean 'unreal'. And the addition 'mātram' to it is a liberty taken, not to speak of the addition of 'kevala' after 'nāmadheyam' in the Advaita interpretation. And since both vācārambhaṇamātram and nāmadheyamātram will be meaning the same thing, one of them will be redundant.

It is a tall order to be asked to believe that modifications of substances into their products are imaginary and exist in name only. International trade and technological developments would then be reduced to a farce. A pot fulfils a definite function which a lump of clay cannot. Even the Advaita school must concede that within the domain of the Vyāvahārika reality, the pot is real enough like hundreds of other things open to perception. The denial of the reality of modifications cannot therefore be made applicable *from the practical point of view.* If it is made in the Upaniṣad from the Pāramārthika angle, it would be a travesty to declare that "Clay *alone* is real" *(Mṛttiketyeva satyam)* as no exception can be made, from the Pāramārthika point of view of Advaita. If the negation is only from the

Vyāvahārika standpoint, the modifications of clay into pots cannot be dubbed 'unreal'. Either way no illustration is possible. The Śruti should have confined itself to Vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam *Brahmaiva satyam*[4]. Thus it makes no difference, whether 'Mṛttiketyeva satyam' is taken as a fresh illustration running along with the three others before or as intended merely to make clear *(upapādanam)* of the Vivarta trend of the main illustrations in respect of the world's unreality.

We may now turn to the details of the Dvaita interpretation of the disputed text and its tail end (Mṛttiketyeva satyam) to see how far it may be considered to give a better account of itself in overcoming the obstacles, logical and exegetical, encountered by the Advaita.

To begin with, it would follow naturally from the opening reference to Brahman's initiating Cosmic process after 'taking thought' *(tad aikṣata)* of its own free will to do so, that what it created must have been real and not a make-believe world. The emergence of a stupendous universe of living creatures on land, air and in the seas, and the existence of many solar systems like ours as the scientists tell us about *cannot but be real creations.*

The searching question put to the son about the ONE must naturally have been intended to awaken in him a sense of the existence of an Unseen Power energising all Matter and Spirits, like the Unseen Power hidden within the tiny seed of the banyan fruit which in course of time would develop into a mighty tree. The Advaita interpretation misses the point that it is *not* by the power of the *seed alone* that the mighty Nyagrodha has come into being, but by the immanent power of the Invisible Brahman permeating it. It is only a half-truth that the seed produces the tree by its own power : *Vaṭakaṇikāyām iva Vaṭavṛkṣaśaktiḥ* as we have it from Śaṅkara (Katha Up. C. i, 3, 11). If that be true, there is absolutely no necessity for the father to ask his son to cut open one of the tiny seeds and look in and tell him what he sees there. On the son's telling him "Nothing, Sire", the father enlightens him that it is by the unseen power of *that subtle invisible One (aṇiman)* whom the son *does not see* that the Mighty nyagrodha stands and *not* by the powers of the *seed alone : Yam etam aṇimānam na nibhālayase Etasya vai Aṇimnaḥ Mahān Nyagrodhas tiṣṭhati* (Chān. Up. vi, 12, 2). This should be clear from the use of two different words aṇvyaḥ in the feminine plural to denote the seeds *(dhānāḥ)* and *aṇiman* in the masculine singular to denote the Supreme ONE in the text of the Upaniṣad itself.

4. Read : Na ca ghatāder api Mṛdi adhyastatvād Vivartapakṣepi taddṛṣṭānto yuktaḥ. Mṛt-tattvajñānepi ghaṭādyanivṛtteḥ. Vyavahārarūpasya ghaṭāder api sattvāt. Tāttvikatva-vivakṣāyām Mṛdopi Sattvoktyayogācca. (Nym, i, 32)

In spite of the difference in status between the reality of the world and of B's being, there is a modicum of resemblance (sādṛśya) between the two, sufficient for an illustration between them. The Upaniṣad itself describes B. as Satyasya Satyam (real of the reals—Chan. Up. ii, 1, 10). Śaṅkara concedes that the existential aspect of B. is manifested in Ākāśa and others (BSB ii, 1, 6). Their distinction of status is a matter of detail.

As both the hypothesis of the material causality of B. and its Vivartopādānatva in regard to the world *do not fit in* with the requirements of the promissory statement (for different reasons, already exposed), it becomes necessary to think of a more satisfactory approach to the problem. The approach based on the primacy of B. as the Independent

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Source of the being, becoming and functioning of all finite reality, the modicum of resemblance in point of their reality offers adequate ground to justify the thesis of Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam :

Paratantraprameyam hi Svatantra-Bhagavadāyattatayā viditam niḥśreyasāya bhavati. Anyathā Gangāvālukāparigaṇanavat Tattvasaṅkhyānam apārthakam syāt (J.TS c.)

In keeping with this new approach 'Eka' in Ekavijñanam going back to Ekam eva advitīyam, at the beginning of the Adhyāya can be understood in the sense of what is primary and supreme (mukhyam or pradhānam) which is one of the many meanings recorded of Ekam, lexically.

Proceeding from this first step, it can be established as an axiomatic truth that knowledge of a primary principle, fact or datum gives completion to it and enriches the knowledge of the workings of the subsidiary, the constituent or contributory factors. This may be expressed in the form of a formula :

Pradhānajñānād apradhānam Jñātaphalam bhavati.

We have thus two ways in which the promissory statement can be understood. As already pointed out, the illustration of clay proceeds on the basis of similarity or resemblance (sādṛśya), the example of gold on preeminence and nail-scissors on kaimutya.

There cannot be two opinions on the primacy (prādhānya) of B. Śaṅkara himself applies the term 'Pradhāna' to B. in his c. on B.S. iii, 2, 11. However, this primacy of B. is sure to be besmirched if it is to undergo any transformation into the world of name and form. On the other hand, to make it the substrate of an illusory projection of the world of Vivarta would make it submit to an illusory transformation *voluntarily, after taking thought* (aikṣata)

to create, which would be funny and would hardly redound to its credit. If it does so involuntarily, it would have to be under pressure of some other Power, which has been ruled out by making it the only one that exists. Thus, both ways, Its primacy will be gone.

These difficulties can only be averted by exploring the possibility of finding a more viable explanation of the supplementary text Vācārambhaṇam ..... which has been harnessed to the Vivarta theory by the Advaita school whose acceptance, as we have seen, is detrimental to Brahman's primacy.

It is to prevent this that the Dvaita philosophers have suggested a new line of thought and interpretation of the text, as embodying a linguistic and philological analogy, intended to bring out the primacy of B. by highlighting the primacy and pre-eminence of the Vedic language and its vocabulary, with its wider range of currency, prestige, influence and intelligibility, in the good old days of the Upaniṣads all over the country, as compared with the limited range of currency and appeal of the popular languages and their dialects of the times. The mastery of the classical language gives a decided advantage. As an example, the term 'Mṛttika' is introduced in support of the analogical argument. One can easily think of its popular and dialectal variations such as māti, miṭṭi, mud, maṇ, maṇṇu, etc.

To explain the semantic and synactic bearings of the wording of the text in the overall construction of the passage, the words 'Vācārambhaṇam' and 'Nāmadheyam' here are both of them neuter nouns in apposition and the predicate is 'Vikāraḥ' (always in the masculine). Vikāraḥ is derived from vi-kṛ as Vikriyata iti vikāraḥ (karmaṇi ghañ) that

which is amenable to modification and therefore 'impermanent'. The three words taken together constitute a self-contained linguistic proposition about the nature of names (words) used to denote various objects in the man-made (Prākṛt) languages and their dialects. Such words are 'produced' then and there by the Vocal chords and organs of speech thro' speech sounds (vācārambhaṇam) at the time of their utterance. As such, they are subject to genesis and modification (Vikāraḥ): Vikṛtam. Hence, they are deemed to be impermanent (anitya), unlike the words of the sacred language of the Mantras, which are eternal and are only 'manifested' by utterance. They are independent of human utterance. Hence they are described as 'Satyam' or 'Nityam'. The use of the word Satya, in the sense of what is unproduced, unaging and deathless is attested by Chān.Up.: *Nāsya jarayā etad jīryate* Na vadhenāsya hanyate Etat satyam brahmapuram (viii, 1, 5). The word 'Mṛttika' is given as an example in point. It should be kept in mind that during the age of the Upaniṣads, the language of the Vedas had come to be regarded as the breath of the Supreme B. (Bṛh.Up. Asya mahato bhūtasya niśśvasitam etad Ṛg Vedo Yajurvedaḥ iv, 5, 11). A Vedic Poet is called upon in Ṛg Veda viii, 75, 6, to praise the gods 'in the eternal speech' (*nityayā vācā*). Manu says the Supreme Lord allotted names and duties to the Devas, Ṛṣis and others using the names already in existence in the Vedas (i, 21).

The gist of the analogical argument is that a person versed on the Classical tongue of the country has immense advantages over those who are content with the regional ones and their dialects. This bears out the truth of the formula *Pradhānajñānād apradhānam jñātaphalam bhavati.* The benefits of Aparavidyā are more than compensated for by the lasting benefits of Para-Vidyā, which therefore matters most and which Śvetaketu had evidently disregarded.

It should not cause any surprise if a speaking linguistic analogy had been introduced by Uddālaka in support of his thesis of Ekavijñanena sarvavijñānam. It loses none of its relevancy, propriety and credibility to the time it relates and the beliefs then accepted, irrespective of the reservations modern scholarship may have on the subject, at this distance of time. What is pertinent to our present consideration is whether its acceptance and incorporation here as an illustration of the thesis of Ekavijñānena Sarvavijñānam, *in the sense intended,* is compatible with the beliefs and traditions of the times to which they refer and satisfies the exegetical requirements, without strain.

In the Dvaita tradition of interpretation, Vācārambhaṇam is a compound of which the first member is 'Vācā' with a long vowel. The proposition consists of two parts, a general statement 'Vācārambhaṇam nāmadheyam Vikāraḥ'. (in prose order): All names of things ushered into existence by the speech sounds are subject to change and modification and are as such impermanent. The second part provides an illustration, *by contrast:* only the *word* 'Mṛttikā' in the Vedic language (and others of the same kind) are 'Satyam' (eternal and unproduced by utterance). Vyāsatīrtha points out that since the Laukika words have been declared to be subject to change (vikāraḥ), the counter-example cited and described as 'satyam' must necessarily belong to the category of the unproduced and the imperishable: *Iha vikṛtapratiyogina eva satyaśabdena vivakṣaṇīyatvāt* (Nym).

The particle 'iti' after the word 'Mṛttikā', in the text, according to the present interpretation is used to pinpoint

the 'word form' 'mṛttikā' as such and *not* its denotation, which has no bearing on the point of the linguistic and philological analogy. We have seen how this 'iti' serves no purpose in the Advaita interpretation. The restriction here to the word-form (śabdasvarūpa) is governed by the ruling of Pāṇinian Grammar *Na veti vibhāṣa* (i, 1, 44) which prescribes that a word used in a context of thought-content (arthaprakaraṇa) with an *iti* after it shall be construed as referring to its 'word form' only *and not* to its actual denotation. If the word is used in a terminological context with an *iti* after it (Śabdaprakaraṇa), it shall be construed in its expressed sense denoted by the word.

As the present context, according to both the parties is the thought-content of how the knowledge of the One Supreme leads to the knowledge of the many in its philosophical sense, the 'iti' used after 'Mṛttikā' has to be restricted to the word-form ('Mṛttikā'). This has *not* been done in the Advaita interaction. The Dvaita way of construing the words *Mṛttiketyeva satyam* thus rests on firmer foundations both logically and grammatically.

In Indian thought, Philosophy is not merely love of wisdom, but the discovery of the truth of things (Tattvam) from the ontological standpoint. Hence the classification of reality into 'Svatantra' and 'Paratantra' (Independent and Dependent), in Dvaita philosophy, without ignoring the epistemological and the axiological standpoints altogether. The definition of 'Tattva' as what is unsuperimposed and open to someone's valid knowledge, be it Man or God, takes care of supersensible reals also. This classification enables us to find the source of all change taking place in finite reals in the impulsion of the will of the One Self-existent positive Principle of the Independent Being, as the

changing reals in finite reality cannot *suo moto* provide such a source of change to the others, as they are all equally subject to change. This is the *raison d'etre* for the classification of Reality into Svatantra and Paratantra, which is capable of explaining the relation between the finites and the infinite, the many and the One. It is in this sense that change and causation in regard to the eternal substances recognised in Vedāntic thought has been defined in terms of Parādhīna Viśeṣāpti in Dvaita thought[5].

5. For the concept of Creation as Parādhīna-Viśeṣāpti see my *Philosophy of Madhvācārya*, Chap. XXVI.

6. MĀYĀMĀTRAM IDAM DVAITAM ADVAITAM PARAMĀRTHATAḤ

This text is the second half of the Śloka:

Prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na samśayaḥ

and is followed by another verse:

Vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenacit
Upadeśād ayam vādo jñāte dvaitam na vidyate

Their meanings are discussed by Vyāsatīrtha according to the Dvaita tradition, *as Śruti texts*, forming part of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. Its twelve prose passages are divided into four Khaṇḍas and are interspersed with four groups of verses, twenty-nine in all, at the end of each Khaṇḍa. These verses are introduced with the words "Atraite ślokā bhavanti", spoken probably by the author of the prose passages, whoever he might have been.

Śaṅkara in his BSB ii, 1, 33, refers to an *'Āptakāma Śruti'* which describes Brahman, the author of the world (i, 1, 2), as 'Āptakāma', who has no unfulfilled desires to be realised by creating the world and that therefore B's creation of the world must be deemed to be a mere sport *(līlākaivalya)* or an act of self-expression of its nature: *Devasyaiṣa svabhāvoyam Āptakāmasya kā spṛhā ?*

This makes it clear that these groups of verses of which the above cited *'Āptakāmaśruti'* is one, should already have come to be accepted as Śruti, in Śaṅkara's times. It deserves to be noted here that the epithet 'Āptakāma' *applied to B. as the Creator of the world* does *not* occur in any Principal Upaniṣad *except here*, in one of the Ślokas reviewing some of the Theories of Creation held by Cosmologists (Sṛṣṭi-cintakas) of those days. The conclusion is therefore legitimate that Śaṅkara's reference to the Āptakāmaśruti is

obviously to this text. It would be both irrelevant and untenable to suppose[1] that the reference *may* either be to Bṛh.Up. iv, 4, 6 or to Śvet.Up. i, 11 where the epithet Āptakāma is met with. For, in both these cases, it is *not* Brahman or the Creator-God connected with Sṛṣṭicintā that has been referred to as 'Āptakāma', but the *embodied-self* which has just attained knowledge of B. preparatory to exit from its physical body. This should be clear from Bṛh.Up. iv, 4, 6 "that at the time of the final departure of the self of the Jñānin, his vital airs do not depart with him" *(na tasya prāṇā utkrāmanti)*. How then can *this* text be taken to apply to 'Brahman'? As for Śvet.Up. i, 11, it tells us that "the knower of God, on the dissolution of his body attains universal sovereignty and has all his desires fulfilled". These are *not* references to the God of creation *with whom we are concerned in the Na prayojanavattva-adhikaraṇa of the B.S.*, wherein Śaṅkara has referred to the Āptakāma Śruti, to establish the Siddhānta view that the Creator-God cannot be supposed to engage in creation to satisfy some unfulfilled desire of his, by engaging in creation. The point is plain as a pike staff for anybody to see and only the blind can miss it. We are therefore left *with Devasyaiṣasvabhāvoyam Āptakāmasya kā spṛhā* as the only one which answers to the requirement of the topic of world creation discussed in B.S. ii, 1, 33 wherein S. has referred to the Āptakāmaśruti, in rebutting the Pūrvapakṣa.

Śaṅkara quotes another Śloka also (i, 16) from this group in his Bhāṣya on B.S. ii, 1, 9, where he tells us that

1. As has been done by some scholars like A. Venkatasubbia and Dr. Mahadevan who have opposed my identification in their writings. See also my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature*, pp. 164-167.

his precursor (Gauḍapāda) "the knower of the Vedantic tradition" construes it as establishing that it is Paramātman (the Supreme Being) who appears as implicated in the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep, on utpatti, sthiti, laya due to the spell of Māyā :

Māyāmātram hyetat Paramātmano avasthātrayātmanā avabhāsanam Rajvā iva sarpādibhāvena iti. Atroktam Vedāntārthasampradāyavidbhir Ācāryaiḥ :

Anādimāyayā supto yadā Jīvaḥ prabudhyate
Ajam anidram asvapnam Advaitam budhyate tadā iti.

A closer look at the wording of the verse shows that it draws a sharp distinction between the 'Jīva', who is *named* as such, as the one undergoing these states (cf.Bṛh.Up. iv, 3, 12) due to the influence of beginningless Māyā and that on waking from his slumber of Māyā the Jīva comes to know the "Unborn, Unsleeping One without an equal or a higher (Advaitam). It is clear from S's introductory remarks on the verse and its purpose that it is the 'Paramātman' who appears as the embodied self on account of beginningless Māyā that he and his predecessor looked upon it as the *locus classicus* of their 'Brahmājñānavāda' *on the analogy of the rope-snake illusion,* as stated by Gauḍapāda himself in II, 17 of his work. This interpretation of Anādimāyayā suptaḥ . . . .has been contested by Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya,* on the ground that *in this Śruti text and* in Śvet.Up. iv, 9, it is the Jīvātman and *not* Brahman, who has been *named* as falling a prey to the influence of Anādimāyā and that therefore the position of the Śruti, properly speaking, is Jīvājñānavāda and it has nothing to do with S's 'Brahmājñānavāda'. This rebuttal of R. raises a moot question how far R. is within his rights to question the propriety of S's interpretation of a Śloka *of his own Master,* as it had

come down to him. It would be a different matter where the interpretation of a text of binding authority *on both the parties* cited by one in his support is questioned and set aside by another. Unless therefore, Śaṅkarite tradition itself, *before* R. had accepted the text in question *as a Śruti* binding on all, it would be *ultra vires* and needless for R. to have referred to it as a Śruti on a par with Śvet.Up. iv, 9, and given his own interpretation of it. In the absence of such a tradition, R. would naturally have restricted himself to showing the internal inconsistency in S's interpretation between the first and the second half of the verse *and be done with it.* What drove R. to call it a Śruti *and place it* on par with Śvet.Up. iv, 9, *unless it had been admitted* in his days, in the rival school also as a Śruti text? This probability is confirmed into a certainty by S's own reference to the Āptakāma Śruti under B.S. ii, 1. 33 which could *not have escaped* R's attention.

While raising 'the important question' of the status of the Māṇḍūkya Up. and the twenty-nine Kārikās attributed to Gauḍapāda, in Vol. III of the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* edited by him (1981) Prof. Karl Potter is reticent on what he himself has to say about the important fact of R's citing *Anādimāyayā supto* as a Śruti text on a par with Śvet.Up. iv, 9, brought to light, for the first time in 1931, in my paper on the subject of the Gauḍapāda Kārikās in the *Rev. of Phil and Religion, Poona.* Potter merely observes in passing that "B.N.K. Sharma argues that both Madhva and R. hold the view that the first twenty-nine Kārikās are Sruti". Between 1931 and 1957, I have published five papers on the subject of the Śrutitva of these verses in the RPR, the Poona Orientalist and the Bharatiya Vidya (Bombay) and have met the points raised by T. M. P. Mahadevan,

R. D. Karmarkar and Y. Subrahmanya Sarma and others in my *History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and its Literature* (1981). Besides S's bhāṣya on the B.S. and Sureśvara's Vārtikas on the Bṛh.Up. Bhāṣya and Ānandagiri's gloss on it, I have placed on record evidence from the traditionally accepted works of S. such as the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, Viṣṇusahasranāmabhāṣya and NṛsimhatāpaniUp. and Vidyāraṇya's Jīvanmuktiviveka, Advaitānanda's Brahmavidyābharaṇa, *Parimaḷa* of Appayya Dīkṣita and Upaniṣad-Brahma-Yogi's c. on the Māndūkya Up. (Adyar Lib. Edn.) and from Kūranārāyaṇa and Mahācārya of the R' School. The Advaita writers named are held in high esteem in their school and they cannot be considered to have been ignorant of the *tradition* of their own school. What surprises me most is Potter's passing remark that "Various scholars have found fault with the argument of Bhattacārya and Sharma on the ground of using unauthentic works as evidence, of misinterpreting passages, of ignoring relevant evidence, especially from the commentary of Ānandagiri. Others have apparently been persuaded, at least partly. One could hardly say at this point that any consensus has emerged" (op. cit. p. 105). I must say that next to S. the author of the Sūtrabhāṣya and his direct disciple Sureśvara, Ānandagiri has been my chief witness and I have *not ignored him* at all!

Quite apart from S's reference to the Āptakāmaśruti and Anādimāyayā suptaḥ (i, 16) the quotes I have given from the disputed ślokas given by Sureśvara in his Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārtika Viśvo hi sthūlabhung nityam (ver. 3) and Svapnanidrāyutāvādyau (ver. 13) as 'Vedāntokti' and 'Āgamaśāsanam' have been duly *identified* by Ānandagiri as Śruti; Sthānabheda Śrutim pramāṇayati, Udāhṛta-

śruter artham sangṛṇhāti (p. 56) and "Atrāpi Śrutim paṭhati" (p. 582) speak for themselves. That apart, Sureśvara himself takes care to mention Gauḍapāda *by name* as the author when he quotes from the *undisputed part of his work:* Gaudpādīyam vaco atraiva gīyate.

Aniścitā yathā rajjur andhakāre vikalpitā
Sarpadhārādibhir bhāvais tadvad ātmā vikalpitaḥ (ii,17)

These should suffice to dispel any fastidious objections against accepting the twenty-nine Kārikās as Śruti. And Ānandagiri is not a tyro.

In the Introduction to his c. on S's Māṇḍukya Bhāṣya, Ānandagiri draws a clear distinction *of status* between the twenty-nine Kārikās explanatory of the Upaniṣad, which he says were *received* by Sri Gauḍapāda from Lord Nārāyaṇa with his grace and others composed (praṇītān) by the Ācārya (Gauḍapāda), referring evidently to Prakaraṇas II-IV, and that the Bhāṣyakāra (S) proposes to comment on both:

"Sri Gauḍpādacāryasya (1) Nārāyaṇaprasādataḥ pratipannān Māṇḍūkyopaniṣadarthāviṣkaraṇaparān (2) api ślokān Ācāryapraṇītān vyācikhyāsuḥ Bhagavān Bhāṣyakāraḥ." Here a very clear distinction is being made by Ānandagiri between the ślokas "received by Gauḍapāda from Nārāyaṇa with his grace" and the "others composed by the Ācārya himself". As the ślokas explanatory of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad had been "received by Gauḍapāda from Nārāyaṇa" they cannot be said to have been *composed by him*. This is crystal clear and there is no question of misunderstanding or misinterpreting Ānandagiri's plain words. One can only rouse a man who is sleeping with eyes closed. How can one rouse a man who sleeps with his eyes open?

Vyāsatīrtha does not enter into this controversy, probably because of the Śrutitva of these tweny-nine ślokas had come to be tacitly admitted by leading Advaita writers of his days. Even the author of the A-Siddhi does not join issues with him *on this question.* Vyāsatīrtha therefore confines himself to a close analysis and criticism of the logical content and contextual setting of the two ślokas and shows how they are incapable of establishing any such thesis as the falsity of the external world and its creation or the sole reality of Brahman.

To begin with, he draws special attention (with M and Jayatīrtha) to the most important point about the wording of the two ślokas in terms of an unmistakable 'Tarka' or 'Prasaṅga' form of argument in Indian Logic, which most of the modern scholars who have written on the subject of these verses have either tried to make light of or play down, or else ignore. The 'Tarka' form of argument corresponds to the *reductio ad absurdum* which is used to discomfit or discredit an opponent's position by producing a logical consequence of it that is absurd or unpalatable to the opponent or is opposed to all established Pramāṇas (aniṣṭaprasanjanam tarkaḥ). This is done by means of a 'Viparyaya-paryavasāna' (denying the consequent of the opponent's position and cornering him into an admission of the opponent's stand).

Tarka seems to have been an effective weapon in the days of Yājñavalkya, who must have made good use of it in dealing with his numerous adversaries. We have seen that S. himself has described the Yājñavalkya Kāṇḍa of the Bṛh. Up. as 'Tarkapradhāna'. The Kaṭha Up. says the knowledge of Brahman can neither be established by 'Tarka' nor disestablished by it. At the hands of the great

Buddhist Logicians, Tarka became a potent weapon against their Brahminical opponents. Śrīharṣa makes effective use of it in confuting the *Realists.*

The Tarka argument is distinguished by the use of the hypothetical 'If' (yadi) and its counterpart 'then, in that case' (tarhi) and the use of the Liṅ form of the verb (predicate) as Prapañco yadi vidyeta Nivarteta. If the world exists, it will be sublated. The hypothesis must be based on an incontrovertible concomitance (vyāpti) between the probans and the conclusion. It is here that the difficulty arises for the Advaita. It cannot afford to postulate or hypothesize that whatever exists is necessarily open to sublation. For the Advaita Brahman exists always and is unsublatable. The Vyāpti breaks down and Gauḍapāda (the supposed author of the verse) is said to have had 'a deep insight into Tarkaśāstra' (Mahadevan, *Gauḍapāda—A Study in Early Advaita*, Madras, 1952 p. 86)

For purposes of Viparyayaparyavasāna, the Vyāpti has to be restricted to 'whatever exists' and its 'necessary sublation'. The 'if' is *not* to be read into the body of the Vyāpti. Probably to avoid this difficulty, Mahadevan attempts to formulate the vyāpti in terms of "If the world *really does exist*, it would be removed." This will *not* improve matters. For the Advaita Brahman does *really exist*, but it is not *removed.* The desired conclusion cannot be established. On the contrary, the conclusion would be that not being sublated or sublatable, the world would remain real for all time (*nitya).*

R. D. Karmarkar (*Gauḍapāda Kārikas*, Poona, 1953) comes out with an original solution to solve the difficulty, by proposing to interpret the word 'nivarteta' to mean "it would undoubtedly *continue to exist*" (nitarām varteta). Such

a construction of nivarteta is against all established usage of 'nivarteta' in Sanskrit philosophical literature and Gauḍapāda's own use of it (c.f. Nivṛttes sarvadukhānām and S's words Tasmān na kaścit Prapañcaḥ pravṛtto vinivṛtto vā asti) and other usages like Nivṛtta-Karma, Nivṛttir ātmā mohasya, Viśvamāyānivṛttiḥ etc.)

Potter's *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* Vol. III gives the English translation of sloka i, 17 as follows :

"[When this happens] if the world were existent, it will have to cease to be, [but] the duality is merely Māyā (p. 105)". *The words I have put in square brackets* are unauthorised and tendentious. For, once it has been established in i, 16 that after waking up from Anādimāyā, the self realises oneness, there is no need either to raise the question as to *how* oneness could be realised *if* the world order remains un-negated or provide for its negation once again, by declaring it to be merely Māyā. It would be taking an unauthorised liberty with the text.

All this goes to show that neither the word 'Prapañca' nor 'vidyeta' could possibly bear the sense of the external world as such or Vidyeta the sense of 'existing' or 'really existing'. In keeping with the requirement of the Vyāpti, 'Vidyeta' will have to be construed in the sense of 'being born' or 'produced' for the nonce by some adventitious factor (upādhi) such as Māyā or Avidyā. As 'utpatti' (genesis) is the same as the thing in question attaining its selfhood (ātmalābha) such a construction would be compatible with the Vyāpti. Existence can also be defined as Sattā-yoga (conjunction with *esse* or *isness*). As the grammatical root *(dhātu)* can have other allied meanings (dhātūnām anekārthatvāt), Vidyeta can very well be

taken in the sense of 'utpadyeta' without any difficulty[1].

But as the external world (Prapañca) as we know it from Pramāṇas is subject to Pralaya, it would not be proper to accept it as eternal and indestructible. Hence, it would be necessary in any case *in this context* to construe 'prapañca' not in its conventional sense but in a derivative sense of an established order of fivefold eternal distinctions embracing the whole gamut of the three eternal verities of Jaḍa, Jīva and Brahman referred to in i, 16 (in the verse *just preceding)*.

Vyāsatīrtha therefore makes use of this technical sense of 'Prapañca' (in its Pickwickian sense) of a body of fivefold eternal distinctions as the subject (pakṣa) of the Tarka argument posed by the wording of the śloka : "Prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta" (which we have seen could not be taken in its accepted conventional sense of the word as the 'external world'). Being a 'Tarka' argument, it has to be pressed to its logical end by way of Viparyaya-paryavasāna, envisaging the contrary of the consequent Prapañcaḥ (Pañcavidho Bhedaḥ) Yadi vidyeta (Utpadyeta) (tarhi) Nivarteta. Na nivartate.

Tasmāt na utpadyate (Kim tu Nitya eva).

"If the body of the fivefold (distinctions) embracing Anādimāyā, Jīvas and Brahman were produced *de novo* by any adventitious factors, it would come to end some day.

1. Read : Videḥ sattārthakatvam angīkṛtya 'utpadyate' iti vyākhyātam Vyatyayo bahulam ityātmanepadam. Sattā ca kādācitkī vivakṣitā. Atha va Vidyatiḥ sattārthako arthād eva utpattivāci. (J.VTNṭ) Vyāsatīrtha cites Kumārilā's definition of 'bhāvanā', where the root 'bhū' has been used in the sense of Utpatti. As 'bhū' and 'vid' have the same meaning, the sense of 'utpatti' can be analogically extended to Vid (Vidyeta-Utpadyeta)—Nym.

*

It does not do so. Hence, it is not produced by any such factors. It is eternal and unsublatable.

It cannot be argued that such an etymological derivation of 'Prapañca' springs a surprise on us and is unauthenticated by any internal evidence in support of it in the text of the ślokas. For, the fact is that these distinctions are implicit in and clearly presupposed by references to the three eternal verities (tattvas) of (1) the insentient principle (Jaḍa) of Anādimāyā (2) the Jīva (collective singular) and (3) Brahman called 'Advaita' (one without an equal or a higher), in the very śloka immediately preceding 'Prapañco yadi vidyeta . . .' viz.

Anādimāyayā supto yadā Jīvaḥ prabudhyate
Ajam anidram asvapnam Advaitam budhyate tadā. (i, 16)

The prefix 'pra' before 'pañcaḥ' meaning 'estimable'' indicates that a knowledge of these fivefold distinctions among the three tattvas is indispensable for the attainment of freedom from the cycle of births and the shackles of Māyā. This can be gathered from other Śruti texts such as *Tam evam vidvān* amṛta iha bhavati. Pṛthagātmānam preritāram ca matvā juṣṭas tatas tena amṛtatvam eti (Śvet. Up. i, 6)

The intrinsic distinctions between the slumbering Jīvas and Jaḍa Māyā would be self-evident. So is the difference between the slumbering Jīva and the Unsleeping Lord. The anāditva of Samsāra and the dividing line between the Jīvas in bondage and those already released before them living in the immortal regions: "Yatra pūrve sādhyās santi devāḥ" and their distinctions from the Lord and mutually among the Selves both released and unreleased add up to five fundamental distinctions in all. c.f. Uta amṛtatvasya īśānaḥ (Ṛg Veda x, 90, 2) and Etasyaiva

ānandasya anyāni bhūtāni mātrām upajīvanti (Bṛh. Up. iv. 3, 32) Read: Nātra Prapañco viśvavistāraḥ. Kintu jātiyaro arthe pañcan śabdāt ḍa-pratyayah. Tataśca pañcavidhaḥ pañcaḥ. Sa ca prakṛṣṭatvāt Pra-pañcaḥ. Prakṛṣṭatvam ca Mokṣāngajñānatvāt. Tatra viṣayākāṅkṣāyām prakaraṇaprāptam uktam 'Bheda' iti (J)

It will be seen that the only way in which the prasanga argument can be saved from disaster would be by giving the key-words of the verse 'Prapañcaḥ' and 'vidyeta' more appropriate meanings required by contextual conformity and logical adequacy as pointed out by the Dvaita interpretation.

III

The inconsistency in interpreting Ślokas 17 and 18 in terms of denying the reality of the created world comes out in another way also. The wording of the ślokas reviewing various cosmological theories in verses 7, 8 and 9 *prior to* 17 and 18, reveals certain unmistakable signs of approval, disapproval or indifference to them, as the case may be. These should be helpful in determining where the personal preference of the author of these ślokas lay. It is therefore regrettable that the English translation of these verses given in Potter's *Encyclopedia* (Vol. III, p. 116) omits these expressions of opinion of their author, whoever he might have been and has given us a more or less wooden translation of the text with a monotonous use of 'some say', 'others say' and 'yet others say', without giving any inkling of the reactions expressed by the *author of these verses*. It would be idle to deny that these recorded reactions and estimations of the theories have any bearing on our evaluating them from the point of view of the author of

the verses themselves. It looks as though the Translator or the Editor does not wish to let the reader know what these reactions were, of the author of those verses. Nevertheless, words like Anye, Apare, Sṛṣṭau viniscitāh, Anyair vikalpitā, carrying different shades of meaning have something very important to convey to us about the adequacy or otherwise of some of these recorded views, in *the estimation of the author of these verses.*

This point assumes special importance and significance when we find that one of such views that "some others have fancied that Creation is akin to a dream or a projection of Magic.

Svapnamāyāsarūpeti sṛṣṭir anyair Vikalpitā (7 cd)

is, in principle and substance, the same as that of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara :

Svapnamāye yathā dṛṣṭe Gandharvanagaram yathā
Tathā viśvam idam dṛṣṭam Vedānteṣu vicakṣaṇaiḥ
(G.K. ii, 31)

Sato hyutpattiḥ praḷayo vā syāt. Na asatas śaśa-visānādeḥ (S. on G.K.)

Two of the recorded views are unmistakably realistic in thought and are mutually complementary. And both carry obvious expressions of approval :

Icchāmātram Prabhos sṛṣṭir iti sṛṣṭau viniścitāḥ (8 ab)
Devasyaiṣa svabhāvoyam Āptakāmasya kā spṛhā (9 cd)

The latter hails Creation as the spontaneous expression of Lord's nature (Prabhos svabhāvaḥ) and adds that He has no unfulfilled desires to be fulfilled by engaging in creation. Two other views that Creation is undertaken by God for the sake of *His* enjoyment (bhogārtham) or for the purpose of play (krīḍārtham) have been ascribed to 'others' (9 ab) and the view that Creation is akin to a dream or Magic

show *(svapnamāyāsarūpā)* has been expressly ascribed to "the fanciful thinking (vikalpa) of others". *And that one is the same as Gauḍapāda's.*

It does not stand to reason therefore that any such theory of Creation attributed to 'others' *and superseded in the end* by "Devasyaiṣa svabhāvoyam Āptakāmasya kā spṛhā", can possibly represent the Siddhānta view of the author of these verses or delivered in terms of "Māyāmātram idam dvaitam" in 17 c.

To sum up—Taking into account (1) *the break down of the Vyāpti* in the Prasanga argument (Prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta) *from the Advaita point of view itself* and (2) the approval accorded to Icchāmātram Prabhos sṛṣṭiḥ iti sṛṣṭau viniścitāh" (8 ab) and (3) the acceptance of the act of creation as the spontaneous expression of the Lord's nature and will (9 cd) it will have to be conceded that "Māyāmātram idam dvaitam" referring to the created Universe will *have to be given* an interpretation which *will not clash with these facts* and above all Śaṅkara's own reference to the Āptakāma Śruti which, while accepting Creation as a fact, purports to set aside only the contention that it is undertaken by God in order to realise some unfulfilled desire or purpose on His part. And we have already seen that this 'Āptakāma Śruti' *cannot* be identified with *any other text* save the present one among the twenty-nine ślokas viz. with 9 cd. The adjunct 'Āptakāma' applied to the Creator-God is what is called a 'hetugarbha-viśeṣaṇam' and it is only a significant negation of any personal benefit or advantage to be gained by the Creator that is denied here.

Coming to "Advaitam paramārthatah" (17 cd) it would be pertinent to keep in mind that these words can be interpreted in the sense that Brahman is the only real that

exists, *only after* it is first established that the entire created world is Mithyā or not-pāramārthika, like a dream or a magic show (svapnamāyāsarūpā). We have seen the difficulties, textual and contextual, which stand in the way of such a conclusion being drawn either from the 'Tarka' argument 'Prapañcho yadi vidyeta' or from the pronouncement 'Māyāmātram idam dvaitam'.

Viewed from this perspective, Māyāmātram could well be taken in the sense that the world of name and form is the outcome of the spontaneous and effortless exercise of the Divine will (māyā) which has the backing of *Icchā-mātram prabhos sṛṣṭiḥ* in sloka 8 ab carrying token of approval in its wording: *Iti sṛṣṭau viniścitāḥ*. In keeping with this, the term 'Pāramārtha' in Advaitam pāramārthataḥ can properly be understood in the sense that Brahman is the Highest (para) knowable (ma) or *ut-tama-artha* in the radical sense of Parama or uttama. Even in Advaita philosophy the term Paramārtha comes to be applied to B. in the sense that it is of the highest order of reality as compared with the lower order of reality assigned to the world. But such a classification of reality into true and false is not logical as 'reality' cannot be the generic property of both what is satya and what is 'mithyā', as pointed by Kumārila

Satyatvam na ca sāmānyam mṛṣārthaparamārthayoḥ

There is no such difficulty in recognising the reality of B. to be supreme in the sense of its being independent of every other principle in existence (Parama) which are all determined by Its will (parādhīnasatyam). It is in this sense that the Upaniṣad speaks of B. as Satyasya satyam Prāṇā vai satyam teṣām Esa satyam (Bṛh. Up ii, 1, 20). The Purāṇa clarifies this difference in the status of their reality:

Dravyam karma ca kālaśca svabhāvo Jiva eva ca
Yadanugrahatas santi na santi yadupekṣayā

(*Bhāg.* ii, 10, 12)

From the realistic point of view then, B. can be meaningfully said to be 'Parama' or the Parama-prameya, highest knowable. 'Artha' in the sense of knowable is derived from the root ṛ to move. Aryataiva jñeyataiva arthatvam arthaśabdapravṛttinimittam atra vivakṣitam. Arter auṇādika-tha-pratyayasya prasiddhatvāt. Gatyarthānām ca jñānārthakatvāt (J. NS. p. 267). References to B. as 'Parama' in this sense may be seen in Viśvataḥ paramam nityam (Mah.N. Up. xi, 2), Paramam yo mahad brahma, Mattaḥ parataram nāsti (Gita), Uttamaḥ Puruṣastvanyaḥ etc.

In a mystic way of putting things, the world is *non est* as compared with the Supreme or as St. Augustine puts it that as compared with Him they are neither fair, nor good nor *are* at all: '*Qua comparata nec pulchra sunt, nec bona sunt, nec sunt*' (Con. ci, 4). The same sentiments are expressed in describing the Turya Form of the Lord as "Advaitas sarvabhāvānām Devas turyo vibhuḥ", in Śloka 10. The phrasing—Sarvabhāvānām 'Turya Advaitaḥ' is a selective genitive (*nirdhāraṇaṣaṣṭhī*) according to Sanskrit grammar (Pāṇ. ii, 3, 41)—the black cow among cows yields plenty of milk: Gavām kṛṣṇā bahukṣīrā. In the present case also, the genitive 'sarvabhāvānām' marks off B. from all the rest, as unequalled (a-dvaitaḥ), while other entities in the world have their equals and superiors too. But B. has neither an Equal nor a higher (samādhikarahitam) and hence 'Advaitaḥ'. The description of Turya as 'sarvadṛk sadā' also bears witness to the existence of *others whom B. perceives*. 'Advaitas Sarvabhāvānām' cannot therefore be

taken to establish that no other beings exist besides B. It can only mean that It towers above all else.

As the text 'Advaitas sarvabhāvānām' cannot abolish all duality, 'paramārthataḥ' in 'Advaitam paramārthataḥ' is to be construed as an elliptical ablative (lyablope pañcamī) meaning that the Turya is designated as 'A-dvaitaḥ' in the sense of being the Highest of all knowables (paramārtham-apekṣya). The point is this—When it is said that among all existents (sarvabhāvānām-madhye) the Turya alone is A-dvaitaḥ (without a second), it follows that all the rest have their 'seconds'. If 'Advaitaḥ' applied to Turya should mean there are no other beings at all in reality, the use of the selective genitive (sarvabhāvānām) would be inappropriate. The elliptical ablative has been utilised in the Advaita interpretation of '*Upadeśad*' in verse 18. The mantra concludes that the supreme truth of the uncontradicted reality of the world under the government of the Lord as expounded in the Māṇḍūkya Up. and its explanatory ślokas can only be acquired thro' authentic Ārṣa tradition thro' instruction *(upadeśa)* of the Masters. Those who have missed it have to continue to be under the delusion that duality is a myth.

IV
CONCLUSION

The foregoing survey should make it clear that there is conclusive evidence in the prose text of the Māṇḍūkya (4–5) to hold that every one of the states of human life of waking, dream, deep sleep and beyond, with which this Upaniṣad deals, in their serial order, is carried on under the constant control, regulation and monitoring by the Invisible hand of the Supreme Being, the creator of the world-order. The prose text of the Upaniṣad 4–5 describes

the 'Prājña' associated with the state of deep sleep (suṣupti) of Jivas as the 'Antaryāmi', Lord of all (sarveśvaraḥ) all-knowing (sarvajñaḥ) and the source of the genesis and dissolution of the created world (prabhavāpyayau bhūtānām). The Bṛh.Up. which is much older refers to the state of deep sleep of Jivas and speaks of them as locked in the embrace of Prājña-Ātmā. The B.S. (i, 3, 42) based on this text and another (Bṛh.Up. iv, 3, 35) affirms that both in the state of Suṣupti and Utkrānti, the Śārīra Ātman remains different from the Prājña Ātman. This consensus on this point between these two Upaniṣads is sufficient to establish once for all that as one of this group of four Forms Viśva, Taijasa, Prājña and Turya has been unambiguously identified as the 'Antaryāmi' all-ruler, source of genesis and dissolution of the created world 'including the dream creations), it should automatically follow that the counter-parts of Prājña should also all of them be the same Antaryāmi-forms bearing the names appropriate to their monitoring activity. It would indeed be *pathetic* for the Upaniṣad to speak of the Pratyagātman *caught in the meshes of Anādi-Māyā as 'Prājña'* which means the 'Wise One'! *Seen in this right perspective,* it would be clear that so far as the text of the Māṇḍūkya and the Bṛh.Up. and the B.S. are concerned, the terms 'Viśva', 'Taijasa', 'Prājña' and 'Turya' are intended to refer only to the steering and monitoring Forms of the Supreme Being, called by those names. *It is time modern scholars, Eastern and Western who have been brought up in the belief that the Supreme Brahman has nothing to do with these states in regulating them for the benefit of the embodied-self, revise their opinion by taking a fresh look at the relevant texts of the Māṇḍūkya and the Bṛh. Up. and the B.S., which are decidedly earlier than Śaṅkara and Gauḍapāda.*

The misconception that the four forms of the 'Ātman' described in the Māṇḍūkya refer only to the Jīvātman implicated in the various states is the outcome of the ambiguity surrounding the use of the term 'Ātman' in denoting the Jivātman sometimes in the Śrutis also. We have seen in the earlier pages that in all the higher contexts of its use in the Upaniṣads dealing with the genesis of the world and the goal of Man, the term Ātman is *primarily* used in the sense of the Supreme Being. There is no need to revert to this point here. One cannot help feeling that the ambiguity surrounding this term has come in handy for the Advaita school to capitalise on it.

The Buddha has been called 'Advayavādin' in the *Amarakośa*. Buddhism advocated Śūnyavāda or Śūnyādvaita, while Vedantic Advaita mitigated it with 'Ātma-Advaita' to combat Buddhist Nairātmyavāda (no soul theory) to stem the tide of Buddhism and save the Vedic heritage from being swept away. Buddhism had come down heavily on the concept of a Creator-God and causation, by championing Ajātivāda (no causation theory). Nevertheless, the Buddhist philosophy of Nāgārjuna and others had left a deep impression on Gauḍapāda and Ś. and paved the way for the adoption of Vivartavāda in Advaita, in place of Ajātivāda, *to keep up appearances*.

Under the powerful dialectic of Advaita, earlier Sāmkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāmsā realisms receded into the background. Advaita allied with the concept of Māyā established its hegemony in the field of thought. In the circumstances, the old Ārṣa tradition of the teachings of Upaniṣads had begun to recede and go out of circulation. It was not until the days of Rāmānuja and Madhva that it could come into its own. The philosophical ideology of body

and soul relationship of Jīvas and Jaḍa with B. sponsored by R. drew its inspiration from the Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa of the Bṛh.Up. Their acceptance as inseparable adjuncts of B. without being eligible to be accepted as Svarūpa-Viśeṣas partaking of the essence of B. as in the case of its attributes of Satyam, jñānam and ānanda posed a difficulty. It was left to Madhva to remedy this shortcoming, by freeing B. from the inextricable Body-and-Soul relationship between two substances of Jīva and Acit (of opposed natures) by focussing philosophical attention on the supreme transcendence of B. (without prejudice to its immanence in all finite reality *(Tatstham tadvyatiriktam ca)* as the 'Śāstra-dṛṣṭi'. The Upaniṣads and the Brahmasūtras credit great sages like Vāmadeva and Indra with such 'Śāstradṛṣṭi', which obviously, is another name for 'Antaryāmi-dṛṣṭi', as suggested by R. in his *Śrībhaṣya*, probably for the first time among commentators on the Brahmasūtras as they are known to us. Madhva finalised it with a direct quotation from the Bhāgavata more explicitly : Śāstram Antaryāmī—

Samvit Śāstram param padam (Bhāg. i, 6, 17)

Dasgupta had long before brought to the notice of scholars that "it is highly probable that at least one important school of ideas regarding the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and the Brahmasūtras was preserved in the Purāṇic tradition. The theosophy of the Purāṇas was much influenced by the Sānkhya and Yoga. Śaṅkara's interpretation of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and the Sūtras diverged very greatly from the semi-realistic interpretations of them found in the Purāṇas. It was probably for this reason that Śaṅkara seldom refers to the Purāṇas. But since Śaṅkara's line of interpretation is *practically absent* in the Purāṇas and since the extreme Monism of some of the

passages of the Upaniṣad is softened and modified by other considerations, it may be believed that the views of the Vedanta as found in the Purāṇas and the Gita, present, at least in a general manner, the *oldest outlook of the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads and the Brahmasūtras" (A History of Indian Philosophy* Vol. III, p. 496)

In the light of this finding of Dasgupta, it need hardly come as a surprise if the following verses from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa should unequivocally identify the Four Forms of Viśva, Taijasa, Prājña and Turya of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and its explanatory Kārikās as the names of the Forms of the Antaryāmi-Brahman steering the embodied selves thro' the various states of life of waking, dreaming, dreamless sleep and Mokṣa and monitoring them. The verses are as follows:

Vāsudevas Saṅkarṣaṇaḥ Pradyumnaḥ Puruṣas svayam
Aniruddha iti Brahman Mūrtivyūho'bhidhīyate
Sa Viśvas Taijasaḥ Prājñas Turīya iti vṛttibiḥ
Arhendriyāśayajñānair *Bhagavān paribhāvyate*

(xii, 11, 21–22)

V

The latest work which has appeared on the subject of the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad and the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda is by Prof. Thomas E. Wood (*The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the Āgama Śāstra,* first Indian Edn. Motital Banarsidass, Delhi, 1992.)

Prof. Wood has quite a few disturbing things to say about these two Kārikās: Prapañco yadi vidyeta and Vikalpo vinivarteta, we are here concerned with. His observations and findings are such as to raise serious misgivings about the adequacy of the Advaita interpretation of these two verses and compel us to explore the possibility of a different Non-Māyāvāda interpretation of them.

Unlike Mahadevan and Karmarkar, Prof. Wood recognises that they pose 'the greatest problem'—which according to him is not textual, but philosophical. He argues "The AP-6 begins the discussion with the remark that the origination (creation) of all things is well established. It would certainly be odd for a writer to begin a teaching to the effect that Īśvara and the world are ultimately unreal, with such a remark. Nor is there any reason to think that the use of the word 'viniśchyaḥ' (well established) is ironic. After all, the Kārikās are a commentary on Māṇḍūkya–6 which simply and straightforwardly asserts the existence of an ultimate Cause which is God (Īśvara) and there is no reason to think the Kārikā denies the reality of what is asserted by the Mantra on which it is a commentary. If there is any irony at all, it occurs in AP-7 where the view that the world is of the nature of a dream and Magic is said to be imagined (vikalpitā) by its proponents. The term Vikalpa is not used in describing any other view in these four Kārikās. AF-9 (Devasyaiṣa svabhāvoyam āptakāmasya kā spṛhā) which surely represents the Kārikā's own view (Siddhānta) is mentioned without any comment whatever" (op.cit. p. 9)

Prof. Wood proceeds "Before we reach the conclusion that the *AP does not support the Māyāvāda,* we must take a look at AP-17 and 18 which are *'very peculiar'* (my italics): AP-17 "The phenomenal world (prapañca) would no doubt disappear *if it existed.* This duality is made of Magic (māya). Non-duality is the highest truth." AP-18: "If imagination (vikalpa) were imagined by anyone it would disappear. The doctrine is for the purpose of instruction. When known, duality does not exist.

These verses do not support Māyāvāda. According to these Verses, the world does not exist. AP-17 uses the assertion to show that the world cannot be said to disappear when the delusion of duality vanishes. The first half of this verse has the form "If it were the case of P then it would be the case of Q, where the proposition P and Q are both false". So also the verse says the world neither exists nor can it be said to disappear. A-18, if anything, is even more radical; for it asserts that the world does not even have an ontological status of illusion or imagination (vikalpa).

"It is interesting to compare AP-17 and AP-18 with AP-7 (svapnamāyāsarūpeti). AP-7 has also puzzled scholars who favour the Śaṇkara school of Vedanta; for, as we have seen this Kārikā clearly fails to endorse the Svapnamāyā view of Creation.

"Now, the Māyāvādin may try to interpret AP-7 in the light of AP-17 and 18. If he did this, one would get the result that the idea that the world is an illusion or a dream is not illusionistic enough; for the truth is that the world does not exist, not even as an imagination or illusion. Consequently, the doctrine of Māyā becomes a Māyāviç view held by those who are still in the grip of Māyā (p. 14).

"However, AP-7 will *not* support the interpretation. Note that AP-7 is a commentary on Māṇḍūkya-6 which asserts that there is an Īśvara or Lord of all—a point which is underscored by AP-6 which asserts that the origin of the world from Īśvara is a well established conclusion of the Vedānta":

Prabhavas sarvabhāvānam satām iti viniścayaḥ
Sarvam janayati prāṇas Cetomśūn Puruṣaḥ Pṛthak.

Prof. Wood is thus obilged to confess that "AP-17 and 18 *are, on any interpretation, anomalous*. They do not support the TC interpretation but create insuperable problems for any other interpretation as well. I think AP-17–18 make it impossible to give a correct interpretation of the Āgama Prakaraṇa and I am therefore inclined to regard even the AP as a composite work" (op. cit. p. 15).

The conflict envisaged by Prof. Wood between what he calls the TI and the TC interpretations of the Māṇḍūkya stems from the misconception inherent in the Advaita theory that the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep and beyond, described in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Māṇḍūkya and some other classical Upaniṣads to which the Jīvātman or the embodied self is exposed in Samsāra are gone thro' by them *on their own independent initiative*, without the controlling and regulating agency of a Supreme Being whom the Māṇḍūkya 6 itself describes in no uncertain terms as Sarveśvara, Sarvajña, Antaryāmi and as the author of the genesis and dissolution of these states (prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām). The part played by the Prājña Ātman in Suṣupti state of the Jīva already dealt with in the Bṛ. Up. (See Chapter IV) leaves no room for doubt that all these states of the Jīvātman are monitored by the respective forms of B. These points have been thrashed out in our earlier discussions. There is no "sundering of God and the Absolute, as with a hatchet", as fancied by Belvalkar and Ranade, between mantras 6 and 7, if the monitoring agency of the Lord as Antaryāmi running right thro' from Viśva to Turya as intended by the Upaniṣad is kept in view. It would be ridiculous to contend that the Antaryāmi steps in only at the Suṣupti state of the Jīva. Such a stand would be a complete negation of the entire

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thought of the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa of the Bṛ.Up. described in twenty paragraphs (III, 7, 3–23) embracing the entire Cosmos.

In keeping with the primacy of the Antaryāmi's role, AP–12 "Neither his own self nor another, neither truth nor untruth the Prājña knows nothing. Turya is all-knowing" will have to be construed as resting on the use of the suppressed causal *(antarṇītaṇic)*. That alone will be consistent with the role of the Hiraṇmaya Puruṣa in regard to the Śārīra Ātman, described in Bṛh.Up. iv, 3, 11.

The commentaries of Madhva and Kūranārāyaṇa show the application of this recognised exegetical principle to such intriguing contexts in the Upaniṣads enable us to do full justice to both the passive role of the Jīvātman and the active role of the Antaryāmi-Brahman in all these states. Kūranārāyaṇa gives a felicitous and understandable explanation of AP–12 :

Prājñaḥ prakarṣena na jñāpayati iti Prājñaḥ. Jīvasvarūpa-kala-ajñāna-vyatiriktam svāpnam bāhyam vā na kimapi jñāpayati iti Prājñanāmaka ityarthaḥ (Māṇḍūkya 5) to avoid serious conflict with the description of Prājña as "Ānandabhuk in AP–3 and Māṇd. 5 itself". Sureśvara too agrees that there is enjoyment of bliss in Suṣupti for the Jiva :

Asti bhogas suṣupte ca tathā ca ānandabhuk yataḥ

and in the next line he states :

Aiśvaro vātra bhogo'sti sarvasthāṇābhimānataḥ (p. 1566)

Since the embodied self does *not* consciously carry his linkage from one state to another (a fact indirectly admitted by Sureśvara also in iv, 3, 1114) the 'abhimāna' and *ekībhāva* in the description of this bliss as *aiśvaro bhogaḥ* would seem to be an acknowledgement of the role of the Antaryāmi in giving a taste of bliss to the Jīva in deep sleep, based

on a much older tradition reflected in the example of the lover locked in the blissful embrace of his beloved (Bṛh.Up. iv, 3, 21). The term 'abhimāna' itself betokens a measure of inner control (niyamana) over abhimanyamāna (B.S. ii, 1, 5). Sureśvara's words *Aiśvaro vātra bhogo asti* probably indicates that he knew of a tradition to that effect of a linkage between the Jīvas and the role of Īśvara as the Antaryāmi in these states, tho' he could not subscribe to it because of his allegiance to the Advaita position. We have seen that Śaṅkara's axiomatic pronouncement "Śāstradṛṣṭyā tu sarvatra Īśvarāpekṣatvam āpadyamānam na parāṇudyate (B.S.B. ii, 2, 3) will have to concede the rationale of the role of the Antaryāmi in monitoring all the states of the embodied self, in the last analysis, which is the subject matter of the four states with which the Māṇḍūkya is concerned.

It is rather surprising that Prof. Wood, who refers approvingly to Kūranārāyaṇa's endorsing what he calls the TC interpretation of the Māṇḍūkya should *not* have thought it fit to make it *quite explicit* that like Madhva he too accepts throughout his commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Up. that "the Ātman with Four Forms" (the subject matter of the Upaniṣad) is *not* the Pratyagātman of the Advaita School but the Supreme Brahman the Īśvara, the Sarvajña and the Antaryāmi, presiding over each and every one of the states of the Jīvātmans, controlling and regulating them from within and successively uniting Himself with each one of His Alter-egos in each of those states (ekībhūtaḥ). The terms Viśva, Taijasa, Prājña and Turya are primarily the names of the Supreme Brahman as the inner Controller of these states in their different environments. Terms like Sthūlabhuk, Ānandabhuk, Prājña, Bahiḥprājña, Antaḥprājña etc. all refer to the Lord in the suppressed causal

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sense of those terms (antarṇītaṇijanta). Kūranārāyaṇa explains these terms accordingly. By not bringing out this fact *prominently* to the attention of his readers and saying merely that "Kūranārāyaṇa speaks of the Self of four forms", "now with respect to the fourth Pāda of the self" gives rise to a misconception that Kūranārāyaṇa is using the term 'Self' or 'Atman' here in the same sense in which it is used in the Advaita interpretation of Avasthātraya. The reader may *not* notice stray epithets like Bhagavān or Hari mentioned by Kūranārāyaṇa. The whole background of KN's approach to the Four Forms ought to have been brought out, as he himself would like it to be:

Samastomkāravācyo ayam Ātmā Brahmādiṣu
niyāmakatvena sthitaḥ Catuṣpāt catvāraḥ pādā
amśāḥ Svarūpabhūtaḥ

The conflict envisaged by Prof. Wood between what he calls the TC and TI interpretations of the Māṇḍūkya 5, 6 and 7 is of interest only to the Advaita interpretation of it. Neither Madhva nor Kūranārāyaṇa has any trouble over it. For, to them it is the role of the Antaryāmi Brahman that is described in the Upaniṣad as controlling the states of the Jīva and the Antaryāmi is the same throughout.

Coming to AP 17–18, however 'anomalous' they threaten to be in the Advaita interpretation from the TC or the TI point of view as pointed out by Prof. Wood, a solution has to be found for sustaining the *reductio ad absurdum* argument put forward in them, instead of disowning or dismissing them as interlopers. Prof. Wood himself points out that the valid argument would be to negate the counter-factual instead of the antecedent. But neither course is possible for the Advaita position of the unreality of the world (mithyātva). Hence the stalemate, which could be ended

only by abandoning the generally accepted sense of the term 'Prapañca' *used in this* (peculiar) context and its predicate 'Vidyeta'. If these two Key-words in the argument are decoded, as suggested by the Dvaita interpretation, everything becomes smooth and clear. In accepting the suggestion that 'Prapañca' here be understood in the sense of an eternal system of fivefold distinctions in the interrelation of the three eternal verities of anādimāyā (bhāvarūpa ajñāna) Jīvas and Īśvara (Brahman), we are not asked to take anything for granted, anything not authenticated by the text itself, as the existence of these three verities has been expressly referred to in the verse (i, 16) immediately preceding the troublesome 'anomalous' ślokas: Prapañco yadi vidyeta and Vikalpo yadi kalpitaḥ. The exigencies of an incontrovertible Vyāpti for purposes of Viparyayaparyavasāna necessitates our understanding the predicate 'Vidyeta' in its *next nearest cognate sense* of 'utpadyeta' (if produced anew) which cannot be deemed to be a liberty. As Prof. Wood has come to the conclusion that AP does *not* support the Māyāvāda and that 'Devasyaiṣa svabhāvoyam Āptakāmasya kā spṛhā' represents the Siddhānta of the Kārikās of the AP, the reality of the world would emerge unscathed as an integral part of the conclusion of the reality of the three eternal verities and their interrelation.

7. IDAM SARVAM YAD AYAM ĀTMĀ

This text from the Maitreyi Brāhmaṇa of the Bṛh.Up. (ii, 4) opens with Yājñavalkya's call that 'Ātman' should be seen, heard of and reflected upon to attain immortality. It has a family resemblance to others of its kind such as Puruṣa eva idam sarvam (ṚV. x, 96, 2) and 'Brahman is verily all this (Bṛ.Up. ii, 5, 1) which gets repeated in thirteen paragraphs, following ii, 5, 1.

We have seen in the discussion on the Vācārambhaṇa Śruti that it would be a grave error of judgement to proceed on the unproved assumption that the term 'Ātman' has been used in the Principal Upaniṣads more or less exclusively to denote the Pratyagātman, the hypostatic 'pure self' of Man stripped not only of his external appurtenances of body and organs but of any intrinsic properties of his conscious personality such as to will and the power to act by way of self-expression as an intelligent being, to rise from darkness to light and from death to immortality.

Kīdṛk tat pratyag iti cet tādṛg īdṛg iti dvayam
Yatra na prasaratyetat pratyag ityavadhārayā.

It is such an abstraction of 'pure being' which is the subject matter of philosophical inquiry and realisation in the Upaniṣads, according to Advaita.

We have seen that in all higher contexts pertaining to the goal of Man, the genesis of the world and man's deliverance from the rounds of transmigration, it is the Supreme Brahman *other than* the Pratyagātman who has been postulated as the Inner Controller and energising Principle (Antaryāmi) not only of all insentient reality but the world of thinking beings as well. cf. "He who dwells in the Ātman and controls the Ātman from within, whom

the Ātman does not know, He is thy Ātman the Antaryāmi" (Bṛh.Up. iii, 7, 22). This text establishes once for all that the term 'Ātman', in its primary sense, is reserved for the Supreme Being present in the human self, as everywhere else. There is no evading this clear import of the text, by trying to make the Pratyagātman himself the master and controller of his body and organs from within. At best that may be half-truth. Man's helplessness at the time of his impending death has been vividly brought out in one of the nine illustrations given by Uddālaka in his Upadeśa to his son concluding his message with the solemn truth "Aitadātmyam idam sarvam", of which *Tat tvam asi* at the tail-end is only a corollary.

There is ample evidence in the Upaniṣads and the Gita that all states of embodied existence of selves are always under the vigilant control of the Antaryāmi (Gita xv, 8, 11, 13 and 14; BS. i, 2, 42). The Pratyagātman is only a tenant in his physical body, *on tenure*. He is not its absolute owner or ruler. He is always the Seeker and never the sought. If any confirmation of this is needed one has only to turn to the *concluding paragraph following the repetitions of Brahmaivedam Sarvam* (All this is indeed Brahman Bṛh. Up. ii, 5, 1–14) which reads: Verily, this Ātman is the Lord of all beings and the King of all. As the spokes are held together in the hub and the felly, so too are held all the gods, all the worlds, all breathing creatures *and all these Ātmans (Asmin ātmani sarve ete ātmānas samarpitāḥ* (Bṛh. Up. ii, 5, 15). Here, the second 'Ātmānaḥ' can only refer to the Pratyagātmans. *This should provide indisputable evidence that in the opinion of this Śruti, the Pratyagātman is different from the Supreme Ātmam, the Antaryāmi and is dependent on Him in all states of his existence, here, now and beyond.*

Whenever he comes across such difficulties in the text of the Upaniṣads, Śaṅkara is usually ready with his two-level theory of truth to explain them away and to pit the Dualistic implications of the supposed 'identity texts' such as the present one and Bṛh.Up. iii, 7, 22 of the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa itself in which the Pratyagātman has been sharply distinguished from the 'Antaryāmi', against some *other supposedly* Monistic text which is *equally in dispute*, such as Yatratvasya and *assume* that the earlier one cited by him is unquestionably in favor of identity, *without examination of its exegetical details.* This cannot be accepted as a proper procedure. Every interpretation of a disputed text, dualistic or Monistic-looking will have to be put thro' a rigorous analysis before a conclusion is arrived at. We are constrained to say that Śaṅkara tries to get away by trying to make one disputed text come to the aid of another, which is far from convincing. In this respect, the commentary of Madhva shows a better sense of commentatorial responsibility.

The use of the language of identity (which can be traced back to the Brāhmaṇas) in a figurative statement is not uncommon in Scriptural passages and in common parlance. We often say this water is all salt, the King is the state, the Brahmin is all the gods. The Mahābhāṣya cites "(consumption of) sour curds is direct fever" (i, 159). Vedic texts like—Ghee is life, the Sacrificial Pillar is the Sun, the handful of Darbha grass is the Sacrificer—and others of its kind have been listed and explained in the Tatsiddhipeṭikā of the Pūrvamīmāmsā (i, 4, 23). The *Upaniṣadic texts are also part of the Vedic corpus and are not exempt from the purview of the same rules of interpretation* as can be seen from the application of many of these principles in

the Brahmasūtras also. The Advaita thinkers have themselves appealed to the Āpaccheda nyāya of the Pūrvamīmāmsā in establishing the superiority of the posterior to the prior (pramāṇa), to discredit the evidence of Pratyakṣa as against Śruti.

If the text 'Idam sarvam yad ayamātmā' (Bṛh.Up. iv, 4) is to be interpreted in the sense that the world of name and form has no existence apart from B. on the lines of 'Yaḥ Puruṣaḥ sa sthāṇuḥ', as a superimposition, it would necessitate giving both 'sarvam' and 'ātmā' secondary meanings, which will offend the principle of economy of assumptions. If the secondary sense is restricted to only one of them (Ātmā) in terms of dependence of everything in the world of name and form on Brahman, the spirit of the text as clarified in the concluding part (vākyaśeṣa) in ii, 5, 15 (quoted earlier) will remain unchanged.

Moreover the present text 'Brahmaivedam sarvam' (ii, 5, 1–14) is also *preceded* in the previous Brāhmaṇa (ii, 4, 6) by "Everyone will discard one who takes everything to be located (rooted) *elsewhere than in Brahman* (anyatra), the examples of the drums being the *source* of the sounds (ii, 4, 7) following. The text 'Puruṣa eva idam sarvam' (RV. x, 90, 2a) is followed by (He is the Ruler of the immortals (RV. x, 90, 2c). The Iśa Up. 1, 7 ab, if taken literally would conflict with Iśa 6 preceding and Iśa 8 which speaks of the Wise One who has created the worlds to last forever. (śāśvatīs samāḥ).

There is thus no scope for the identity doctrine if one carefully examines the texts in the light of what precedes and what follows such seemy references on account of the language of identity.

8. YASMĀT PARAM NA APARAM ASTI KIMCIT

This text is from Śvet.Up. (iii, 9). Śaṅkara has *not* commented on this Up. tho' he has quoted from it in his Bhāṣya on the Sūtras. The Advaita interpretation is based on the commentary of Śaṅkarānanda. Following this Radhakrishnan translates the verse: Than whom there is naught smaller, nor more immense, nor more subtle or atomic, that ONE stands like a tree established in Heaven. By Him the whole world is filled.

Such a wholesale negation of *both* the possibilities is to rule out the existence of any second entity as such besides B. (Ātman)—ātmanaḥ param, na aparam asti kimcit. Utkṛṣṭam apakṛṣṭam va kimcit nāsti. Dvitīya-abhāvāt ityarthaḥ (Śaṅkarānanda).

Such an interpretation goes against both the preceding verse (8) which runs: "I know that GreatBeing which is Sun-like in color and is beyond Tamas (Prakṛti)" and the *next* following "That which is beyond *this world* is the One without Form and suffering. Those who know it become liberated": Tato yad uttarataram tad arūpam avyayam" (9). Here, the antecedent of 'tataḥ' *has to be* the world of name and form, referred to as 'Idam sarvam', which is said to be 'filled by the Puruṣa': "Tenedam pūrṇam Puruṣeṇa sarvam". That would naturally make the world of name and form the second entity in question, of inferior status to the Ātman, showing that *there certainly is* an entity which is inferior in status to B. *(apakṛṣṭam)*, as compared with It. It would therefore be wrong to treat the first line in terms of a double negation of both 'Param' and 'Aparam'. In order to get over this difficulty, Śaṅkarā-

nanda proposes to make 'Hiraṇyagarbha' mentioned *as far back* as in verse 4, the antecedent of 'Yasmāt', instead of *this* world (idam sarvam) *given in the same verse.* However, this makes no difference to the difficulty presented by the words 'Tato yad uttarataram' whether the antecedent is 'the world' or Hiraṇyagarbha mentioned in verse 4 earlier. There is no annulling the existence of something less than or inferior to B. (apakṛṣṭam). The attempt to do so is an exercise in futility.

Vyāsatīrtha therefore rightly points out that the negative is to be *restricted* to *Yasmāt param na* and not *extended* to 'Aparam' also. What the Śruti intends to state is that while there is naught greater than Ātman (B) there certainly *is* something lower or inferior to it in status (Aparam asti). The world, which we are told is filled by the Puruṣa. This concluding statement Vākyaśeṣa establishes beyond doubt that there is a second entity which is 'filled' by the Puruṣa all over. This is again reinforced by a reference in the very next line: What lies *beyond this world* is the Sun-like Puruṣa, without Form, by knowing whom one attains immortality. There are also plenty of other references like "He is the Lord of immortality (iii, 12) who develops the immature nature of whatever is to be refined" (v, 5). "*Two unborns*, the knowing self and the insentient, the ruling one and the ruled" (i, 9). The one Lord rules over the perishable and the souls (iii, 14) all of which clearly establish the actual existence of the world of matter and Souls which is of inferior status to the Supreme Lord, according to the Upaniṣad. In the face of so much evidence it would be foolhardy to contend that there is no second entity at all, in fact, subject to His sway. In the second line of iii, 9, "Than whom there is naught else

greater or more subtle, we have *two* negatives *actually used* and it stands to reason that there cannot be anything greater or subtler than the Supreme. But in the first line of iii, 9a the text has advisedly used only *one negative* "Yasmāt param na" and there is nothing to forbid our construing this negative with the words 'Yasmāt param' *only*, and *not to extend it to the latter part* (Aparam *asti* kimcit). Such an extension would be inconsistent with the existence of the world which is said to be 'filled' by the Puruṣa and with the existence of the Puruṣa *as one who stands far above the world* (tato yad uttarataram).

Rāmānuja also in his *Śrībhāṣya* on B.S. iii, 2, 35, goes into the details of the wording of Śvet. Up. iii, 9 and establishes that what this text really wants to convey is that there is no *other* Being (aparam) which is superior (param) to Brahman. It is the only one which is without a higher to challenge its authority and independence : Mattaḥ parataram nāsti (Gita, viii, 7). In other words, B. is the only Paratara. The negative 'Yasmāt param aparam na' denies supereminence to everything other than B. and insists on the *sole paratvam* of B. *Tadvyatiriktasya paratva-abhāvam pratipādya)*. R. also points out that the sweeping negation of all else but B. would be inconsistent with the spirit and the letter of the opening passage of Adhyāya III of the Upaniṣad itself (as we have seen) and what is stated immediately after : Tato yad uttarataram (iii, 10) and others following in iii, 11–15. He also shows the text : Nahyetasmād iti netyaparam asti (Bṛh. ii, 3, 6) conveys an identical purport *Etasmād Brahmaṇo anyat param nāsti ityarthaḥ)*.

In R's way of construing the first line, the negative particle is shifted after 'aparam' and connected with it and the entire first line is made to convey the truth that there

is no other Being higher than B. In the Dvaita way of interpreting it, the absence of any being greater than B. is affirmed *side by side* with affirmation of the existence of other entities like the world whose position and status are inferior to B's. In other words, the Dvaita interpretation focuses attention on *both these facts*, expressly, instead of leaving the existence of the inferier principles to be gathered by implication.

9. INDRO MĀYĀBHIḤ PURURŪPA ĪYATE

This text is from the Madhu-Brāhmaṇa of Bṛh.Up. (ii,5,19). Its original source is Ṛg Veda vi,47,18, wherefrom it is quoted in the Upaniṣad. The full text is:

Rūpam rūpam pratirūpo babhūva Tad asya rūpam praticakṣaṇāya
Indro Māyāhiḥ pururūpa īyate yuktā hyasya Harayaḥ śatā daśa.

Śaṅkara interprets it as conveying that the Supreme Being (Parameśvara) illusorily appears in a countless patterns of close similarity with each other, within countless species of life inhabiting the world of name and form such as humans, animals, birds and aquatic creatures, in order that His unconditioned nature as a mass of consciousness, as the source of all illusory appearances can be *made known*.

Parameśvaro nāmarūpe vyākurvāṇo yādṛksamsthānau mātāpitarau tādṛgrūpa eva putrādirūpeṇa jāyate. Nahi catuṣpado dvipāj jāyate dvipado vā catuṣpāt. Kimartham punaḥ pratirūpam āgamanam tasya ityucyate Tad asya ātmano Nirupādhikatvapraticakṣaṇāya, pravikhyāpanāya. Yadi hi kāryakaraṇātmanā nāmarūpe na vyākriyete, tadā asya Ātmano Nirupādhikam prajñānaghanākhyam rūpam na pratikhyāyeta. Indraḥ Parameśvaraḥ Māyābhiḥ prajñābhiḥ Nāmarūpakṛtamithyābhimānair vā māyābhiḥ, na tu paramārthataḥ, Pururūpo bahurūpo babhūva. Ekarūpa eva san, Avidyāprajñābhiḥ. Kasmāt kāraṇāt? Svaviṣayaprakhyāpanāya. (Śaṅkara Bṛh.Up.C.)

But the text itself does not allude to any such physical relationship that S. has in mind. There is also another

mantra in the Ṛg Veda (iii, 53, 8) which speaks of the many forms assumed by Indra by his own power to be present at various pressings of Soma in several yajñas at the same time, thrice a day. The simultaneous self-manifestation of Indra to receive oblations offered to him cannot be deemed to be illusory. It would be derogatory and repugnant to the solemnity of the Vedic sacrifices if the god invoked by the Ṛtviks should be other than himself—a projection of magic. The words "Tad asya rūpam praticakṣaṇāya" clearly show that these Pratirūpas of Indra are for the votaries of Indra to see Him *(praticakṣaṇāya) as He is in reality, before them.* They cannot therefore be illusory projections. Such an idea will be repugnant to the sanctity and solemnity of the sacrificial system of the Ṛg Veda from which the quotation has been made.

Apart from that, according to Advaita, it is the Pratyagātman who erroneously assumes thro' ignorance that he perceives countless appearances of name and form and not the Nirupādhika Brahman, as such. It would therefore appear that the phrasing 'asya rūpam' would be inappropriate as the appearances are not the Rūpas of the formless absolute. The reason given by Śaṅkara for Parameśvara assuming these forms by Māyā is far from convincing,—to *make Himself known*. The Nirupādhika Brahman is the only real that exists. Why then should it put on a mask of Māyā and appear as the *illusory many* in order "to make itself known" (svaviṣayaprakhyāpanāya) as Prajñānaghana? *To whom* should it make itself known? What does it stand to gain by this exercise in futility? This shows that the term "asya praticakṣaṇāya" ought more properly to be construed in the sense of "for the others" (perceivers), the devotees of Indra, *to see Him.* This

would agree better with the root sense of the verb Cakṣ, to see (of which Hindi caṣmā is a derivative). The other meaning of Cakṣ, in the sense of speaking or explaining needs a prefix ā (ācakṣate). It is the latter sense, Śaṅkara has in mind when he explains it as Prakhyāpanāya.

The overall sense of the Mantra seems to be connected in some way with the Lord's numerous Forms to be directly perceived by the Jīvas *for their own benefit*. Since Śaṅkara himself agrees that the term 'Indra' here in the Upaniṣad (also) in this context stands for the Supreme Brahman (Parameśwara) we are brought one step nearer to the possibility of understanding this Mantra as propounding a symbolic relation of Bimba and Pratibimba between the Supreme Being and the myriads of the selves (Jivasvarūpas). The concept of Bimbapratibimba-relation between Jiva and Brahman in Dvaita Philosophy is derived from this Mantra of the Ṛg Veda[1].

Apart from the solitary word 'māyā', there is nothing in the original Mantra : Rūpam rūpam pratirūpo babhūva as it occurs in the Ṛg Veda, where it is found as a part of an extensive recital of the praises of the vast powers, heroism and exploits of 'Indra', which in the Ārṣa tradition of the Vedic Seers is used like the other names of the minor gods to denote the Supreme Being, in its fullest primary sense. Śaṅkara himself concedes that it is so. So there is no problem about the tenability of the Adhyātmic sense and

1. ***Rūpam rūpam pratirūpo babhūva iti Pratibimbatvācca na Sāmyam*** (M. BSB ii, 3, 50)

Rūpam rūpam pratirūpo babhūva iti pūrvoktānām Jīvākhya-pratibimbāni prati Bimbabhūta-Bhagavadrūpāṇām iha Rūpa-śabdena pratyabjjñānāt (Nym.)

(See also my BSPC. Vol. II pp. 179–80).

interpretation of this hymn. In Ṛg Veda (vi, 47, 16) 'Indra' is praised as the great Hero (Vīra) who has subjugated (*damāyan*) many ferocious adversaries (*ugram ugram*). He enables those loyal to him to prosper (*anyam anyam ati nenīyamānaḥ*) and He thwarts those who aspire beyond their deserts (*Edhamānadviṭ*). He makes the ordinary mortal go forth from birth to birth (*Coṣkūyamāṇo viśaḥ*). He assumes many forms with his powers. The horses yoked to his chariot run into tens and hundreds. He kills the Dāsas and Śambara (ṚV. vi, 47, 16 ff).

It is in this set-up that the present text *Indro māyābhiḥ* occurs in the Ṛg Veda. Without going into intricacies, we may take it that in its broadest sense this Mantra tells us that the Forms assumed by 'Indra' are for *His votaries to see : Tad asya rūpam pratcakṣaṇāya)*. Thus, the context and the spirit of the Sūkta in which the exploits of 'Indra' are lauded by the Vedic Poet and Seer would be repugnant to hold that these powers and exploits of 'Indra' partake of the nature of Magic or are illusory projections.

10. SATYASYA SATYAM

In Br.Up. ii, 1, 20 we read: From this Ātman issue forth all the breaths, all the worlds, all Devas, all beings. His secret name is 'Satyasya Satyam', the 'truth of truth'.

It is argued by the Advaita thinkers that this text speaks of degrees of truth *in their sense*. It implies that the truth of Prāṇa and the rest of the world is less than that of B. and must therefore be unreal (mithyā) because the truth of the world is negated by the absolute truth of B. And what is negated must be 'mithyā'. The conclusion follows that the whole world consisting of Prāṇas and ever so many other tattvas is Mithyā.

The cryptic statement of the Upaniṣad 'Tasya upaniṣad Satyasya satyam' 'His secret name is Truth of Truth' contains the clue to the hidden sense behind the statement. Elsewhere, in Bṛ.Up. v, 5, 3–4, 'Aham' and 'Ahar' have both been pronounced to be the secret names of the Lord. The opening words of ii, 1, 20, speak in all seriousness of the genesis of the worlds, the Devas, the Prāṇas and so many others (Prāṇopalakṣitasarvajagat). This creation is also the outcome of its deliberate thought *(īkṣāpūrvakam)* as stated in the Ait.Up. i, 1 and elsewhere. Hence, the created world cannot be dismissed as Mithyā in the sense of being the counterpositive of a negation in essence for all the three periods of time (as officially defined). A parallel passage in Bṛ.Up. iv, 4, 18 throws light on the description of Ātman (B) as Satyasya satyam by explaining that the Supreme Being is the Prāṇa of Prāṇas, the eye of the eyes, the ear of ears, the mind of the minds. Those who know this know the ancient Brahman. Commenting on this passage,

Śaṅkara says that "the power of sense organs like the eye, ear and others to perceive objects, hear sounds etc., is derived from the power of B. transmitted to them. In the absence of such transmission they would be inert *like pieces of wood and stones*[1]".

In the same way, the words Prāṇasya Prāṇaḥ have to be construed to mean that Brahman is the impeller (preraka) of the Prāṇas. This kind of relationship does not do away with the reality of the controlled. It is based on the dependent and derivative nature of the reality of the world as determined by the eternal will of the Lord. There is no need to go beyond this reasonable limit and reduce the Prāṇas and everything else to Mithyātva, in the sense defined by the Advaita.

The appeal to two orders of reality as Pāramārthika and Vyāvahārika is not the only way or even the rational or reasonable way of explaining the statement Satyasya satyam. It would be improper for the Śruti to declare that Prāṇas are real (Prāṇā vai *satyam)* and *then, immediately after, take it away*. It may well be that as compared with the self-determined reality of B. the reality of the world as determined by B's eternal will is, comparatively speaking, of very little importance (apakṛṣṭasatyam) just as we say that as compared with the wealth of the millionaire the bank balance of X, Y or Z is 'nothing'. Such figurative ways of speaking are not uncommon in life and literature:

Tvam idam sarvam asi Tava vayam smaḥ Taduktam
Tvam asmākam Tava Smasi (A.A. ii, 5)

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1. Brahmaśaktyadhiṣṭhitānām hi Cakṣurādīnām darśanasāmarthyam. Svataḥ kāṣṭhaloṣṭhasamāni hi tāni Caitamyātmajyotiṣā sūnyāni.

Pavitrāṇām pavitram yo Maṅgaḷānām ca maṅgaḷam
Tāsām āvirabhucchauriḥ Sākṣān *Manmatha-manmathah*
(Bhāg.)

Some Advaita thinkers have argued that as B. has been defined as 'Satyam' in Satyam jñānam anantham Brahma (Taitt. Up.) it is suggestive of a presumptive reasoning that the world of name and form is Mithyā. But there is a specialised and authenticated interpretation of 'Satyam' itself applied to B. in Chān. Up. viii, 3, 4–5 throwing light on the esoteric sense of the tri-syllabic 'Sat-ti-yam' (Satyam) "Verily, the name of Brahman is 'Satyam'. There are three syllables here sat, ti and yam. That which is 'Sat' is immortality. What is 'ti' is mortal. *Yam* is that by which these two worlds are held together", (controlled) and kept apart (from colliding) as we find it said in another Śruti (eṣām lokānām asambhedāya). This is tantamount to saying that Satyam as applied to B. expresses the idea that it holds the world of immortality and the mortal world under its sway (cf. *Uta amṛtatvasya īśānaḥ* and for that very reason is called 'Sat-ti-yam (Satyam for short). The description and the etymological light thrown on the significance and propriety of the description of Brahman as 'Satyam' should show that it is not necessary to do away with the reality of the world of the mortals and the immortals to save the reality of Brahman. Brahman who has created the world after due deliberation *(tad aikṣata)* can be expected to take care of its own reality without the proferred help of Māyāvāda and Mithyātva of the world of creation.

11. ATO ANYAD ĀRTAM

Vedānta-Kaumudi of Rāmādvaya claims that the Śruti text 'Ato anyad ārtam' of the Bṛh.Up. iii, 4, 2 is evidence of the world's mithyātva (falsity).

The words 'ārti' and 'ārta' are interrelated. 'Ārti' means suffering, pain, affliction and misery. Only living beings and thinking selves can experience pleasure and pain and react to them. Insentient principles in the world of name and form cannot. In the circumstance, the statement of the Śruti Ato anyad ārtam meaning "Any other than this (Brahman) is subject to affliction, pain and suffering and therefore imperfect *(ārtam)* has naturally to be understood to convey that the Jīvātmans can never be taken to be identical with the Supreme B. which is always and for ever free from all kinds of 'ārti' (Niraniṣṭo niravadyaḥ).

Śaṅkara has however tried to construe 'ārtam' in the sense of what is perishable or is an 'effect' which would only apply to the insentient world of name and form, as the Jīvātmans are not 'effects' (kārya). Anyway, tho' the Jaḍa-prapañca is indeed an effect it cannot be called 'ārtam' in the accepted sense of the word as attested by its usage confined only to living beings and thinking selves:

Ārto jijñasur arthārthī Jñani ca (Gita vii, 6)

Ārtatrāṇāya vah śastram he prahartum anāgasi (Śākuntalā)

Ārtā Viṣaṇṇāḥ śithilāśca ghorāḥ *(Mukundamālā* 14)

That apart, the privative pronoun 'anyat' (other than) tho' it refers to everything other than the 'given one' in general, yet contextually speaking, it has to be restricted only to such others of the same category or genus *(sajātīya)*. Since 'anyat' has to denote some 'other' than the given Brahman which is of the nature of Caitanya (intelligence) the

'other' sought to be distinguished from it and pronounced to be 'ārta' must necessarily be a sentient principle also and *not* a Jaḍa-vastu belonging to the category of name and form. This principle of exegesis has been recognised in the *Asya gor* dvitīya-nyāya' of the *Mahābhāṣya* quoted by Śaṅkara himself in his Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra : Guhām praviṣṭau ātmānau (i, 2, 11) with approval and applied to the Siddhānta.

In response to Uṣasta's demand that he should give a final definition of Brahman as immediately present and directly intuited (Yat Sākṣād aparokṣād Brahma), Yājñavalkya defines it as 'Sarvāntara' which is *in all*, as the unseen Seer, the understander of understanding and so on. It would be a serious mistake to take it that it is the Pratyagātman which has been referred to as the 'Sarvāntara' by Yājñavalkya. The Pratyagātman is no doubt within the Body. But it is open to question whether the same Pratyagātman is within every other physical body of countless men and women not to speak of animals. According to the Gītopaniṣad it is *the Lord* who resides in the heart of every living being (18, 61). Leaving that question aside, Yājñavalkya has himself openly declared in the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa (Bṛh.Up. iii, 7, 22) Madhyandina recension, that the Antaryāmi Brahman present in the Pratyagātman controls him from within : *Ya ātmani tiṣṭhan ātmānam antaro yamayati eṣe te ātmā antaryāmi.* The description of Brahman as *Sarvasmād antarataraḥ* in Bṛh.Up. i, 4, 8 must show that terms like *Sarvāntara* and *Sarvasmād antarataraḥ* can *never* be applied to the Pratyagātman.

The Śruti *Ato anyad ārtham* cannot therefore be cited as evidence of the world's Mithyātva, as such an interpretation is out of context.

12. ANANTAM BRAHMA (Taitt.Up. II, 1)

Citsukha holds in his *Tattvapradīpikā* that the epithet 'anantam' applied to B. in Satyam jñānam anantam brahman, is proof of its being 'unlimited' by the existence of any second entity (Vastupariccheda) which means that it is the only real that exists and can exist.

Vyāsatīrtha disputes this way of understanding the meaning of 'anantam'. He points out that 'anta' (end) conveys the sense of a limit and not what is limited by other things in existence. This absence of limit to one's being, in time, space and the number of its distinctive attributes may well be intended by the word *anantam* applied to B. in this text. 'Anta' then would signify a limit and not the absence of difference. Even tho' non-difference (abheda) is in the nature of absence of limitation, it would be proper to keep the Notions of difference and limitation apart. When we speak of Ākāśa as being unlimited in space and time 'sārvagata ākāśaḥ' it only means that it is so in spite of the existence of time and space as equally real existents in their own right and loci. Space and time are eternal verities and are boundless in space and time and abide in themselves *(svavṛtti)*. If space is created, it could not have been previously existing. The non-existence of Space cannot be imagined by any mental effort. An untraceable Śruti text *cited by Śaṅkara* speaks of B. as eternal and all-pervasive *like Ākāśa* (BSB II, 3, 4). So, when we speak of Ākāśa as being unlimited by space and time, it only means that it is so in spite of the existence of space and time in themselves and not in the sense that Time and Space are *not* in existence at all. Even so, it is only when material

objects having an existence of their own (like our own thinking selves) do exist that B. can be said to be *not* limited by *their existence*.

The contention that our thinking selves are *real* while material objects are unreal (mithyā) cannot be put forward at this stage, as the Mithyātva of material objects is yet in dispute between the Monistic and the Dualistic schools. Similar objections that the real existence of material objects besides B. is impossible because B. is all-pervasive and that no two bodies can occupy the same space are irrelevant because B. is not 'a body' in the physical sense of the term and the Śrutis tell us that B. can be smaller than the smallest atom and is the inner source of impulsion of all others. It must be left to the inscrutable power of B. (its acintyādbhutaśakti) to be able to be more minute than minutest atom or electron, if what the Upaniṣads say that the B. is the innermost being in everything: Anyasmāt Sarvasmād antarataraḥ (Bṛh. Up. i, 4, 8), Aṇor aṇīyān (Śvet. Up.) is true. The only answer to such riddles is what has been suggested by Śaṅkara himself:

Acintyāh khalu ye bhāvā na tāms tarkeṇa yojayet
Prakṛtibhyaḥ param yacca tad acintyasya vaibhavam

The atoms of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika are by hypothesis unlimited by the existence of time. That does not mean that Time does not exist and that atoms alone exist. Moreover according to accepted Advaita interpretation, the text Satyam jñānam anantam is understood to isolate B. from all that is false (anṛta) and material (jaḍa) by means of the terms 'satyam' and 'jñānam'. These two eliminations will take care of the supposed limitation likely to be imposed by the presence of 'others' material and non-material as a whole. There would thus be no possibility or necessity to

seek to set aside possible limitation by the existence of other entities by the use of the term *anantam* once again.

It would thus appear that the only proper way to construe 'anantam' as applied to B. would be to hold that it is not limited by any limit set to the number of its sovereign attributes whose nature is beyond human imagination.

The Śrutis themselves have not set any limit to them as they transcend speech and thought: Parāsya śaktir vividhava śrūyate svābhāviki jñānabalakriyā ca (Śvet Up. vi, 8).

Vyāsatīrtha therefore concludes that the only viable interpretation of 'anantam' would be that Brahman transcends the limits of Time and Space and any full stop to the countless number of its sovereign attributes: *Tasmād deśa-kāla-guṇa-aparicched eva anantaśabdārthaḥ*. The commentary of Vijayīndra Tīrtha clarifies that 'aparicched' means *iyattāśūnyatvam* (boundlessness).

This interpretation that B's attributes are infinite in their range and number is corroborated by the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*:

Mayyanantaguṇe anante Guṇato anantavigrahe (vi, 4, 48)
and the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (vi, 5, 85).
Tejobalaiśvaiyamahāvabodhasuvīryaśaktyādiguṇaikarāśiḥ
Paraḥ parāṇām sakalā na yatra kleśādayas santi Parāvareśe.

We have already seen that Prof. Dasgupta has drawn attention to the fact that the Purāṇic tradition has preserved some original lines of thought which had been overshadowed in later times of the Advaita school.

13. AHAM BRAHMA ASMI (Bṛh.Up. i, 4, 9–10)

From the Advaita point of view 'Aham brahmāsmi and Tat tvam asi, are two sides of the same coin. The only difference is the subject of the proposition is changed from the second to the first Person. Aham Brahmāsmi occurs *twice* in the same section (i, 4, 10), firstly as a description of Brahman's own experience of itself as it existed from time immemorial before creation that It is "aham Brahma asmi"; Brahma vā idam agre āsīt. Tad ātmānam eva avet Aham Brahma asmi iti. It then goes on to say that whoever among the gods, ṛṣis and men comes to know B. as "Aham Asmi" attains fulfilment of his nature (Sarvam abhavat)[1].

A peep into the immediately preceding section(i,4,9) throws light on the context and how the *first* statement is to be correctly understood. For, the preamble raises the question—Given that self-fulfilment is attained by knowing Brahman (brahmavidyayā), men who would like to attain self-fulfilment ask themselves "What is it that B. itself came to know whereby it has become perfect and self-fulfilled? The question is a poser. If B. became perfect only by knowing something, it could not have been perfect before. If on the other hand it has managed to be perfect without having to know anything, others too can do so and dispense with Brahmavidyā[2].

1. Sarvam means fulness, completeness also in some of the oldest Brāhmaṇas and in the text of the Ṛg Veda too.

For references See my *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad From Madhva's Perspective* (1988).

2. For a similar questioп raised in Sureśvara's Vārtika re. Hiraṇyagarbha see *Bṛh.Up.Vārtika* IV, 71, 72.

The Upaniṣad disarms this objection by answering that unlike in the case of the Jīvātman, the Supreme B's perfection, self-fulfilment, blissfulness and absolute knowledge of its own perfections is not something earned by any effort. On the other hand, the Jīvas, whether gods, ṛṣis or men have to attain their respective levels of perfection only by knowing B. as the eternally existent All-knowing Perfect Being (thro' Its grace). Thus, the two key words 'Aham' and 'Asmi' referring to Brahman sum up the inexhaustible richness of content of B's unconditioned existence for all time and its being always aware and conscious of its eternal existence and perfections: *Satyam Tadapi Brahma Svasvarūpam Nitya-aparokṣajñānena Sarvadā jānatyeva. Ata eva sarvadā paripūrṇam iti parihāraḥ* (M.Brh.Up.Bhāṣya).

Here, Madhusūdana sidetracks the issue by suggesting that it is not the Supreme B. that is meant in the sentence 'Brahma vā idam agre āsīt tad ātmānam eva avet Aham Brahma asmi *iti*, but the Apara-Brahma (Hiraṇyagarbha) who is also a Jīva, representing all other Jīvas. But the difficulty here is that this Hiraṇyagarbha comes into existence only after the end of the Praḷaya, whereas the Śruti *idamagre* refers to the pre-creation stage, when only the Supreme existed breathing windless by itself, as we have seen. Madhusūdana further argues that if 'Brahma vā idam agre āsīt tad ātmānam eva avet...' should refer to the Supreme B. it would be inconsistent with the subsequent statement about its *becoming Sarvātmaka* after attaining such knowledge: *Śuddhaparatve ca bodhanimitta-sārvātmyalakṣaṇa-phala-kīrtana-anupapatteh* (ii, 299–300). But Madhusūdana seems to forget that Śaṅkara's Brahman is *Nityabuddhavabhāvam* and has no need to go thro' a process of *attaining fresh knowledge of its nature.* That is why Madhva puts the record

straight saying that the Supreme B. is always aware of Its infinitude by its Nityāparokṣajñāna. This should dispose of Madhusūdana's frivolous objection. It is however another question if the Advaita-Brahman which is Nirviśeṣa can afford to know itself as 'I am Brahman', without risk of Kartṛkarmavirodha.

It should be obvious that the two words describing the content of B's personal experience of itself are not used here in the simple grammatical sense of 'I' and 'am' of our daily usage. This is confirmed by Br.Up. V, 5, 3–4 which mentions 'ahar' and 'aham' as secret names of B.: Tasyopaniṣad 'Ahar' iti. Tasyopaniṣad 'Aham' iti. The Īśa. Up.(16) also speaks of the Person present in Prāṇa (Asu) as "Aham Asmi". These secret names of B. cannot be lightly dismissed as meant only for 'upāsana' and not as true descriptions of its being. Nor is their first mention in the opening sentence "Tad ātmānam eva avet *Aham* Brahma *asmi* iti", nothing more than a simple grammatical predication of the content of B's self-awareness. There is a striking parallelism in thought between Aham (Brahma) asmi and Tasyopaniṣad aham iti (Bṛh.Up. v, 5, 4). What is even more significant is that the Ormuzd Yuaht of the *Avesta* and the Exodus in the *Old Testament* should speak of 'Ahmi Yad Ahmi Mazdo' and "I am That I AM", as the most secret names of God (See my HDSV pp. 158–159). As secret names they must express some deep meanings of great mystic and etymological significance. The Upaniṣads themselves etymologise certain key words like 'Tajjalān', 'Satyam' etc. Śaṅkara traces the two words 'Ahar' and 'Aham' to their root meanings when he says *Pratyagātmabhūtatvāt pūrvavat hanter jahāteśca rūpam*" (Bṛh. Up. Bhāṣya V, 5, 3–4). He does not elaborate.

The description of the Supreme Ātman as the innermost of all *(asmāt sarvasmāt antaratarah* Bṛh.Up. i, 4, 8) may very well be expected to give the right clue to the understanding of the sense of 'Aham' as applied to B. as the One which could not be thrown out at all or discarded by any living being at any time, as it happens to be the innermost core of every existent entity. Here, the Supreme Being has been described as the best beloved of all, dearer than one's own offspring, kith and kin and possessions,—the "innermost indweller in all (asmāt sarvasmāt antara-taram). It should be obvious that it would be absolutely *impossible* for anyone to attempt to throw out or discard One who has penetrated into one's inmost self, without first jumping out of oneself which is impossible just as the cleverest dancer cannot dance on his own shoulders! . . Thus, in the deepest sense of the term B. is the AHAM, the Undiscardable. A famous verse from the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* puts the idea in a nutshell (X, 23, 27):

Prāṇabuddhimanas-svātma-dehāpatyadhanādayaḥ
Yatsamparkāt priyā āsan tatah konvaparaḥ priyaḥ?

We can discard our external possessions, kith and kin and throw them out. But we cannot discard our own selves, much more so One has entered into the core of our being and stationed Himself there, *firmly*. Hence the propriety of the name 'AHAM' given to Brahman in the Upaniṣad. 'Asmi' is likewise another secret name of the Lord as can be seen from the reference to it in Īśa Up. 16. The propriety of referring to the Supreme B. as being present in 'Asu' (Prāṇa) in the Īśa Up. has its source in the upshot of the Udgītha Vidyā of Prāṇa (Chān.Up. i, 2, 7, 9).

If the other epithet 'Asmi' as another secret name of B, should be able to give a clinching answer to the question

raised by the inquirer "Kimu tad Brahma avet yasmāt tat sarvam abhavat", it can only be by making it clear that not only does B. exist from eternity but that It is for ever fully aware and conscious of its own existence and power with its own eternal immediate perception (Nitya-aparokṣa svarūpajñāna) which is what 'AS-MI' really means in its etymological sense : *Sarvadā Asti iti meyam, Meyatve prakāra-pradarśanāya 'asti' śabdaḥ.*

It is in these above senses that B. is proclaimed in the Upaniṣad to be 'AHAM' and 'ASMI' and *not* in the ordinary grammatical sense of the terms. If what Gauḍapada is believed to have stated is true that Jīvātman in deep sleep is aware neither of his being nor of others, nor truth or falsity (G.K. 1, 12) that should precisely be what should distinguish the Jīvas from B.

After having defined the true nature of B's self-knowledge as above, the Upaniṣad goes on to say that whoever among Devas, Ṛṣis and men attain such knowledge of B. as it is, in terms of its being 'Aham' and 'Asmi' will, in his turn, be enabled to attain the full measure of his own self-fulfilment, according to his spiritual fitness. This is indicated by the separate mention of these aspirants, in the order of their fitness, as Devas, Ṛṣis and men (note the words yathā and tathā).

Viewed in this clear contextual perspective, it will be seen that even the next statement made about the Devas, Ṛṣis and men is not intended to inculcate the belief that the individual self should think of itself as being in reality identical with the Supreme or start meditating so.

We have already seen that the opening words defining B's self-experience are not intended to be a bare grammatical statement that it knew itself that it was (Brahman) but

that it was the undiscardable and one eternally conscious of its own existence and perfections. In calling upon men and women to know B. what the Upaniṣad expects of them is not that they should think of their own selves as being identical with B. but that B. is the "Undiscardable One always fully conscious of its own being and perfections. It is not the intention of the Upaniṣad to authorise men and women to think of themselves as Brahman. If the emphasis is not on the actual content of B's self-Experience of its being the Undiscardable and its eternal self-awareness as all-knowing, the wording of the original text would have been complete without the addition of the reflexive pronoun 'ātmānam' (itself) as the sense of the reflexive (ātmānam) would be fully conveyed without it by saying "It knew I am Brahman" (Tad avet Ahaṁ Brahma asmi" iti).

Śaṅkara however explains the simple text "Brahman alone existed in the beginning and It knew Itself as I am B (i, 4, 10) with a good deal of interpolations to accommodate the whole of His Adhyāsa doctrine and read it into this text. According to him the text means to say "The Self now experiencing itself as embodied was, in fact, the Unconditioned B. itself *even before (agre) its realising itself to be so* (prāk prabodhāt). Therefore, it is all that exists in reality. However, through superimposition, it has come to regard itself, erroneously as "I am *not* Brahman, I am *not all* (asarvam) and to suppose itself to be a doer (kartā) and enjoyer (bhoktā) and a transmigrating self (Samsāri). When its eyes are opened by a compassionate Guru, it discovers itself as the pure subject-objectless consciousness free from all superimpositions of individuality. Thus, Brahman's coming to know Itself as "I AM Brahman" (ātmānam avet) consists only in the removal of the super-

impositions caused by Ignorance of the truth. It is *not* at all an act of knowing Itself as the object of Its own consciousness. When Ignorance vanishes its effect is also wiped out. With its disruption, pure Consciousness emerges as all that there is (Sarvam abhavat)''.

It will be seen that the way in which Ś explains 'agre' in the opening passage is very far fetched and artificial, not to say inconsistent with *his own explanation of the same word* in a similar context Naiveha kincana agra āsīt (Bṛh. Up. i, 2, 1) and Ātmā va idama agra āsīt (A.Up. i, 1) as ''before creation of the world''. To abandon this accepted sense of 'agre' and construe it as *prāk prabodhat api* (even before knowing himself to be identical with B) is to read his entire Prakriyā of Brahmājñānavāda into this text, which is taking an unconscionable liberty in commentary-making. The irony of it is that there can be no embodied Self *before* Creation or what passes for Creation in Śaṅkara's Philosophy. It makes no sense to speak of an embodied self, which is not yet in the picture, being identical with the Unconditioned B. even before coming to know the latter. If the 'aprabodha' (absence of knowledge) is to be B's own, it would make B forget its own self, no matter how, why or for how long,—which is incompatible with the conception of B. as Nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvam. Thus, Ś's interpretation of the opening line: Brahma vā idamagra āsīt'' opens many lids of the metaphysical Pandora's box at the same time, with its inevitable consequences. His interpretation is unnatural as it interposes and even prefixes a whole stage of ignorance of its own nature in the case of B. due to superimposition which leads to coming to look upon itself *somehow* as ''I am NOT B. I am NOT all''. We are therefore asked to go in for more

interpolations that on being duly instructed by a kindly Teacher, it discovers itself in time as what it has always been ''I am Brahman''.

This necessitates the explaining away of the clearly worded second sentence ''Tad ātmānam eva avet'' not so much as a direct and immediate act of B's knowing Itself as the object of its own knowledge and intuition but as a sublation of a superimposition, caused by Ignorance of its own identity. This roundabout way of interpreting the two successive texts taken together involves a good deal of metaphysical kite-flying, for which there is hardly any justification in the wording of the texts, as they stand inter-related by way of *mutual sequence of thought*, which does not at all call for any parenthetical padding.

Irrespective of construing Aham and Asmi as secret names of Brahman, the opening sentence ''Brahman alone existed in the beginning and knew itself as B'' has nothing to say about its identity with Jīvasvarūpa, notwithstanding Ś's attempt to sneak in the Jivātman into the context by a circuitous interpolation of additional matter. The *Advaitasiddhi* does not enter into the question of the textual tenability of this interpolation, probably because it found it rather difficult to swallow. It prefers to find room for the identity of Jīva and B. somehow, within the terms of the opening text itself as it stands. This cannot be done unless one of the terms Aham or Ātmānam could be construed as referring to the Jīvātman. But both are impossible, as 'Ātman' refers in the text to 'Brahman' and so does the reflexive 'Ātmānam'. The point is that the Jīvātman does not enter into the picture here. This point is brought out by Vyāsatīrtha when he says: *Kimca atra vākye Brahmaṇa eva prakṛtatvāt nānena Jīvabrahmaikyasiddhiḥ.*

The only possibility of bringing in the Jīvātman within the scope of the discourse is thro' the next paragraph which appears to extend the principle of identity to the Jīvasvarūpa also, when it says "Whosoever among the gods, ṛṣis and men becomes awakened to this becomes 'that' ". And Madhusūdana naturally seizes it. But the difficulty about this text is that it recognises the existence of different classes of selves such as Devas, Ṛṣis and men. *A-Siddhi* naturally tries to get over this difficulty by saying that no such plurality of selves can be taken to exist in reality because, according to the text only those among these classes who are proved to be Brahmajñānins become Brahman. But, then, selection of the best from among the Devas, Ṛṣis and men would still leave behind many ineligibles and they would be as real as the many among the eligibles, unless the whole fraternity of jīvas, gods, ṛṣis and men is written off as non-existent, offhand. In that case, there can be no talk of Jīva-Brahmaikya at all.

There is only one other text which could be summoned to help. That text reads—"Even now, one who knows *thus* (iti) viz. I am Brahman becomes all". The difficulty with *this* text is that it carries an *iti (thus)* attached to the words 'Aham Brahma Asmi'. That makes it an Upāsanā-vākya which, according to Advaita tradition of textual interpretation, does not confer the status of reality on the datum of Upāsanā, which could be carried on even on the basis of superimposed data.

As a last resort, one has to turn to the other statement "Whosoever meditates on another divinity, thinking it is different from the Aham Brahma Asmi is an ignoramus". However, from what we have seen of the Scriptural status of the words Aham and Asmi, not only on the authority of

the Upaniṣads themselves but also of the sacred Scriptures of other ancient religions of the world on grounds of semantic and ideological affinity, with particular reference to the derivation of 'A-ham' and 'A-hār' and Śaṅkara's own suggested derivation of Ahar and Aham and above all the significance of the description of B. as 'Antara-tara' in Bṛh.Up. 8, 4, 8, the inherent difficulties pointed out in construing the words "Aham brahmāsmi" cannot be overcome.

A viable interpretation of "Yo anyām devatām upāste Anyo asau anya Aham Asmi iti na sa veda" can be arrived at by accepting the finding that 'Aham' and 'Asmi' are used here only as secret names of B. and not in the sense Śaṅkara assigns to them. Looked at from this angle, this text would be a censure of him who worships a divinity of his choice under the impression that it is different from the "Undiscardable (AHAM) Brahman who is eternally conscious of His absolute existence for all time (asti). The Upaniṣads themselves often make it a point to emphasise that the Antaryāmi Brahman is the same in every being—Sa yaścāyam Puruṣe Yaśca asau Āditya sa Ekaḥ (Taitt.Up. ii, 4, 11). He who is in this Person and He who is in the Sun, He is one and the same.

In other words, the text is *not* intended to be a censure of those who make a distinction between Jīva and Brahman, but those who fail to recognise the identity of the Universal Antaryāmi in all beings, all other deities and objects of worship everywhere: Yo anyām devatām upāste anyo asau Anyo "AHAM ASMI" iti na sa veda ityatrāpi Antaryāmi-bheda-jñānī nindyate (Nym)—the greatest truth of Universal religion and philosophy which humanity is yet to realise that there is but one Svatantra Antaryāmi the

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'AHAM ASMI', the "I AM THAT I AM" to whom all worship, gets directed, with or without our knowing (Such worship knowingly carried out is of course the best). This is what the Bhagavadgītā (iv, 23) also has to tell us:

Yepyanyadevatābhaktā yajante śraddhayānvitāḥ
Tepi māmeva Kaunteya yajantyavidhipūrvakam

It stands to the credit of the Founder of Dvaita philosophy to have affirmed this truth by his insightful interpretation of 'Yo anyām devatām upāste anyosāvānyo Aham asmi iti na sa veda' from the point of view of the Viśvāntaryāmi.

It is curious to find that Ś. himself has quoted the above text in his bhāṣya on the Gīta (iv, 12) in a way totally unconnected with the identity of Jiva and B. and as censuring those Karmins who offer their sacrifices to other deities like Indra instead of to the supreme Being Vāsudeva, who is the real bestower of the fruits of all sacrifices. This interpretation of the above Śruti is in substantial agreement with that of Madhva.

The standpoint of the Antaryāmi is the same as what the Brahmasūtra (i, 1, 30) calls *Śāstradṛṣṭi* which it applies to the declarations of the great Vedic Seer Vāmadeva, *after* he had obtained Brahmic realisation:

Aham Manur abhavam Sūryaśca aham Kakṣīvān ṛṣir
asmi Aham bhūmimadām Āryāya (Ṛ.V. iv, 24, 1–2)

Śaṅkara however holds that Śāstradṛṣṭi is *not* Antaryāmidṛṣṭi but 'Sarvātmakatvam', being one with everything, achieved by Vāmadeva by realising his oneness with B.

We have seen that in Ś's philosophy such oneness consists in bieng 'Cinmātram' (bare consciousness without content). Vāmadeva as a conditioned self could not have put forth any claims of identity with other conditioned

selves like Manu, Sūrya etc. If the claim was made *after* he attained realisation of oneness with B, he could *not have done so*, as *bare Cinmātra*, which can neither feel, know any other or speak.

Hard put to it to explain the anomaly, A-Siddhi says the reference is to be understood to have been made by way of a 'philosophical looking back' (*bhūtapūrvagatyā*) on Vāmadeva's part. The difficulty with the bestowal of land on the Ārya is explained from the point of view of the 'conditioned consciousnes' (*upahita-Caitanya*). But the difficulty here is that the Upahita-Caitayna of Vāmadeva would no longer be extant *after* his realisation and he cannot resurrect himself and look back and remember!

As 'Aham' and 'Asmi' are acknowledgedly Mystic names of B they are entitled to be applied to it directly in their fullest plenary etymological sense, as B. is the highest referent of all words: *Vacasām vācyam uttamam* and there is no need to go in for Lakṣaṇā in regard to their application to B.

14. TAT TVAM ASI IN ITS AKHAṆḌĀRTHA PERSPECTIVE

'Tat tvam asi' from Chān.Up. (vi, 8, 7) has become the trump card of Indian Monism in Vedānta philosophy. It has almost become a byword among dabblers in Indian philosophy. It is one of the 'Mahāvākyas' of the Advaita school and is frequently cited by traditional scholars. Most of our modern scholars have come to take it on trust, at its face value and in its Dictionary sense of 'That Thou Art', without taking the trouble to investigate its credentials, for themselves. This appears to be due largely to their having been predisposed towards Monism being the highest possible philosophical view and the culmination of Indian thought, by the writings of Deussen and Vivekananda. It remains to be said, however, that unlike in the case of the traditional scholars of Advaita, their views are not based on any first hand acquaintance with the original Sanskrit texts or the result of application of acknowledged principles of Textual exegesis. We cannot therefore take them seriously. We have also to acknowledge that other major schools of Vedānta, which are also very much alive, as inheritors of the same Upaniṣads and Sūtras have an equal right to be heard. We shall therefore leave the modern scholars to draw their own conclusions after giving a patient hearing to both sides of the question as, so far and for the most part, their acquaintance with the original writings of the other schools, many of which are not available in (English) translations, is very superficial.

According to Advaita, the purport (tātparya) of 'Tat tvam asi' (and other Mahāvākyas) is the non-difference in

essence of what passes under the name of the individual self of Man and the 'Universal Consciousness' designated as 'Brahman' in the Upaniṣads. Other discourses met with in them in the form of various Vidyās presented for meditation and accounts of world-Creation by a Creator and unfoldment of Nāmarūpa-prapañca are only doorways to the comprehension of the undifferenced Nirviśeṣa-Brahman which is the substrate of all superimpositions which have projected the external world of name and form, which we suppose to be 'out there', including our own selves as participants in what goes on.

The operative part of Uddālaka's teaching (Tat tvam asi) is thus nothing more or less than the non-difference in essence of these two foci of Consciousness which seem to us to be so different.

The formal textual enunciation of this truth has to rest on the correct ascertainment of the true nature and essence of the individual self (tvam-padārtha) shorn of all its superimpositions of individuality, attributes of doership-enjoyership etc. and similar stripping off of all determinations by way of attributes associated with Brahman, as the Creator of the world, its sustainer and dissolver and the bestower of release from bondage (Samsāramokṣasthiti-bandhahetuḥ). Thus, the received concepts of both the individual self and Brahman have to be reduced to a vanishing point of bare consciousness (without mutual difference). This is called 'Tat-Tvam-padārtha-śodhana', to start with. In regard to Brahman, this purgation would consist of divesting it of all such attributes (even) of Satyam, jñānam, ānanda, predicated of it in the Śrutis, by a process of 'Akhaṇḍārtha interpretation' of the texts, leaving only a bare undifferenced consciousness. After the ground has

thus been prepared, the Mahāvākya (Tat tvam asi) will step in to present the residual pure consciousness as a simple impartible Cinmātram as the purport. This is done, not in the normal way of establishing any subject-predicate relationship between the 'two' which would be incompatible with the requirements of Akhaṇḍārtha, nor in terms of 'this Cit' is 'that Cit', which is equally out of the question, but *just 'Cit'* or 'Cinmātram', without any further specification (kevala).

It will be seen that not only the Pratyagātmā but the Upaniṣadic Brahman also has to be subjected to this process of distillation of essence, in the interest of arriving at the purport of what would be absolutely undifferenced. In other words, both the Pratyagātman and the Nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvam Brahma will have to *surrender* their personal identity, in the most intimate sense of that term, and get resolved into 'pure Cit'.

Brahman's much-talked of august metaphysical attributes of Satyam, jñānam, anantam, ānanda etc. have all of them to be mercilessly reduced to the vanishing point of Cit, which cannot turn in on its own being to comprehend its own 'Cittvam'. This resultant 'Cittvam' will be on a par with human consciousness in a state of 'Coma'. Such will be the upshot of the application of the technique of Akhaṇḍārtha to the Tat tvam asi text.

If an attributeless pure Cit is all that is to be established as the truth of the Upaniṣads, it seems unnecessary to make as many as three or four predications of it as Satyam, jñānam, anantam, ānandam Brahma, all of which are, in the last analysis, made to express nothing more than the stem-sense (prātipadikārtha) of Brahman as Citsukha has defined Akhaṇḍārtha :

Samsargāsangisamyagdhīhetutā yā girām iyam
Uktā akhaṇḍārthatā yad vā tat-prātipadikārthatā.

If everyone of these epithets refers to nothing more than what is expressed by the 'stem-sense' (of Brahman) they would all of them, turn out to be synonymous in their content of meaning and connotation. It would be far-fetched to say that these terms refer only to the 'Conditioned Brahman' (the Saguṇa) in their primary sense and are then extended by remote control (Lakṣaṇā) to the Śuddha-Brahmam and that, as such, there is no possibility of these attributes becoming synonymous when applied to the Śuddha-Brahman. The Conditioned-Brahman is, by all accounts, unreal (anṛta) and 'A-svaprakāśa' and 'limited' and as such terms like Satyam, Jñānam and Anantam can *never* be applied to the Conditioned Brahman, in the first instance, in their primary sense at all.

We have already seen something of the examples of such Akhaṇḍārtha methodology in regard to 'Soyam Devadattaḥ' and 'Prakṛṣṭaḥ prakāśas Candraḥ' and there is no need to revert to them[1].

It cannot be said that the cognition of B. contemplated by the Vedic texts is only in terms of its being 'Nirviśeṣa'. If that be so, it can never be 'known' at all; for knowledge (jñāna) like 'desire' is organically connected and related to an object and to a certain 'aspect' (prakāra) of the thing to be known. The vaster the knowledge, the more are the Prakāras comprehended by it. Without such an aspect

1. Cf. Prakṛṣṭaprakāśah Candramā ityādivākyeṣu prkṛṣṭaprakāśatvādyasādhāraṇasamsargo Nakṣatrādyaprakṛṣṭaprakāśato vyāvṛttirūpo bhedo bodhyate yathā, Tathā Satyam, Jñānam Brahma ityādāvapi tāvevārthau iti tayor abhāve kim śāstreṇa bodhyam (*Rāghavendra,* NS *Parimala* p. 386 b)

no object can be conceived by any mental effort as 'knowledge' always falls into a pattern of thought 'this' is 'such and such'. Scriptural injunctions like "Brahman should be known and heard" would lose their point, if Brahman to be known is absolutely Nirviśeṣa. Investigation (vicāra) of B. to be meaningful must be based on knowing it as possessed of certain specific attributes, so as to be free from doubts and vacillaton about its true nature. An inquiry must have a subject, not already known, or fully known in its specific aspect, relevant to the inquiry and the inquirer. A 'something' not known in its specific aspect relevant to the inquiry cannot be made the subject of an inquiry. Doubts are the outcome of being aware of the given thing's common or general attributes and missing the distinctive ones. A final decision of its having certain specific attributes, as distinct from the general, would alone help to come to a final decision about its true nature.

A 'Nirviśeṣa-Brahman' cannot fulfil any of these requirements. In the Taitt. Up. (ii, 1) when the opening passage holds out the promise that one who knows B. attains the supreme goal, it merely tells us that there is such a Being and the next lines "Satyam jñānam anantam Brahma" following are intended to give specific and detailed information about its nature and attributes. Otherwise, if a bare, indeterminate knowlege of B. is all that is necessary to have of it, by way of Akhaṇḍārtha, the recital of the attributes of satyam jñānam anantam would be entirely superfluous and uncalled for. This should make it clear that the attributes posited of B. are indeed there and are not fictitious. Any apprehension about the unitary nature and essence of B. being shattered by the admission of so many attributes (as satyam, jñānam, ānanda) should be set at rest

in such a way as would allow the attributes *to remain* and be accommodated in its being, leaving it to Brahman itself to preserve its Unity and integrality with all its numerous specific attributes intact, by the inner dynamics of its own being thro' Svarūpaviśeṣas which can well be deemed to be self-linking (sva-nirvāhaka) to forestall any possibility of regression. A simple recourse to 'Arthāpatti' will help us to posit such a connecting link in the very being of Brahman. And Arthāpatti is precisely intended to set matters right in such emergencies: *Anupapadyamānārtha-darśanād tadupapādake buddhir Arthāpattiḥ.* If Arthāpatti could be called in to establish the Anirvacanīyatva of Avidyā, why should it *not* be requisitioned for *a far nobler objective of rationalising the unitary nature of B. (aikarasya) in regard to its countless attributes, which are all 'Vaidha'?*

If B. qualified by its metaphysical attributes of Satyam, jñānam etc. is not to be the purport of the Śruti, some non-descript entity and *not necessarily* 'Brahman' in question, would become the intended import, instead. If the subject of the import is the nebulous Nirviśeṣa-B, even the resultant import of Akhaṇḍārth a would be incapable of establishing in clear-cut terms that 'this' is 'Brahman' in terms of a subject-predicate relation between the definition and the defined. So much so, the question of 'what is Brahman' would remain unanswered. It cannot be said that even if the requirements of a subject-predicate relation are not fulfilled, the reference to the predicative element alone as the purport of the proposition would be consistent with Akhaṇḍārtha . . . . For, in Advaita, the predicative (B) is already established by self-evidence. But it can come under the scope of the purport of a Vākya only as practically related to the subject of the proposition and not

otherwise. Hence, it is not possible to avoid admitting, in the last analysis, that texts like Satyam, Jñānam have to be viewed as conveying a co-ordinated sense of their parts and not as an impartite something or a bare stem-sense. For, in that case, all the three epithets, Satyam, Jñānam, Ānanda would turn out to be synonymous in their connotation and therefore redundant.

The difficulty in pressing for an Akhaṇḍārtha of the entire sentence 'Tattvam asi' is obvious. A sentence or a proposition as a whole, is made up of its constituent parts, carrying and yielding its own meaning without overlapping on others or being in conflict with them—the whole leading to an integrated judgement.

The shearing away of the respective primary senses of the terms Tat and Tvam to make them fit the Procrustean bed of Akhaṇḍārtha is unprecedented in exegetical norms. No doubt, there are occasions when a secondary meaning or a metaphorical sense has to be given to a particular term in a sentence as in "the Hamlet is in the Gangā". But, a double Lakṣaṇā at the same time, on both the terms Tat and Tvam errs on the side of Kalpanā-gaurava.

Since the primary sense of Satyam, Jñānam etc. cannot be realised except as applied to the Śuddha-Brahman, their synonymity can hardly be avoided, or prevented, if Akhaṇḍārtha is insisted upon, in the face of it all. It would not be possible to hold that Satyam, Jñānam etc., applied to Śuddha-Brahman can be Vyāvahārika in their status, when applied to it. For, these attributes *are not known to exist* in Brahman except on the authority of the Śruti and the Śruti does not say that they are Vyāvahārika in their status when applied to it, and not Pāramārthika while predicating them of Brahman, in all seriousness.

The explanation that these attributes of Satyam, Jñānam are pressed into service only for the purpose of excluding their opposities *(atadvyāvṛtti)* from Śuddha-Brahman is also untenable. For, if the exclusions as such *(vyāvṛtti)* are real, the attributes which operate as excluding factors (vyāvartaka) would be equally real (pāramārthika) in B. If the exclusions are unreal (mithyā), the excluded attributes of anṛtatva (falsity), ajñānatva (ignorance) and paricchinnatva) (being limited) will have to be invested with the same order of reality as Brahman, which cannot be welcome to Advaita. The counter argument that both Vyāvṛttis and their Vyāvartakas alike are liable to be negated by the same contradicting knowledge is yet to be proved and cannot be taken for granted *at this stage*. If the excluded Brahman is Nir-viśeṣa, the exclusions so laboriously worked out would serve *no purpose:*

Vyavṛtte Nirviśeṣe tu kim vyāvṛttyā prayojanam ?

If the exclusions are Mithyā, there would be no need for the Śruti to embody them in the definition of B. (by way of Vyāvṛtti), for it is expected of the Śruti to instruct the Seeker of truth about what is real and true and *not* what is *not* true. It cannot be said that all such references to these exclusions are intended to put an end to possible misconceptions about Brahman that *it may be unreal,* ignorant or limited. Such explanations are futile as no misconceptions about B. *can arise* from the Advaita standpoint where a prior knowledge of B. as pure consciousness and *as substrate* of all superimposed misconceptions is a precondition to the birth of misconceptions.

Moreover, if it is one and the same Brahman from which falsity (anṛtatva) has been excluded by the use of the term 'Satyam' in the first instance, which is again sought

to be excluded from ignorance *(ajñānam)* by the use of the second term jñānam, it would be quite unnecessary to do so as B. will have nothing to lose or gain by additional exclusions being made or *not* made, as it would remain right thro' the same Nirviśesa, irrespective of the exclusions :

Vyāvṛtte Nirviśeṣe tu kim Vyāvartyabahutvataḥ? (A.V.)

One cannot hope to explain the introduction of more than one Vyāvṛtti, on the analogy of the Vikalpavidhi in Śrutis in regard to Vrīhi or Yava as offerings in a particular sacrifice. Such Vikalpa Vidhi (Optional prescription) is permitted only in cases where each separate performance with either of the two Dravyas (offerings) leads to the accomplishment of the same end. But in the present case, all the attributes of B. such as Satyam, jñānam are 'given' as permanently existing in B. co-existently and have therefore to be taken together to obtain a true knowledge of it, in all its completeness and not selectively, or optionally.

Nor can it be that all the three exclusions made on the basis of Satyam, jñānam, anantam taken together at one sweep operate as the doorway to determining the true nature of B. for purposes of Tat-padārthaśodhana. For, we see that knowledge produced by the other text 'Vijñānam ānandam Brahma' (Bṛh.Up. iii, 9,28) where only Vijñāna and ānanda are listed and Satyatva and anantatva are *not mentioned* at all, is also accepted as capable of producing a true knowledge of B.

Tho' the inclusion of other attributes of B. mentioned in other Śākhās of the Śruti may be necessary for the purpose of Guṇopasamhāra in Upāsana, as made out in Ś's bhāṣya on B.S. (iii, 3, 12) there is no such necessity for similar gathering together of other attributes, not mentioned

in the text for purposes of direct comprehension of B. (Brahmapratipatti). Consequently, there is no bar against treating the three terms Satyam, jñānam, anantam as competent to define the true nature of B, severally, as there is no possibility of over-pervasion of any of these attributes in their primary sense *elsewhere*. The purpose of giving more than one attribute is to make known that countless are the attributes of B. and each one of them is in itself capable of being a complete definition of B.

There is no substance in Sureśvara's argument that the operations of the exclusions (vyāvṛttis) in the manner suggested does not necessarily make B. actually qualified by such vyāvṛttis as its adjuncts (viśeṣaṇas), thereby making the predication a 'SA-khaṇḍārtha' (synthetic judgement). Sureśvara explains that the fact that B. is to be excluded from falsity, ignorance and limitation is not based on the expressed sense of those words, which are only reality, knowledge and infinitude. The excluded meanings are derived ones *(ārthikārtha)* from the consideration of the incompatibility which would otherwise arise as between the Nirguṇa texts which *negative all attributes* of B. and the present text Satyam, jñānam which seems to posit them of B. To remove this incompatibility and in the interest of giving precedence to the Nirguṇa Śruti, the only way out is to construe the terms Satyam, jñānam etc. in terms of the exclusion of the opposites from B. There is no need therefore to admit that the exclusions of falsity, ignorance etc. from B. are also intrinsic characteristics of B. Therefore the Akhaṇḍārthatva of the text is not affected in the least.

But granting that a judgement arising from a verbal proposition and predication about a given subject may not

include within its objective content a derivative meaning or an adjunct obviously suggested by the disposition of the words of the given text read together with another predication about the same subject in another Śruti, still, when it comes to the question of determining the true nature of B. as intended by the Śrutis (which are the only means of knowing it), even an ārthika viśeṣaṇa of B, such as its being qualified by the attributes of being excluded for ever from falsity, ignorance etc. will have to be admitted as part of its essence and cannot be dismissed as falling outside the scope of the Vākyārtha. It is difficult for Advaita to come out of the labyrinth of Atad-Vyāvṛtti which it has built up for itself *and got into.*

There is also a lurking fallacy in the argument that the resort to the exclusion of the opposites (atadvyāvṛtti) is the only way to reconcile the Śruti Satyam, Jñānam, Anantam with the 'Nirguṇa Śruti'. Instead of stifling the sonorous voice of the Taitt. Śruti "Brahmavid āpnoti param. Tadeṣābhyuktā satyam jñānam anantam Brahma. Yo veda nihitam guhāyām"...and subjecting it to a tortuous process of Atadvyāvṛtti why should one *not* accept in all sincerity and good faith that Supreme B. is indeed the essence of reality, infinite knowledge and bliss? The so called 'Nirguṇa-Śruti' itself *enumerates* as many as ten distinct positive attributes: Eko devas Sarvabhūteṣu gūḍhas Sarvavyāpī Sarvabhūtāntarātmā. Karmādhyakṣaḥ Sarvabhūtādhivāsi, Sākṣi Kevalaḥ", tapering off with the solitary "Nirguṇaśca". The solitary 'Nirguṇa' will have to be explained in such a manner as would respect the august list of ten positive attributes given, instead of rescinding them at one stroke of the pen. It is possible to construe the solitary 'Nirguṇa' in the concatenation of majestic attributes to mean that B. is

at the same time free from all attributes associated with Prakṛti,—an interpretation which has the sanction and approval of the Ekāyana Śruti: 'Niraniṣṭo Niravadyaḥ' and Sattvādayo na santīśe na santi Prākṛtā guṇāḥ (Viṣṇu Purāṇa i, 9, 43), Traiguṇyavarjitam ajam *(Mbh.* i, 1, 1) and the Utsarga-apavāda nyāya of Pūrvamīmāmsā. It may therefore be concluded that the efforts of the Advaitic Dialecticians to rely on the concept of Atadvyāvṛtti to establish Akhaṇḍārtha of both the Mahāvākya and its subsidiaries are far from happy or successful.

Sureśvara himself in his *Taitt.Up.Bhāṣya Vārtika* says in so many words that B. is defined as 'anatam' in the sense that it is *qualified* (viśiṣṭam) by being isolated from everything that has limited existence:

Anantena antavadvastuvyāvṛttyaiva Viśeṣitam

The same principle can be applied uniformly to all the attributes so as to directly inhere in B. on the basis of its own internal dynamics. That would knock off the bottom of Akhaṇḍārtha, so far as the subsidiary *(avāntara)* vākyas are concerned.

By a strange irony of fate, Madhusūdana himself, while apparently holding fast to Akhaṇḍārtha, describes his B. in the opening Maṅgalācaraṇa Śloka of his *Advaitasiddhi*:

Satyajñānasukhātmakas Śrutiśirotthākhaṇḍadhīgocaraḥ

The first part here describes B. in positive terms using the word 'Sukhātmaka' meaning *Satyajñānānandasvarūpaḥ,* (ātmā meaning svarūpa or svabhāva), This is at loggerheads with 'Akhaṇḍārthadhīgocaraḥ', if 'Akhaṇḍārtha' is to boil down to mere negation of the opposites, without at the same time affirming the *presence* of satyatva, jñānatva, ānandatva as the essence of B. in their own right and *not* their absence

thro' courtesy of Atadvyāvṛtti. This ambivalent attitude of Madhusūdana is not unusual with him. We see him after establishing with all his strength of logic and conviction (?) that Brahman is absolutely 'Nirākāra', (II p. 231) telling us *sotto voce* "To my mind, there is no Being higher than Gopikā-Kṛṣṇa" (Kṛṣṇāt param kimapi tattvam aham na jāne). It seems to be the privilege of Advaita to have an easy conscience !

'TAT TVAM ASI' IN DEFENCE OF AKHAṆḌĀRTHA

The author of the Advaitasiddhi has attempted to answer many of the objections raised by Vyāsatīrtha against the Akhaṇḍārtha interpretation of 'Tat tvam asi'. His main contention is that resort to Lakṣaṇā on more than one term is justified because once the import of the Mahāvākya in terms of the identity of the Jiva and Brahman has been established, there can be no objection to double Lakṣaṇā. This is not a proper way of argument. Even supposing that the Tātparya is in favor of identity, such 'identity' can be accommodated in many other ways, short of 'Svarūpa-aikya' between Jiva and Brahman. The possibility of such 'Gauṇa-aikya' thro' Jahal-lakṣaṇā on any one of the two terms, at a time, has been expounded at length in respect of Tat tvam asi by the Dvaita Philosophers, in their writings. In insisting on its pound of flesh of Cinmātraikya, Advaita threatens to reduce both 'Tat' and 'Tvam' to a vanishing point without a content. A bare 'identity' without reference to its correlates or any referents, makes no sense. Answering the objection that the acceptance of bare Cit as the purport of the Mahāvākya would be nothing more than a tautology, Madhusūdhana argues that even tho' the Realist may accept that the property of 'Cittvam' is non-different from itself, he cannot admit, with the Advaitin, that *it is also identical with its abodes (āśrayas)* the different Cits which to him are many. The Tg. rejoins that according to the Realists also, a given 'Cittva' is identical with its own āśraya, viz. the Cit,—just as Brahman which is Cit is the abode of its own Cittvam and non-different from it. The Logicians too admit the common property of 'potness' (ghaṭatva) subsisting in many pots (particulars)

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at the same time, is in each case non-different from its *āśraya*, without making all the pots identical with one another. The objection of Siddhasādhanatā raised by the Nym. against the Advaita view cannot therefore be parried on the ground of 'Cittvāśraya-aikya' *not* being acceptable to the Dvaitin.

The concept of Nirviśeṣa-B is regarded as vital to Advaita by Madhusūdana, tho' Maṇḍana himself is prepared to accept that B. is essentially self-luminous and of the nature of bliss. But somehow under the influence of Sureśvara, subsequent writers of Advaita have cultivated a partiality for the negative view of B. according to which the terms Satyam Jñānam etc., used in the definition of B. are to be construed in terms of an exclusion of their opposites (atadvyāvṛtti) in B. to avoid conflict with the concept of Nirviśeṣa. The ascription of seemingly positive attributes like Satyam Jñānam are therefore said to be posited of B. from the Vyāvahārika angle.

But this raises an inconvenient question whether these eliminations (Vyāvṛttis) are in themselves identical with B; or are different from Brahmanhood and *therefore unreal (mithyā)*. The A-Siddhi argues that these Vyāvṛttis are identical with B. Iṣṭāpatteḥ *Tad evam Vyāvṛtteḥ Satyatvepi na doṣaḥ* (ii. 205). In the same breath it also says that tho' the Vyāvṛttis are unreal *(Mithyā)*, it will *not* entail the acceptance of the same order of reality as Brahman for the *absence* of *anṛtatva* (falsity), *absence* of knowledge (ajñānam) leading to Advaitahāni (danger to the principle of one reality), because the excluded absence of falsity etc., and the exclusions themselves are both of them negated by the same sublating knowledge of B, when it arises: *Ekabādhaka-bādhyatvasya ubhayatra tulyatvāt* (ii. p. 205). The *Taraṅgiṇī*

rejoins here that this is illogical and cannot be accepted as the absence of falsity and falsity both of which are in the nature of absolute non-existences *(atyantābhāva)* in relation to one another *(paraspara atyantābhāvarūpa)* they cannot be conceived as sublatable in one and the same locus with reference to the same delimiting adjunct of such absence of absolute negations.[1] The other plea of the Vyāvṛttis of *anṛtatva* etc. from B. being necessary to counter any illusion or misconception about their possible presence in B. is equally untenable, as any such illusion has to be nullified by knowledge of the ever shining substrate Consciousness of B. as in the case of the illusion of a post in regard to an anthiil by revealing the real nature of the substrate as an anthill and *not* as a man! In the same way, it would be working at cross purposes to interpret positive attributes like Satyam, Jñānam predicated by the Śrutis in farfetched terms of absence of unreality, absence of ignorance and so on and induce an illusion which was not there and then set about to eradicate it by labored explanations.[2]

Another point agrued by Madhusūdana is that pure consciousness is the import of Tat Tvam asi. It is self-established at all times. But the acquisition of the knowledge of B. as qualified *per accidence* by the attributes of Satyam, jñānam etc. is indispensable to get rid of the ignorance about its true nature. But such knowledge of B. as qualified *per accidence* by these attributes will *not* render that cognition of B. an 'aspected one' *(saprakāraka)* even tho' knowl-

1. Paraspara-atyantabhāvarūpayor ekatra ekāvacchedena ekabādhakabādhyatvasya vaktum aśakyatvāt. (Tg. ii. 287)

2. Prakṣālanād dhi pankasya dūrād asparśanam varam. (Prevention is better than cure).

edge of B. is Niṣprakāra. For, this knowledge in terms of its being Sarvajña etc. by way of Upalakṣaṇa is not included within the body of the Akhaṇḍārtha as part of its syntactic structure based on the words and their meanings. This overlooks the fact that the wrong knowledge of B. now prevailing and which is to be eradicated is itself 'aspected' (saprākāra) and its correcting knowledge cannot but be 'aspected'. For a Niṣprakārakajñāna can do no correction.

Even if attributes like being the author of the world (jagatkāraṇatva) and all-knowingness are turned away from B. as not constituting its essence, because they are 'relative' to something ' other than ' B. (parāpekṣa), it is doubtful if even reality, ānanda and such others could be struck down as not constituting the essence of B. In fact, the very words ' Brahma satyam ' have been taken to signify that *B. alone is real* by some Advaitins. In such a predicament, it seems hazardous to agree that Satyam, jñānam, ānanda should be treated as extraneous to B's true nature. The importance given to Vyāvṛtti or exclusion of opposites smacks of Buddhist Apohavāda. The way in which S. himself talks of B. as Nityaśuddhamuktasvabhāvam is an unmistakable pointer that he can hardly have approved of the penchant for Vyāvṛtti exhibited by some of his over-enthusiastic followers. Maṇḍana Miśra, a senior contemporary of S., as well as Padmapāda and Vimuktātman are not so keen on turning satyam jñānam ananda into purely negative concepts, as we have seen, in the Introduction. Madhusūdana himself talks with a double voice, as we have just seen.

While dealing with the details of the Dvaita interpretation of Tat Tvam asi based on Lakṣaṇā on only one of the

terms at a time, Madhusūdana does *not* dispute the authority of any of the precedents and sanctions of usage of particular type of Ekapadalakṣaṇā, cited by Vyāsatīrtha and his predecessors from the Mahābhāṣya and its commentaries in support of the secondary meanings worked out by them in regard to Tattvam asi, consistent with the trend of the illustrations given by Uddālaka. The A-Siddhi's review is directed more towards maintaining that *in spite of these precedents, sanctions* and authorities in support of the Dvaita interpretation, the *intended* purport of the illustrations and their wording *still* remains committed to Akhaṇḍārtha in favor of Cinmātram. It also questions the propriety of the way in which the Dvaita interpretation aligns the contextual perspective of the illustrations to its requirements.

We shall look into these points raised by the A-siddhi and its objections against the interpretations of certain crucial terms like 'Anena Jīvena Ātmanā, Apītah, Prajāh etc., in the Dvaita interpretation, in our review of them.

INADEQUACY OF AKHAṆḌĀRTHA INTERPRETATION OF TAT TVAM ASI

The Akhaṇḍārtha interpretation of Tat Tvam Asi is concerned mainly with the three words Tat tvam asi. The entire scenario of the nine illustrations provided by Uddālaka and the exegetical details pertaining to the grammar, syntax and wording of the illustrations and their structural bearing in determining the import of the Upadeśa fade into insignificance and have no voice in determining the import. . .The terms of reference embodied in the illustrations *do not* lend themselves easily to a Monistic interpretation in terms of the identity of Jiva and B. They clearly point to the possibility of visualising a figurative identity between them as the purport. This may not commend itself to Advaita thought which is bent upon establishing a Svarūpaikya between them. It is for this reason that it tries in various ways to explain away the unmistakable realistic trend of every one of the illustrations in various devious ways, short of throwing them overboard. Its preference for a double Lakṣaṇā on both Tat and Tvam in terms of their Akhaṇḍārtha empties the identity, reached after so much effort, of all *content*. The 'identity' is reduced to a bare 'Cit-tvam' (consciousness) which is as innocuous as 'innocuous' can be, reducing both Tat and Tvam to a vanishing point. They are no longer what you and I believe them to be; or what modern scholars Eastern and Western may think of them, in their heart of hearts! But these are irrelevant to the traditional Siddhānta.

In the circumstances then, no eyebrows need be raised if the interpretational approach of the Dvaita school is guided by resort to minimum amount of Lakṣaṇā on any one

of the terms at a time, according to the exigencies of the interpetation proposed. Those who would call it a running away from the field may well pause to consider *by what name they should call* the running away from the primary senses of *both Tat and Tvam*, to suit the Akhaṇḍārtha! Under Akhaṇḍārtha, the game of philosophising does not seem to be worth the candle. As Vyāsatīrtha points out, the purport of Akhaṇḍārtha is not 'identity' as such, which is a relation between two; but a bare consciousness *(Cinmātram)* without any referents. Such a bare consciousness by its very nature is conceived to be self-shining *(svaprakāśa)* and self-evident *(svatassiddha)*. As such, it would require no Upadeśa.

The point is this. There needs must be an earlier presentation of bare consciousness as the Substrate *(adhiṣṭhāna)* of Cosmic illusion and its outcome of the illusory superimposed experience of difference between Jīva and Brahman, *before* the Mahāvākya could step in to put an end to it. But for the presentation of bare Consciousness as the substrate, earlier, there could be *no experience of Jīveśvarabheda* from which humanity is suffering, according to Advaita. In order to get rid of this incubus which has come to grip humanity, in spite of the presentation of bare consciousness all along as the substrate, the Mahāvākya will *have to embody* within its thought-content, a presentation of the identity in essence of Tat and Tvam. Without such a presentation, the Mahāvākya will be *powerless to dislodge the illusory experience of Jīveśvarabheda,* which has been dogging the footsteps of Jīvas, in spite of the self-shining of the Cinmātram as the substrate and reveal the truth. If all that the Mahāvākya establishes and reveals is only the bare consciousness, which has been

there even during the pendency of the *Bheda-bhrama*, it could hardly lay claim to destroy the illusion and reveal the truth : *Vākyāt prāk Caitanya-ajñāne, bhedabhramaśca na syāt. Adhiṣṭhāna-jñānābhāvāt, Mahāvākyena bhedabhrāntinivṛttiśca na syāt. Bhrama-kāla-jñātād adhiṣṭhānād adhika-abodhanāt* (Nym. ii, 3). If the Mahāvākya should include within its scope of purport, a presentation of the identity of Tat and Tvam, the judgment arising from it would cease to be an Akhaṇḍārtha and become a 'Sa-khaṇḍārtha'. That apart, the import of the Mahāvākya as bare consciousness would be indistinguishable from that of the subsidiary Lakṣaṇa-vākya of *Satyam jñānam anantam* devoted to Tatpadārthaśodhana, as it has also been construed on the basis of Lakṣaṇā and Atadvyāvṛtti in terms of bare being or Consciousness : *Mahāvākyasya avāntara-vākyena gatārthatvam ca syāt.*

Prakāśātman in his *Vivaraṇa* advances an explanation that the presence of two terms Tat and Tvam connoting *prima facie* two distinct entities is necessary to facilitate the case for Lakṣaṇā to overcome the difficulty of their identity in view of the contradictory nature of their primary senses. The second term is thus necessary to help sustain the Lakṣaṇā on the basis of their apposition *(sāmānādhikaraṇya)* of two mutually contradictory association of ideas. Vyāsatīrtha argues that such an explanation cannot be accepted. For, the opening words of the Khaṇḍa *Sad eva idamagre āsīt* refers to Sat as the only existent (according to the Advaita interpretation) and it is followed by other statements such as "All beings have their root in Sat, their abode and support in It, as well as the statement that in deep sleep the self gets united with the Sat. As the Sat is and must be the same as the Śuddha Cit (according to the Advaita view) in the

interest of Ekavākyatā between "Sad eva" resting on Cin-mātraikya, it should be possible to dispense with the term 'Tat' and keep close to 'Cinmātram' throughout the discourse of the Sad-Vidyā of which 'Tat tvam asi' forms part. The Cinmātram (referred to as 'Sat' in the beginning) would serve as the subject of the entire discourse and all that would be necessary to complete the instruction would be to sum up, keeping the 'Sat' steadily and unwaveringly in view and convey by implication and continuity of thought ("You are) THAT PURE CONSCIOUSNESS (Sat)". It cannot be denied that SAT stands for Cit. As a matter of fact, the only justification to go in for Lakṣaṇā at all in the interpretation of a given Vākya according to established norms of Exegesis is the incompatibility of cogent syntactic relation between given terms in a sentence, in their expressed senses. No doubt a sentence cannot consist of a single word in isolation. But the basis or ground for Lakṣaṇā is always the incompatibility of their syntactic relation, as they stand worded, in their primary senses and *not in the mere presence of a second word as such* as the Vivaraṇakāra would have us believe. That being so, the juxtaposition of Tvam asi would satisfy the criterion without the help of 'Tat' (already supplied by the initial 'Sat'). As Sat the Cinmātram is ever present and runs through and through the entire discourse, it should be possible to hold that what the Advaita philosophy wants to establish by insisting on the actual presence of the word 'Tat' could be met satisfactorily with 'Cit' understood right along as the subject of Akhaṇḍārtha and brought into focus for the final Upadeśa.

THE DVAITA INTERPRETATION OF TAT TVAM ASI IN PERSPECTIVE

The Advaita interpretation of Tattvamasi attaches more importance to what it calls the Tātparya at the expense of the grammatical disposition of the words of the proposition and concurrent details provided by the illustrations intended to elucidate the purport as such. This Tātparya is said to be one of identity or non-difference between Jīva and B. But if such identity is to be presented as a constituent part the Tātparya or its content, the Vākyārtha would have to be treated as Sakhaṇḍa (synthetic). That is not acceptable to Advaita. It has therefore ultimately opted to define this identity as nothing more than "bare consciousness" Cinmātram. But this makes the position so innocuous that Cinmātram being indeterminate would be powerless to *eradicate beginningless illusion* of one's being different from Brahman from which the Jīvātman is ailing from time immemorial. It is therefore necessary and imperative to agree to treat the sentence Tattvamasi as a well coordinated statement of its constituent parts like any other grammatical sentence and take he help of Lakṣaṇā to the extent absolutely necessary. This is what the Dvaita tradition of interpretation has chosen to do, by keeping the resort to Lakṣaṇā to the barest minimum, as we shall see in due course.

The analogy of Soyam Devadattaḥ cited by Advaita in support of Double Lakṣaṇā would not be applicable to Tattvamasi. For Devadatta *is one and the same person* connected with a past and a present environment. But the case of the Jīvātman and B. is on a different footing. It is *not yet an established fact* accepted by everyone that the

individual self of Man and the Supreme Being of Scriptures are one and the same. Unlike in the case of Devadatta, the personal identity or svarūpaikya of Jīva and B. in the transmigratory state of the Jīva is out of the question. Nor is their identity in the supermundane state supported by the Śrutis *with one voice* (See R. V. x, 90,2c : Chān. Up. viii,12,3 ; B.S. i. 1, 19 ; iv, 4, 17). Such identity is also opposed to reason and experience. If there are certain identity texts to all appearances, the dualistic texts are legion. Therefore, it becomes necessary to have the Tattvam asi and other texts scrutinized with care and circumspection.

No doubt, the phrasing "Tat tvam asi" appears, at first sight, to proclaim an identity between them. But so do many other texts in the Śrutis with reference to many others, as for instance "Puruṣo vā idam sarvam", "Yajamānaḥ Prastaraḥ", "Ādityo Yūpaḥ", "Āyur vai ghṛtam", "Tvam Yajñaḥ" and statements like 'Rājā rāṣtram', 'Aham Kratuḥ', 'Aham yajñaḥ' based on case apposition (vibhaktisāmānādhikaraṇya). These are not accepted at their face value *even by Advaitins.*

Moreover, 'Tat tvam asi' is not an isolated statement, standing by itself. It has a history, a background and a context in which it is set. It has also a large number of speaking illustrations drawn from life and experience, intended to make its meaning clear. All these facts have to be taken into account and weighed properly before venturing to draw a final conclusion. It will *not* do to rush to any hasty conclusion, ignoring these details and relying on the seemy side of the words: Tat tvam asi.

There is a prevailing misconception among many Advaita scholars and others besides that the philosophers of the Dvaita school

adopt an ostrich like attitude to the existence of the 'Advaita-Śrutis' and deny their very existence. This is not true. The following observations of Jayatīrtha, the celebrated commentator on Madhva, should remove this misconception, once for all. Says Jayatīrtha : "*We do not deny that such texts (seeming to favor identity of Jīva and B. or the unreality of the world) exist, or that the words in which they are couched do not possess the meanings assigned to them. What we deny* is that the import of such passages is the unreality of the world (or identity of Jīva and B.) For, absence of conflict with sound reasoning is the criterion for taking the apparent meaning of a passage to be the intended import also. But in the present case, we have shown that there is serious conflict with sound reasoning in accepting the apparent meaning of the passage, as its real import" (J.NS.p.601)[1].

The Advaita interpretation of Tattvamasi practically closes its eyes to the significance of the context in which Śvetaketu on his return from the Gurukula becomes haughty and egoistical. This may be expected to give a clue to the probable nature of the correcting instruction and its drift which the father thinks it fit to impart to him, to humble his pride and awaken in him a due sense of the limitations of human knowledge and understanding and the need to dive deeper into the heart of the Scriptures to understand the exact place of Man in God's Universe.

Instead, Advaita has given prominence and priority to the postulation of what it calls Ekavijñānena Sarvavijñānam, reading into it its metaphysical theory of the unreality of the Universe as an 'effect' (kārya) or more precisely a 'Vivarta',

1. For Text see my 'Philosophy of Madhvācārya' p. 207.

with Brahman as the substrate of its illusory appearance. The human self itself, having somehow lapsed from its original state of Brahmanhood thro' beginningless Ignorance (Avidyā), has to shake itself free from it and get back to its original Brahmanhood. *But the self as such cannot come under the scope of the formula of Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam either as a transformed 'effect' (kārya) of B. or its 'Vivarta'.* The maxim is therefore irrelevant to 'Tattvam asi'. We have already seen how the Pariṇāma and Vivarta interpretations of Ekavijñānena Sarvavijñānam are unsustainable on logical and exegetical grounds and that therefore the real message of Ekavijñānena Sarvavijñānam has to be sought in the supremacy of B. and the dependence of all finite reality of matter and spirits on B. for its existence and functioning,—a conclusion which can be seen reflected in the concluding statement—Aitadātmyam idam sarvam ("*tat* tvam asi") as Uddālaka's exhortation to his son, to acquire such a knowledge and achieve freedom from the transmigratory life and enjoy the bliss of selfhood in communion with such a Brahman.

The probability of this (latter) view being the more faithful to the context and the background of the preamble of the recital of Cosmic creation by the Supreme after taking thought *(tad aikṣata)* seems to be strongly suggested by one of the nine illustrations with which Uddālaka has enlivened his teaching. It is the illustration which is bound to make the Monist feel uncomfortable. It is the illustration of a person charged with 'theft' and of being in possession of what does *not* belong to him *(apahārsīt, steyam akārṣīt)* and brought to trial. It is difficult to appreciate the propriety and relevancy of *such an illustration* to a Monistic point of view, in which the human soul is *ignorant*

of its real high status and is suffering as a consequence. It has to be pitied and awakened to a sense of its glory, like the Rājakumāra of the legend, who by living from childhood among shepherds believed himself to be a shepherd's son and behaved as such. Anyway, ignorance of what belongs to one's self by right is *not* 'theft' *nor is the ignorant person an Impostor*. The whole background of 'theft' and 'imposture' surrounding this illustration given by Uddālaka is singularly inappropriate, out of place and repugnant to a Monistic approach to the interpretation of Tat tvam asi.

DVAITA INTERPRETATION OF TAT TVAM ASI IN ITS EXEGETICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Dvaita interpretation of Tat tvam asi is based on two different ways of splitting of the words into 'Tat Tvam asi' and 'Atat Tvam asi'. The latter is adopted by Madhvācārya in his Bhāṣya on the Chāndogya Up. and in his Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya, after a critical examination of the wording of the illustrations given in the text, their syntactic bearings, the context and the recital of Cosmic Creation, in the beginning, all of which are overwhelmingly in favor of recognising intrinsic difference between Jīva and B. and justify the Padaccheda Atat Tvam Asi which is *not open to any grammatical objection*. It is based on Savarṇadīrgha-sandhi between the final long vowel in the preceding word Ātmā followed by the short vowel (initial) of the following word 'Atat' (if the reading Atat tvam asi is adopted). The advantage of the reading Atat tvam asi is that its adoption will do away with the necessity of going in for Lakṣaṇā on any of the terms Tat or Tvam. It will take the bull by the horns and establish Svarūpabheda of Jiva and B. without any room for doubt or beating about the bush. The other reading has also been adopted by Madhva in his *Gītā-Tātparya*, as being in accord with the metaphysical dependence of all finite reality on B. expressed in the concluding part, by way of peroration, in terms of *Aitad-ātmyam idam Sarvam*.

The other commonly accepted reading "Tat tvam asi" would any way require the help of Lakṣaṇā or secondary construction, for both the Dvaita and the Advaita interpretations, as a matter of *unavoidable necessity*. For, Advaita too *does not and cannot* posit an identity between

Tat and Tvam in their literal sense. This fact is very important to be noted. *For most laymen, who hear Godmen giving public lectures on the Upaniṣads, "Tat Tvam asi" is a* matter of 'Open Sesame'. *It is not.* (See text from *Viveka-cūḍāmaṇi* 244 of S. quoted in the Introduction.)

The point is this. Resort to Lakṣaṇā is *optional* for the Dvaita interpretation. *It can do without it. Advaita cannot do* without going in for Lakṣaṇā. The Dvaita interpretation can manage with a single Lakṣaṇā on any one of the terms, at a time. This is not possible for the Advaita. It is compelled to go in for double Lakṣanā, simultaneously, which involves *Kalpanā-Gaurava.*

Madhva himself is not averse to Lakṣaṇā in the interpretation of 'Abheda Śrutis'. He has shown there are precedents for Ekapadalakṣaṇā of such identity texts in the Brahmasūtras : Tadguṇasāratvāt tu tadvyapadeśaḥ (ii, 3, 28) and Ata evopamā Sūryakādivat (iii, 2, 18). He has also identified some grounds for such Lakṣaṇā in regard to the identity texts : (See BSPC. Vol. II, pp. 216, III, p. 102)

Svātantrye ca Viśiṣṭatve sthānamatyaikyayor api
Sādṛśye caikyavāk samyak sāvakāśā yatheṣṭataḥ
Sādṛśyācca Pradhānatvāt svātantryād api vā abhidām
Āhur Īśena Jīvasya *na svarūpābhidām kvacit* (AV)

Commentator Jayatīrtha has explained the types of Lakṣaṇā they presuppose. There is authentic literary evidence of Jayatīrtha's Guru Akṣobhya Tīrtha having had a disputation with Vidyāraṇya on the Tattvam asi text at which the celebrated Vedānta Deśika of the Rāmānuja school acted as umpire and declared Akṣobhya the victor. No record of the arguments employed by the two sides has come down. The earliest writer of the Dvaita school to develop an

impressive and colorful pattern of arguments in favor of a Dvaita interpretation of the Tattvamasi text based on Lakṣaṇā and Pūrva-Mīmāmsa nyāyas and grammatical sanctions and precedents from the Vyākaraṇa Śāstra is Viṣṇudāsācārya of *Vādaratnāvaḷi*-fame[1]. It is possible that he might have had access to some of the arguments used in the debate between Akṣobhya and Vidyāraṇya earlier[2].

He was followed by Vyāsatīrtha who has incorporated his materials and made substantial additions of his own by his elaborate analysis and criticism of the Advaita interpretations in their textual details and the intricacies of the Akhaṇḍārthavāda and arguments in its favor in the works of Sureśvara and others.

Both Viṣṇudāsācārya and Vyāsatīrtha refer to Pāṇini's Sūtra *Supām suluk* (vii, 1, 39) which provides for the deletion of the case endings of a Nāma-pada without affecting their case senses. This would enable us to construe 'Tat' in the sense of as many as four cases traceable to corresponding passages in the discourse of Uddālaka such as "Being ensouled by this life giving Supreme Being (Jīvena ātmanā) the Vṛkṣa-Jīva imbibes water and flourishes happily (Chān. Up. vi, 11, 1). All these Beings have their root, abode and support in Sat (vi, 8, 4).

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1. The English translation of the *Vādaratnāvaḷi* with notes has been published by Prof. Edwin Gerow (American Oriental Society Trans. Series Vol. ii, 1990, New Haven, Connecticut.)

2. The incident of the debate has been recorded in Brahmatantra Svatantra Jeer's Muvvāyirappaḍi Guruparamparā Vaibhavaprakāśikā (Tamil) of the Rāmānuja school and by Mahācārya of the same school. For details see my HDSV. (1981). Jayatīrtha alludes to his teacher's victory over a redoubtable Advaita adversary in verse 5 of his c. on Madhva's BSB.

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EXPLANATIONS BASED ON LAKṢAṆĀ ON 'TAT'

(1) Identity resting on grounds of association has been referred to by the author of the Mahābhāṣya as a recognised mode of expression. He cites the example: *Vasanta adhyayanam*, under Pāṇini iv, 2, 63 ('Spring study'). Tho' there is no object of study called Spring study, the object of study is entitled to be called 'Vasanta' as it is studied during Spring (Vasantasahacaritam adhyayanam Vasantaḥ). The close association of Jīva with B. is borne out by many Śrutis: Dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā (Mund. Up. iii, 1, 1). Madhusūdana contends here that this Śruti does not refer to Jiva and B. as the two birds always together but only to 'antaḥkaraṇa and Jīva' (*A-Siddhi* ii, 295). This goes against the finding of Śaṅkara's Sūtrabhāṣya on i, 2, 11 where the two birds have been identified in the Siddhānta as Jīva and B. It will be remembered the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa also speaks of the Jīvātman as being *always* under the constant impulsion of the Antaryāmi, not to speak of the Jīvas being under the constant *control of B.* in the waking, dream and suṣupti states and beyond.

(2) Identity in virtue of basic and fundamental relation with another: *Tadāśritatvena Tad iti vyapadeśaḥ.* In his commentary on Pāṇini's Sūtra 'Samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ (ii, 1, 1)' the term Samarthaḥ (competent) figuratively stands for 'words which are competent for syntactic relationship with another word in a compound formation: Samarthāśritaḥ padavidhiḥ. Such angāngibhāva relation between Jīva and B. is repeatedly proclaimed by Uddālaka in his discourse: Sanmūlā imās Sarvāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanās satpratiṣṭhāḥ (vi, 8, 4).

(3) The language of identity is also used in referring to that which is the source of another: The Brāhmaṇa was His Face (referring to the Virāt Puruṣa from whose face the Brāhmaṇa is said to have been produced (Ṛ.V. x, 90, 12). Corresponding reference in Uddālaka's discourse can be seen in Sanmūlās somya imāh prajās sadāyatanās satpratiṣṭhāḥ (Chān. vi, 8, 4), Toyena Jīvān Vyasasarja bhūmyām (Mah. N. Up, 1, 4). Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on B.S. ii, 3, 17 quotes a Śruti "All these Ātmans come out of Him (   ) besides Mund. Up. ii, 1, 1 "Tathākṣarād vividhās Somya bhāvāh prajāyante tatra caivāpiyanti" and explains that this refers to the genesis of the Jīvas: *Jīvātmanām utpattipralayau ucyete.* Tho' the quotation occurs in the Pūrvapakṣa, it does not take away the authenticity of the Śruti which may of course be suitably explained by the Siddhāntin in the sense that the genesis of the Jīva is with reference to his embodiment only and not of his Svarūpa, as every Vedāntin will have to do. Commenting on Pāṇini's Sūtra *Ig yaṇas samprasāraṇam* (i, 1, 45) the Mahābhāṣya says the vowels i, u, r, l *born of* Samprasāraṇa (vowel gradation) are designated as 'Samprasāraṇa' by metonymy, just as the young one of a crow is called a crow and the offspring of a hawk is called a hawk. The Jīvas owe their genesis (embodiment) to the Lord.

(4) Identity by reason of Dependence on another: Tad-adhīnatvāt Tad iti vyapadeśaḥ. The reference to husked rice as 'grain' in the Vedic passage *Dhānyam asi* dhinuhi *Devān* 'Thou art the grain, Gladden the heart of the Devās" has been explained by the Mīmāmsakas as a lākṣaṇika prayoga based on dependence: Dhānyādhīnotpattike taṇḍule dhānyaśabdaprayogaḥ. This can be extended to the Jīvas as we see from Sanmūlāḥ sarvāh prajās sadāyatanās

satpratiṣṭhāḥ (Chān. vi, 8, 4). This principle of interpretation has been utilised by Madhva:

Yadadhīnā yasya sattā tat tadityeva bhaṇyate
Vidyamāne vibhedepi mitho nityam svarūpataḥ.

This is corroborated by the following passage from the Chān.Up. Verily, they do not call them speeches, eyes, ears or minds. They call them 'Prāṇas' for they are all (from) 'Prāṇas' (v, 1, 15)

(5) Reference in terms of Identity in virtue of resemblance or by extension of signification. This principle of interpretation is embodied in Pāṇini's Sūtra 'Bahugaṇavatuḍati Sankhyā (i. 1, 23)' It is pointed out by Patanjali that it is not the purpose of the Sūtra to designate the words bahu, gaṇa, vatu and ḍati as numerals (sankhyā). For in that case, numerals like eka, dvi would not be comprehended by the Sūtra 'Sankhyāpūrvo dviguḥ' (ii, 1, 52) in view of the specific rule of interpretation Kṛtrima-akṛtrimayoḥ kṛtrime kāryasampatyayaḥ''. The difficulty is met by Patanjali saying that the expression 'Sankhyā' in the Sūtra is not meant to be a *designation*. It is used merely to convey the sense of similitude: Bahugaṇavatuḍatayaḥ Sankhyāvad bhavanti. The term 'Sankhyā' (Numeral) has therefore to be taken by lakṣaṇā to stand for 'Sankhyāvat', tho' the suffix 'vat' expressing similitude is not actually used in the Sūtra. Patanjali observes: Antareṇa api vatim atideśo bhavati: An extension of reference is permissible even in the absence of the use of the term 'vat' (like). For example, we call X 'Brahmadatta' even tho' he is not really Brahmadatta, just because he is 'like Brahmadatta'. Such resemblance in point of attributes of Jñāna, ānanda etc. in a limited sense, is present in the Jīvas in relation to B.

which has been mentioned by Bādarāyaṇa as one of the grounds of the identification of Jīva with B. figuratively: Tadguṇasāratvāttu Tadvyapadesaḥ. The probative value of the Sūtra in respect of this principle of interpretation is not affected by the different way in which this Sūtra has been understood in Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya with special reference to Buddhi and Jīva. The Mīmāmsakas also admit the principle of extension based on similarity as in Āditya Yūpaḥ—the Sacrificial Post is the Sun(Sārūpyāt P.M.S. i, 4, 27).

EXAMPLES OF LAKṢAṆĀ BASED ON 'TVAM'

(6) The moon is commonly said to be between the branches of a tree when it is pointed out to a youngster by his parent. This is known as the 'Śākhāchandranyāya'. Here, the term Śākhā (branch) signifies the vicinity of branches (Śākhāsādeśya) by Lakṣaṇā. Likewise, B. which is always nearest to the Jīva as Sarvāntaratara and dwells in his heart (Gita 18, 61) may well be designated by the term 'Tvam', meaning You are always by the side of Brahman: Tvat-sādeśyam Brahma.

(7) Brahman is the highest sustaining Force behind the Jīva and may be referred to as 'Tvam' even as the Brahmin is spoken of in the Purāṇās as "The Brāhmaṇa is all the gods" in the sense of his being the mainstay of all the other Varṇas:

Brāhmaṇo vai Sarvā devatāḥ Tāh sarvā Vedavidi Brāhmaṇe vasanti.

(8) B. being the source of all may be identified with the Jīva (Tvam) in the same way as the handful of Darbha grass used in the Sacrifice is referred to in the Brāhmaṇa text as Yajamānaḥ Prastaraḥ. Such extended applications on different grounds have been recognised by Jaimini in his P.M.S. (i, 4, 23): "Tatsiddhi jātisārūpya. . . . ."

A one-way Lakṣaṇā at a time may therefore be adequate to meet the situation created by Tat tvam asi. A two-way Lakṣaṇā at one and the same time is therefore superfluous and unnecessary to make sense out of the proposition, in the light of the background and the spirit and letter of the many illustrations given to bring out the significance of the conclusion Tat Tvam asi. Moreover Jahadajahallakṣaṇā

is forced to reintroduce a part of the denoted sense (śakyaikadeśa) of Tat viz. Śuddhacit, which it had abandoned earlier on account of incompatibility of anvaya in associating Cinmātram with the act of thinking (akṣata) and Trivṛtkaraṇa. In contrast, the procedure of Jahallakṣaṇā adopted by the Dvaita interpretation is free from this drawback.

The illustrations given by Uddālaka cannot be diverted to the support of the thesis of identity. We shall see something of A-Siddhi's desperate attempts to explain away the inadequacy of these illustrations from the Advaita point of view. Even Vācaspati Miśra in his *Bhāmatī* has rejected the claim of the rivers becoming identical with the Sea waters and ridicules the idea in his commentary on B.S. i, 4, 22: He asks "What do you mean by 'rivers'? Do you mean the water atoms or their particular structural configuration or the new entity evolved by the combination of atoms? Since the particular structural configuration or the new entity produced by the combination of atoms is bound to get merged when they enter the Sea, what remains there then *to become one with the sea?* As for the water atoms belonging to the rivers, they must indeed be different and distinct from those of the waters of the Sea. Likewise, they too will have to be different from the Sea". Further comment is needless here.

Apart from the incongruity of the illustrations, with the Monistic position, the phrasing of the accompanying words of the illustrations is also often far from being appropriate to the requirements of a Monistic interpretation. For example, in the illustration of juices and the rivers:

Sati sampadya na viduḥ Sati Sampadyāmahe iti Satā Somya tadā Sampanno bhavati, Sata āgamya na viduḥ

Sata āgacchāmaha iti. Difference is writ large on these statements made in the Dārṣṭāntika passages (vi, 9, 2): Sarvāḥ prajās sati sampadya na vidus sati sampadyāmahe iti Sata āgamya na vidus Sata āgacchāmaha iti (vi, 19, 2). It is clear from such statements that it is the *failure* to discern the *existing difference* between themselves and the Sat, while being lodged in it and while coming out of it, for which they are punished with return to rebirth.

Take the case of the rivers mingling with the Sea. After rising from it they get back to their original place viz. the Ocean. The *Ocean remains the same as before,* says the Upaniṣad: Sa Samudra eva bhavati. What does this mean or is intended to mean? If the intention is to declare that the rivers "become the Sea itself" as Radhakrishnan translates it (*Principal Upaniṣads* p. 460), Sanskrit Grammar would require it to be properly worded as *Tāh samudra eva bhavanti* with the subject and the predicate both in the plural. Will it not be not only grammatically correct but factually also true that the Ocean remains the same irrespective of the rivers coming in and going out of it, suggesting by implication that irrespective of Jīvātmans going out and coming back to it, the Supreme B. remains unaffected by their comings and goings, as pointed out by Madhva in his comment on the Sthitaprajña compared to the ocean remaining unaffected by the inflow and outflow of sensations Na hi Samudras Saritpraveśa-apraveśādinimitta-vṛddhihrāsau bahutarau prāpnoti, prayatnam vā karoti (M.GB. ii, 70).

Let us take the illustration of Suṣupti. It is said that in deep sleep the Jīvātman enters into 'Sva' (accusative case). If this should mean that the Jīva in Suṣupti *becomes one with* the Sat (SVA), meaning his own 'being', the reflexive pronoun 'Svam' will have to be read as 'Svena'

to agree with the predicative apīto bhavati according to Sanskrit Grammar. Looking to the use of the accusative Svam, it would appear that 'Sva' has been used to denote the Supreme Being whom the Jīva is said to enter in Suṣupti. The use of the term 'Sva' to denote the Supreme Being is authenticated by the Sūtrakāra in Dyubhvādyāyatanam *Sva-śabdāt* (B.S. i, 3, 1). Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on this Sūtra acknowledges that the word 'SVA' stands for 'Ātman' referred to in the Viṣayavākya in Muṇḍ.Up. ii. 2, 5. "Know Him only as the Ātman and give up all other talk". Śaṅkara affirms here that the word Ātman in the Upaniṣads too receives its true sense *only* when understood to refer to the Paramātman and *not in any other sense,* the other senses ruled out being not only Prakṛti (i, 3, 3) but the Vijñānātman as well: Prāṇabhṛcca (1, 3, 4).

In the illustration of the bird tied to its tether, the concluding words of the Dārṣṭāntika Vākya: Tan manaḥ prāṇam eva upāśrayate Prāṇabandhanam hi Manaḥ (Chān. Up. vi, 8, 2) the references cannot be to the Mind and Prāṇa *alone,* as such, but implicitly to the Jīva and B. also to sustain the parallelism in thought between the illustration and the illustrated. There is no point in stopping with the Mind and Prāṇa. For in the opening words in vi, 1, 8 Yatraitat Puruṣas svapiti Satā sampanno bhavati, the Jīvātman is stated to go to sleep *in the Sat (yatra)*. The sampatti is necessarily with the Sat for the sleeping self. Consistent with this, the reference to Manaḥ reposing in Prāṇa has naturally to be taken to refer to what happens to the Jīvātman and *not to* what happens to the Mind or the bird. Manaḥ and Prāṇa have therefore to be understood in the extended sense of the Self and the Supreme. Otherwise, the dṛṣṭānta pairs and the Dārṣṭāntika pairs will not be properly connected and balanced. There is no difficulty in

applying the words *Manaḥ and Prāṇa* to Jīva and B. either etymologically or by Upalakṣaṇa, of which the former would be more in keeping with Śāstramaryādā (Scriptural norm).

Similarly in the case of the Tree and its life-giving principle. The reference to the tree withering away (when the life-principle leaves it) and its drinking the water given to its roots and enjoying itself *(Pepīyamāno modamānaḥ)* is not to the tree as an insentient entity but to the Vṛkṣa-Jīva as such. The Jīva-Ātmā by whose energising entry and presence in it (Anena Jīvena ātmanā anupraviṣṭaḥ pepīyamāno modamānaḥ) is not the Vṛkṣa-Jīva but the Supreme Being. Vṛkṣajīva cannot afford to continue to keep the tree alive without himself being inwardly sustainted by the Antaryāmi-B. The significance of the 'aṇuprabhāva' of the Jīva-Ātman into the Vṛkṣa-Jīva can be gathered from the statement of the Taitt. Up. "Tat sṛṣṭvā tadeva anuprāviśat" (II, 6). That the 'Jīva-Ātmā' by whose presence in it the tree is stated to be able to drink the water and be happy must be B. as such and not the Vṛkṣa-Jīva as such is confirmed by the use of the same word 'Jīva-Ātmā earlier in the same Adhyāya of the Chān.Up. (vi, 2, 2) as the Divine Being who educes name and form and brings about Trivṛtkaraṇa of the primal substances of Tejobanna. We have the authority of B.S. ii, 4, 20 and Śaṅkara's commentary on it that "it is the considered Siddhānta of all the Upaniṣads that Parameśvara alone is the author of Nāmarūpavyākaraṇa and Trivṛtkaraṇa (See S.B.S.B. ii, 4, 20). The Vṛkṣa-Jīva who flourishes by drinking the water given to the roots must necessarily be different from the 'Jīva-Ātman' the author of Trivṛtkaraṇa and Cosmic Creation. The relation between the Vṛkṣa-Jīva and the Jīva-Ātmā who makes him flourish and enjoy himself by entering into him would be similar to the relation between TVAM and TAT.

It would be a mistake to suppose in respect of the seed of the Banyan fruit which Śvetaketu is asked to cut open (vi, 13, 1) that the term 'aṇimā' is used to refer to the tiny seed itself. The whole purpose of Uddālaka would be nullified if we are to go away with the impression that it is by the innate power of the tiny seed of the fruit alone that the mighty Nyagrodha is alive and upstanding. It would not be proper to hold that the Vaṭakaṇikā (tiny seed) by itself has the power to produce the Vaṭavṛkṣa: *Vaṭakaṇikāyām iva Vaṭavṛkṣaśaktiḥ* (as assumed in the Advaita interpretation). If that be so, there would be no need for the father to ask the son to *break open one of the tiny seeds* themselves and report what he sees inside it. On getting the reply that he sees 'nothing' the father enlightens him that it is by the invisible power hidden inside the tiny seed itself that the mighty Nyagrodha has come into being. This distinction between the tiny seed and the unseen Power *within it is very important* and holds the key to the secret. The tiny seed and the invisible Power energising it are referred to by the Upaniṣad by using *two different words* 'aṇvyah' in the feminine plural (referring to the tiny seeds) Imā dhānāh' and the word 'aṇimā' in the masculine singular referring to the hidden principle.

As a last resort, Advaita interpretation may seek to rely on "Aitadātmyam idam sarvam" in support of the identity thesis. But in the light of all that has been said about the failure of the illustrations to support the identity thesis, the phrase "Aitadātmyam idam sarvam"[1] immediately *preceding* Tat (tvam asi) could be understood in a

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1. Etad sad ātmā yasya ityeva astu vyākhyānām ātma śabdastu Svāmitvārthaḥ Bhāvapratyayatu Parasyāpi vyarthaḥ. Etena Aitadātmyam *Etat-svāmikam Etadīyam iti siddhyati* (J. VTN-ṭika).

sense more in keeping with the reality and multiplicity of Cosmic life depending for all time on the One Supreme Being for its genesis, existence and functioning as the Sole ruling Power over all.

Rejecting the foregoing interpretation of Aitadātmyam of the Dvaita school, as a Taddhita formation of 'Etadātmā' where the derivative suffix is understood to convey the sense of 'what belongs' to the Ātman (Brahman)[1] the A-Siddhi argues that the suffix 'ṣyān' is authorised only in the sense of the substantive (svārthe ṣyañ) as in *Sukham eva Saukhyam'* and is therefore to be preferred to the other sense of 'belonging to' (etadīyam) *Etadīyam ityarthe ṣyāño avidhānāt, prayogābhāvācca* (II, p. 295).

However, the abstract sense of *aitadātmyam* is superfluous and serves no purpose, in the Advaita interpretation. If instead of its superfluity the suffix could be understood in a more *relevant, purposeful* and exceptional sense of 'belonging to' in keeping with the contextual setting, recital of Cosmic evolution by the Supreme B. thro' *trivṛtkaraṇa* and the spirit and the letter of the illustrations given by Uddālaka to illustrate the purport of the Upadeśa, it deserves to be taken into account (as the Dvaita interpretation has done). Here, Jayatīrtha cites the authority of the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patanjali on Paṇini Grammar, in support of taking the Taddhita-suffix, in the sense of belonging to : 'Many and varied are the ways of application of the Taddhita suffixes : *Vicitrā hi taddhitavṛttayaḥ)* (Pāṇ. II, 4, 32)

1. The use of the term Ātmā in its highest sense to refer to Paramātman is attested in the Antaryāmi-Brāhmana of the Bṛh. Up (iii, 7, 10–23) twenty-three times by Yājñavalkya (Eṣa *Te ātmā antaryāmī amṛtaḥ)*

The proviso that this maxim is to be confined to authentic usages *(prāmāṇīkaprayoga)* can only mean that such usages must have an approvable authentic basis *(prāmāṇikārthaviṣayaka)*. As this condition is not violated in the Dvaita interpretation, there should be no objection to its acceptance.

RESUME OF DVAITA INTERPRETATION OF TAT TVAM ASI

We have seen that in Advaita the problem of the Tattvamasi text is not about its Vākyārtha in its accepted sense consisting of the interrelations of the subject, predicate and copula but one of its *intention* distantly suggested by the Tātparya in terms of an indefinable identity of pure consciousness without reference to its relata any longer. This is because if the identity is embodied in a judgement arising from the words as its constituent elements, the sentence will *cease* to be an 'Akhaṇḍārtha'. Even if the identity is to figure only *per accidence* in the import, the judgement will become a synthetic one as 'Kākavad Devadattagṛham', used to identify Devadatta's house as the one on which a crow is perching. On the other hand, if the import is one of identity unrelated to pure consciousness, it would *not* in any way be detrimental to the interest of those who are otherwise opposed to the concept of Jīva-Brahma-aikya, as the manner in which it is sought to be achieved by reducing the import to a bare consciousness (Cinmātram) makes it so innocuous that it will *not* in any way be hostile to the adversary's position. The effort made to arrive at such an innocuous import would be a waste as it will only establish something which is not at all in dispute that pure Consciousness is pure Consciousness. The disagreement will crop up only when 'this consciousness' (of Jīva) is sought to be identified with 'that consciousness' (of B). If the import, on the other hand, centres on the establishment of the 'Jīva-Cit' (TVAM) with TAT (Brahman) which is qualified by the attributes of omniscience, lordship of the world etc. the judgement would become a complex one, as the elements of omniscience, lordship etc. will have to

enter into the body of the judgement as its distinctive aspects *(prakāra)*. If the import is however restricted to the idea of 'bare consciousness' (cinmātram) as its referent, it would hardly call for a laborious 'Upadeśa' from Uddālaka. 'Cinmātra' is by hypothesis, already established to be self-lumious and self-evidenced at all times. The effort made to sustain the Akhaṇḍārtha interpretation of Tat Tvam Asi would thus be in vain, like chasing a shadow.

We are thus forced to come to the conclusion that the sentence "Tattvam asi"—will have to be taken like any other linguistic proposition conveying a particular relationship between the subject of the proposition and what is predicated of it, conforming to the laws of thought and exegetical satisfyingness of the whole.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE THESIS

Madhva is the earliest Vedāntin-Commentator on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad to raise the question of the adequacy of Uddālka's illustrations to the acceptability of the Advaita interpretation of Tattvamasi, from the point of view of *purely textual criteria* of their wording, grammar, syntax and parity of relationship between the pairs constituting the illustrations on the one hand and the counterparts of the illustrations *(dārṣṭāntikas)* namely Jīva and Brahman. Prior to Madhva, these aspects of Advaita interpretation do *not* seem to have received the attention they deserved. Even Rāmānuja who differed from Śaṅkara on the interpretation of this text had not gone into *these details.* He merely contented himself with pointing out Tat tvam asi is not really the main proposition, but is merely a Nigamana, an extension of the metaphysical relation of 'Aitadātmyam' (being ensouled by the Sat-Brahman) in which finite reality as a whole comprising Cit and Acit (Souls and Matter) stand towards the Supreme B. which is its indwelling Source of impulsion. As Rāmānuja had *not* commented on any of the Upaniṣads as such, he had probably no occasion to go into these exegetical details, in the interpretation of the other school. *Modern scholars are yet to wake up to this problem.* As the illustrations are deigned to elucidate the thesis propounded, they cannot *but be vital* to the discussion of the import, irrespective of the question whether the philosophical doctrine of Advaita of Jīvabrahmaikya represents the authentic voice of the Upaniṣads. The difficulties presented by the illustrations have to be faced squarely and ought not to be waved aside patronisingly as 'immaterial'.

All that the author of the *Advaitasiddhi* has got to say about most of the illustrations, after a rapid survey of some of the objections raised by Vyāsatīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta,* with reference to the exegetical details of these illustrations is a generalisation that analogies do not always run on all fours and should not be pressed too far, or that the illustrations given by Uddālaka do not refer to any actually existing differences or failure to take note of them; or that the illustrations are indifferent alike to the existence of actual difference *or their non-existence* between the pairs embodied in the illustrations.

Such replies are evasive, not to say facetious. The question is whether the illustrations given illustrate the thesis of identity or difference. *They cannot do both. Neither can they be neutral nor indifferent to both!* Yet nothing daunted, *Madhusūdana maintains that they do neither.* This is no contribution to the solution of the problem.

THE ILLUSTRATIONS PROPER

(1) The opening section of the Adhyāya (VI) discussed in the Introduction dealing with the recital of Cosmic Creation is a sufficient commentary on the supreme Majesty of B. and the complete dependence of all finite reality on It. However, in order to drive home to the son that even tho' this Supemacy of B. brought out by the acts of Tṛvṛt-karaṇa and Nāmarūpavyākaraṇa is a truth to be known only on the authority of Scriptures, it should *not* be supposed that there is no way in which the human soul can become convinced of the Existence of such a Supreme Being other than his own self as the Ruler of all, thro' any other demonstrable evidence of one's own personal experience, both internal and external. Accordingly, the father first of all puts forward the illustration of deep sleep in which the dependence of the human soul on the unseen power of God is vividly brought out.

To explain the matter a little more clearly, it is a matter of common knowledge that in our waking state we are inclined to think of ourselves as practically independent beings and masters of ourselves. This feeling is *not* there in Suṣupti. Uddālaka's choice of *this state* is to make clear to his son how the individual self is under the wings of the Supreme in this state, finding rest there after the distractions and tribulations of waking life, in the embrace of the Supreme Being, the Prājña. The Jiva comes back refreshed and recouped. This is illustrated by the apt example of a bird tied to a post with a strong string. It attempts to break away and get free by beating its wings and trying to hop hither and thither and finally getting tired and falling asleep after its vain efforts to escape. Even so my

son, the thinking self (manaḥ) is bound to the Supreme (Prāṇa). The words Manaḥ and Prāṇa used here have to be taken as advisedly used to refer principally and contextually in the interest of the illustration of the Jīva and Brahman (Tvam and Tat) corresponding to the bird and its post of rest. Such an inward meaning would also be in keeping with Uddālaka's opening reference in VI, 8 "When the person goes to sleep, he is united with the Sat: Yatraitat svapiti Satā sampanno bhavati. The illustration brings out the utter helplessness of the individual self and the protective benevolence of the Supreme. The Brahmasūtras also confirm that in Suṣupti and in Utkrānti, the Jīva remains different from B. (i, 3, 42). Such is the Ārṣa tradition.

(2) The next illustration refers to the juices of various flowers compounded by the activity of the bees. Tho' different juices with their distinctive tastes and ingredients are present in honey, they fail to realise (na vivekam labhante) that they belong to this or that flower. The wording "They have no *discernment*" shows that the distinctions *are there*, deep down in the honey and have not ceased to be, tho' they are missed in their distinctiveness. Likewise, living beings, tho' existing in Sat in an inseparable relation all along, fail to realise it and *know not* (na viduḥ) that they all exist in the Supreme, here and now and have been and will be, for ever. This failure to realise the truth leads to rebirth in various species.[1]

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1. This is sufficient to show that only living beings are meant by the term 'Prajāḥ' in the text. It is difficult to appreciate the A-Siddhi's objection here that the term 'Prajāḥ' here does not refer to Jīvas "who are not born" (i.e. nitya). If thinking selves are *not* the ones who get embodied, for whom is embodiment?

(3) The third illustration is of the rivers emptying themselves into the Sea. The juices, being unintelligent, may fail to realise their presence in honey. But how can a sentient being like Man fail to realise his being rooted in God all the while? This lurking doubt in the mind of the son is anticipated and answered by the father in the present illustration of the Divinities of the rivers, who tho' sentient beings, fail to realise their own and the others' presence in the Ocean, where they have all joined and come together. Even so, living beings of the world, having taken birth from the Supreme and entering into It in Praḷaya fail to recognise it. Hence they return to rebirth. As it would be pointless to repeat another illustration of *insentients* like juices (in another illustration) the present one is better construed in the sense of the Abhimāni-Devatās of holy rivers like the Ganga and Yamunā, which have been addressed as sentient beings in the Vedas (See Ṛg Veda X, 75, 5). See also the Abhimānyadhikaraṇa of the Brahmasūtras (ii, 1, 6).

(4) The next illustration brings out how, in addition to their abiding in Brahman, living beings are also dependent on B. for their continued existence in their bodies while alive and for their happiness in this embodied state. This has been pinpointed in one of the Brahmasūtras 'Dehayogād *vāsopi* (iii, 2, 6)' whose real contextual significance has been missed by many commentators by resorting to an unimaginative Padaccheda. An example is cited. If someone should strike at the root of a tree it would start bleeding, if it were alive (jīvan sravet). If its life-giving principle should have departed from it and the tree itself is dead, dried up on that account, it will not bleed, even when it is axed. Even so, in your case, my son.

Applying the same formula, we get the equation here that the relation between Tvam and Tat is the same as between the 'tree' or rather, the living being of the tree (Vṛkṣa-Jīva) and B. Scientific investigations in modern times have confirmed the ancient Indian belief that trees and plants have life and feelings of pleasure and pain and react to them. Manu says: *Antassamjnā bhavantyete sukhaduhkhasamanvitāḥ.* The self of the Tree (Vṛkṣajīva) departs from the tree, when the power of the Unseen B. which kept it alive till then departs from the tree and is withdrawn. The same is the relation between our own selves and B. It is the Supreme which sustains the Jīvātman[1] in his body and when it withdraws its presence, from the body the Jīvātman has to quit: *Brahmaṇā tyaktadehastu mṛta ityucyate naraḥ. Yena jātāni jīvanti* (Taitt.Up. iii, 1).

(5) The next illustration is that of a small banyan fruit and the mighty tree into which it has developed in due course. The tree is contained in the seed, or rather in the hidden power permeating the seed. This example is inconsistent with Vivartavāda. The Advaita interpretation takes it that the tiny seed is the tree. Apart from the fact that Jīvātman is *not* a material transformation of B. in Advaita and as such the analogy would be irrelevant to both the Pariṇāma and Vivarta interpretations, it has to be conceded that Uddālaka wants his son to understand that it is not the seed as such, however small, that produces the tree but the Invisible Power hidden within the recesses of the tiny seed that enables the mighty Nyagrodha tree

1. The root meaning of 'Jīva' is to sustain life (prāṇa dhāraṇa). We cannot hold our life (prāṇa) in our bodies as long as we wish to hold it in our life. Vide Gita: *Utkrāmantam sthitam vāpi vimūḍhā nānupaśyanti paśynti Jñānacakṣuṣaḥ* (xv, 10).

to develop out of the seed: Asyaiva aṇimnaḥ (śaktyā) Mahān Nyagrodhas tiṣṭhati. It is to bring out this truth that the father asks the son to break open the seed and report to him what he sees in it. Otherwise, the breaking open of the tiny seed is itself unnecessary. *This point has a great bearing on the correct understanding and interpretation of the purpose of the analogy.* The relation between the invisible power hidden in the seed and the tree, is the same as that between Tat and Tvaṁ.

(6) The next example is of salt dissolved in water. It shows the taste of salt is felt, even tho' the dissolved salt is no longer visible. Even so, B. permeates the human self and is not perceived by it. The relation between the salt and the water is the same as between the Jīva and B.

(7) The most striking, nay speaking, analogy is of the sick man (upatāpi) on his death bed. Relatives flock round, wishing to be recognised. Do you recognise me, do you recognise me, they ask. So long as the sick man's voice (Vāgabhimānidevatā) is not merged in the divinity of the Mind, the mind's in Prāṇa and of Prāṇa in the Highest Being (Parasyāṃ devatāyām), the sick man responds. But when his faculties are one by one merged in their higher-ups, he ceases to know. *That* is the Subtle Principle (aṇimā) on which everything in the world depends for its functioning.

The world of finite reality (idam sarvam) has that Subtle Principle for its main spring and moving spirit (ātmā). As part of this world in which you live, move and have your being, Thou art also the same: Aitadātmyam, i.e. are subject to Its sway, O my son, is how the father concludes his Upadeśa.

It is worthwhile to pause to consider why the Upaniṣad should have chosen the example of a *sick man* on his death bed, at all. The reason is not far to seek. When a man

is hale and hearty, he feels he is master of his world. The demeanor of Śvetaketu himself when he returns to his father is a standing proof of this. On his death bed Man comes to realise his utter helplessness. As a discerning philosopher has said it in grim humor:

Śivohambhāvadhīr bhoge roge Mṛtyunjayārcakaḥ!

This illustration is bound to give a bad jolt to Monistic thought. Śaṅkara explains that this illustration is intended to answer the question in what manner the self of the knower of B. reaches it. If that were so, there is no propriety in introducing a *sick man* into the picture. A knower of B. who has lived an austere life should be an ideal Man whose faculties are alert to the end, his lips chanting the name of the Lord and his mind on God (Gita viii, 13). The Jñāni *need not be a pathetic creature,* a sick man, an upatāpi. Even if the faculties of the Brahmajñānin too have to be merged in their higher sources, one fails to see the reason for *making a sick man of him.* Men like Vāmadeva who could even remember their past lives and doings could have been thought of. Even supposing the fate of the 'Avidvat' (the ignorant man) is brought in to deal with the ways of ascent and descent, or difference in the career of the Vidvat and the 'Avidvat' is intended to be described here, there is *still no convincing explanation* for making the Vidvat and the Avidvat *Sick men* (upatāpi). Unless the intention is to emphasise the utter dependence and helplessness of the Jīvātman, such an example will be out of place in that context and it seems to point the other way all the while.

We have already seen the anomalous nature of the illustration of the Thief and the Impostor and its glaring inconsistency with the Monistic ideology, wherein the Jīvātman is guilty of *nothing more serious than of ignorance of*

his own real nature and identity with the Supreme. The impropriety of branding such a person as a Thief and an Impostor *(Steyam akārṣīt, apahārṣīt)* is inexplicable and unexplained from the Advaita standpoint. If the reward of 'true faith *(satyābhisandhi)* is freedom and the punishment for wrong belief is rebirth in various Yonis of low nature, there seems to be no satisfactory explanation forthcoming for the introduction of the thief and the impostor in the eighth illustration, from the Advaita angle.

A-Siddhi seeks to explain away the strongly worded references to the Thief and the Impostor saying that it is auxiliary to the efficacy of true faith in identity as against holding false belief in difference between Jīva and B. Its purpose is to lend weight to this and it is *not to be taken as a illustration in its own right: Na ca satyānṛtadṛṣṭāntena pūrne, apahārṣīt steyam akārṣīt iti udāharaṇāyogaḥ. Tadupapādakatvena pṛthag dṛṣṭāntatvābhāvāt* (II, 296). This is topsy turvy. For, the proper place to offer a clarification *(upapādanam)* of a pregnant proposition would arise only after the proposition has been intoned. But Madhusūdana's explanation *puts the cart before the horse.* It is with a reference to the Thief and the Impostor that the paragraph itself *begins* in the text of Uddālaka. All this apart, Apahārṣit śteyam akārṣīt are too strong words to stigmatise a misguided Bhedajñāni—one who wrongly believes that Jīva is *not identical with Brahman,* as the Advaita would have us believe.

Thus, the inadequacy of each and every one of the illustrations of Uddālaka from the Advaita point of view is quite patent. The indispensability of a proper Guru (Ācarya) to enlighten the Jīvātman is acceptable from the points of view of both the schools, for different reasons tho' if the Guru and the Śiṣya are both of them to be the victims of the same delusion neither can help the other!

REVIEW OF ADVAITA CRITICISM OF DVAITA INTERPRETATION OF TAT TVAM ASI

The illustration of Suṣupti occurs both in Brh.Up. IV, 3, 18 and Chān.Up, VI, 8, giving a vivid picture of the helplessness of the human self and its going to rest in the Supreme, to recoup itself after its exhausting experiences of the waking and the dream states, with a telling example of a bird which falls asleep after tiring flights in its nest. There is a third example in Br.Up. IV, 3, 21 where the Śarīra Ātmā gets locked in the embrace of the Prājña-Ātmā. All these examples confirm the position that the individual Self is *different* from Paramātman, where it seeks rest. The words of the B.S. Suṣuptyutkrāntyor bhedena (i, 3, 42) even according to Śaṅkara declare that both in Suṣupti and Utkrānti they remain different. The opening lines of Chān.Up. VI, 8 Yatraitat svapiti is much better understood in the sense that the individual self rests *in* the Supreme *(yatra* in its adhikaraṇa sense) *rather than in* the sense of the time of Suṣupti or the state, which it would be superfluous to mention. In the parallel passage from Brh. Up. IV, 3, 19 a tired hawk after flying all over the sky turns to rest in its nest *(samlaya).* This is confirmed by Sureśvara in his Vārtika saying that the Jīvātman seeks rest in Suṣupti *in Brahman:* (1116)

Śyenas śrānto yathākāśe bhakṣyahetoḥ paribhraman
Pakṣau vitatya nīḍam svam eti hi śramanuttaye
Yathā tathā ayam ātmā . . . .
Śrāntas śramahānyartham *Brahmaṇīḍam prapadyate.*

There is no reference to the self finding rest in its own Devatāsvarūpam as Madhusūdana tries to make out. His dismissal of the suggestion that these examples underline the

dependence of the Jīva on B, out of hand; as *Īśvara-adhīna-paratva-abhāvāt* (A-Siddhi II, p. 297) runs counter to *Sureśvara's admission and to S's own* comment on Prāṇabandhanam hi Manaḥ (Chan.Up. vi, 8, 2) that the words Manaḥ and Prāṇa by extension of sense respectively signify Jīva and Devatā which (latter) must evidently be the Paradevatā referred to in the illustration of the sick man (vi, 4, 2) which alone would be consistent with the requirements of the application to the Dārṣṭāntikas (Tvam and Tat). For Manaḥ and Prāṇa taken literally would not signify Jīva and B.

The A-Siddhi has argued that 'Sati sampadya na viduḥ Sati sampadyāmahe' does not imply that it is not the Jīvas' not knowing that they are entering into Sat that is the cause of their rebirth in various yonis but the fact of their not knowing that they have attained Satsampatti. But the latter part of the same sentence tells us that they fail to understand they are coming out of Sat on waking, which should apply to their entering into it also.

It is not possible even for Advaita to maintain that in Suṣupti the Jīva becomes completely one with B. as its own self. (svamapīto bhavati) a conclusion which is rejected by the Sūtrakāra (1, 3, 42). It is also inconsistent with the acceptance of the fact that Suṣupti is a state of Avidyā (Cf. Gauḍapāda i, 12). There can be no objection to the interpretation of Svamapīto bhavati in the sense that in Suṣupti the Jīva reaches close to B.,—'Svam' standing for B. itself, on the authority of B.S. i, 3, 1 Dyubhvādyāyatanam *Sva-śabdāt*, where the term 'Sva' has been used, even according to Śaṅkara, to refer to Paramātman, after ruling out the Jīvātman (Prāṇabhṛcca (i, 3, 4).

The A-Siddhi itself recognises the force of the objection that the state of Suṣupti is not of absolute identity between

Jīva and B. and that therefore the reference to Jīva's becoming one with Brahmasvarūpa (Svam apītāḥ bhavati) in the text has to be understood *not literally*, but in a somewhat diluted sense that in Suṣupti there is not so much transparent difference between Jīva and B. as there is in the waking and the dream state. We can only say that the example of Suṣupti to illustrate so momentous a truth as the identity of Jīva and B. should be *clear enough* to leave no room for speculation or doubt or difference of opinion on the point. It will be seen that according to Madhusūdana all the three illustrations of the rivers and the Sea, salt dissolved in water and flower juices and honey *suffer from* what he himself calls:

(1) Spaṣṭabheda-abhāva-abhiprāyena (2) Asphuṭabhedaviṣayatva or (3) Vāstavabheda-abhedayor audāsīnyena, the underlying difference: (1) not being transparent, not being obvious or the Śruti being indifferent to the existence of real difference or identity *alike*. This is not a compliment to the Śruti or to Uddālaka. The dramatic irony of it all is that Vācaspati Miśra should himself have rejected outright the claim of the rivers becoming identical with the Sea waters. No doubt, when Milk is diluted with a liberal quantity of water, it is not possible to distinguish them with the naked eye but the taste and the consistency or lack of it would help in guessing at the truth. The Ocean being such a vast quantity of water, rivers entering it and getting mixed up could not be identified, except at the confluence. But the increase in volume can be understood on reflection. The annual rush of pilgrims at Prayāga during the Kumbha mela to earn the added merit of bathing in the waters of the Gangā and the Yamunā at the same time is a standing proof that neither of these has lost its identity.

The pleas of Aspaṣṭabheda, Vāstavabheda-abheda-viṣayatve audāsīnya of the *A-Siddhi* are, to say the least, frivolous and evasive. Even the Kaṭha Up. (ii, 1, 15) says when two quantities of water are mixed together they become only 'alike each other' (tādṛk eva bhavati)

A-Siddhi also pleads that tho' the absence of distinctive perception of difference among the components of honey may not be able to *prove* the existence of identity, it may, in a sense, help to probablise the existence of *identity*. The distinctive taste of honey as a compound from the taste of the juice of this or that flower which has gone into its composition would also help one to discern the difference.

According to A-Siddhi, it is not so much the failure to take note of the existing difference of Jīva from Sat into which he enters in Suṣupti that sends him back to rebirth, but simply the fact of remaining in *ignorance* of one's being in Sat (satsampatti-ajñāna). Such an explanation cannot be sustained because in the first place there is nothing in the wording of the text to suggest that the Jīva's entry into Sat in deep sleep is without his being aware of it. Anyway, the mere non-realisation of the entry and exit, as such, which takes place irrespective of one's consent and knowing or not knowing what has happened or is happening, cannot *deprive* one of enjoyment of his innate nature (of bliss) and condemn him to rebirth in different Yoni's as Satsampatti would be a fact, irrespective of one's being aware of it and must confer its benefit as a matter of course. That apart, the very next passage which says "Coming out again from Sat they do not realise that they are returning from Sat" which confirms the point that their punishment is due to the non-realisation of the difference

that actually exists between themselves and the Sat, which is more serious.

A-Siddhi explains the example of the Tree and its life giving principle (Vṛkṣajīva) as intended merely to establish that unlike the bubbles of water which do not re-emerge once they die out, the Jīvas tho' entering into Sat daily and returning from it do not cease to be, after death. How is this to be explained? The answer according to A-Siddhi is this—Physical bodies energised by a Jīva continue to live when the Jīva is in them and die out when the Jīva leaves the body. But the Jīvas as such do not die. Hence, this illustration has nothing to do with establishing that the continued existence of the Jīva in the physical body is itself dependent on the Jīva himself being energised by the presence of the Supreme Being in him as Antaryāmi and his quitting the body, as the Dvaita interpretation would have it.

A-Siddhi seems to forget that its position is against the statement of Br. Up. —Ya ātmani tiṣṭhan ātmānam antaro yamayati (Brh. Up. iii, 7, 22) and is not therefore well-founded. That apart, the clear reference made in the text "when the life-sustaining principle ('Jīva') leaves any one of the branches of the living tree, that branch dies out while the rest of the tree lives on. But when the life-sustaining principle in the Jīva tenanting the tree as such goes out of the tree as a whole, the Vṛkṣa-Jīva too is obliged to depart automatically and can no longer tarry and live in the tree as before. This raises the question : Is there then, in what we call a living tree, a Jīva of the tree and a Supreme Lord who sustains the presence of that Vṛkṣajīv as long as it pleases Him?

The answer is Yes. How do we arrive at this conclusion? Thro' a more careful *reading* of the text! The text makes a significant observaion that the tree absorbs the water with which it is fed and drinks it avidly (pepīya-mānaḥ) and rejoices (modamānaḥ) with pleasure, which is incompatible with an insentient thing like a tree. Only a Sentient principle can be said to drink and enjoy what it drinks. That means the acts of drinking and enjoying what is given to it presupposes the presence of a thinking Self tenanting the tree. We are also told that this Sentient principle in the tree is able to do all this because it is permeated *(anuprabhūtaḥ)* by 'THIS JĪVA-ATMAN' (anena Jīvena Ātmanā anuprabhūtah pepīyamāno modamānas tiṣṭhati). This JĪVA-ĀTMĀ who is said to have entered into the Vṛkṣa (Jīva) to enable him to drink and rejoice must naturally be the Overlord who according to the Taitt. Up. "enters into all that He creates: *Tat sṛṣṭvā tadeva anuprāviśat*. This 'anupraveśa' of the Lord into His creations *holds the key* to the present statement of Uddālaka: "Jīvāpetam vāva kiledam mriyate". This establishes the dependence of the Jīvas for continuing to tenant their bodies as long as it pleases Him. This truth is brought out by a passage in the *Mahābhārata*:

Brahmaṇā tyaktadehastu Mṛta ityucyate naraḥ

This underlines the truth that the Jīvātman tenanting his body cannot stay on there at his own will and pleasure, even tho' he may *want to do so*. It is not in his power to continue in a particular body or choose whichever body or life he would like to be born in. There is a significant verse in the *Mahābhārata* which says:

Yatra yatra ca samyukto dhātā garbham punaḥ punaḥ
Tatra tatraiva vasati *na yatra svayam icchati* (XII,233,10)

The gist of the illustration of the Tree has been put in a nutshell by the author of the *Taraṅgiṇi*:

Vṛkṣādidehe Vṛkṣādijīvo yadanvaya evānveti, yadvyatirekeṇa ca ajihāsitam api jahāti iti vṛkṣādijīvānām asvātantryapratīteḥ.

The illustration of the Banyan fruit(nyagrodhaphalam) also is decidedly in favor of the Dualistic interpretation which makes it clear that the Banyan tree stands erect and pulsating because of the invisible power hidden in the tiny seed. The Jīvātman's existence is likewise dependent on the Supreme Being designated as the 'Aṇiman', present invisibly in the seed. The Advaita interpretation misses this point when it takes it that the mighty Banyan tree exists and flourishes solely on account of the power of the tiny seed itself, by making it appear that the seed itself is the source of the tree. This comes out from the following statement in Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on Kaṭha. Up. (iii, 10)

'Vaṭakaṇikāyām iva Vaṭavṛkṣaśaktiḥ'

This presumption is not correct. For, if the mighty Nyagrodha owes its life and development solely to the power of the seed as its upādānakāraṇa and nothing more besides, there is absolutely no need for Uddālaka to ask his son to break one of the tiny seeds open and see what is inside! On his son's reply that he sees Nothing there after breaking it, the father hastens to point out that "that subtle one (aṇiman) whom you *do not see*, it is by (the power of) *that one* that this mighty Tree is standing". But the power of such transformation is derived by the seeds from that Aṇiman present in the seed. It would be a mistake to suppose that the term Aṇimā is used here to denote the seeds themselves. The seeds seen have already been referred to as —dhānāḥ in the feminine plural, while the Invisible power

within the seed is referred to in the masculine singular as 'Aṇimā'. The seeds are many and the Lord (Aṇimā) is One. The seed and the hidden power in it are not the same. They are not identical. So also is the relation between Jīva and Brahman, the 'Tvam' and the 'Tat'. This illustration does not support the identity thesis.

Advaita interpretation seeks to identify the 'Jīva-Ātman' mentioned in connection with the mighty tree which is being axed (vi, 16, 1) with the Pratyagātman, evidently on the ground that the word 'Ātman' in common parlance is used to denote the Jīvātman. But that is only its conventional sense. Its primary Scriptural connotation is the Supreme B. alone. This comes out from the Siddhānta established in Dyubhvādyāyatanam Svaśabdāt (B.S. i, 3, 1) of which the Viṣayavākya is Mund Up. ii, 2, 5. "He in whom the firmament, the earth and the interspace are woven as also the mind and the vital airs, know that One alone as the 'Ātman' and give up all other talk. For He is the Bridge of Immortality". The B.S. gives the ruling that the use of the word 'Ātman' in the text refers only to the Supreme being and the claims of (Sāṅkhya) Prakṛti and the Pratyagātman are alike *dismissed* in two separate Guṇasūtras. This places the Advaita interpretation at a disadvantage. A-Siddhi finds itself in a tight corner here. It has however attempted to argue that the expression used in the Sūtra 'sva-śabdāt' meaning *ātmaśabdāt* is intended to rule out only the Sāṅkhya-Prakṛti from being entitled to be denoted by the term Ātman, as 'Ātman' is not the primary meaning of Pradhāna or Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya system. The Jīvātman is however ruled out *not* on account of the use of the term 'Ātman' in the primary sense, because the Pratyagātman too is the primary sense of Ātman'. It

is therefore ruled out because in spite of its being *not* insentient like the Pradhāna, the Jīvātman is Paricchinna (limited) by the Upādhis of Avidyā in the state of bondage (tho' one with Brahman in truth).

Such an explanation of the Sūtra 'Prāṇabhṛcca' is not in order. No doubt, it is based in Śaṅkara's own explanation of i, 3, 4 that the Jīvātman is ruled out not because he is ineligible to be denoted by the term Ātman as a Cetana but because he is limited by Upādhis from laying claim to the Omniscience and other sovereign attributes of B. *(Sarvajñatvādyabhāvaḥ): Sarvajñapadasamānādhikaraṇa ātmaśabdo na Jīvavācī iti Jīva atacchabdaḥ.*

This overlooks the fact that the criterion for attuning with B. Scriptural names and marks of import in the passages chosen for Samanvaya is primarily and invariably their absolute fitness to fulfil the highest primary sense of the terms *only* in B. which is the same as what Ś himself calls the criterion of being *anāpekṣikam* not being subject to any restriction by limitation, as of the term *ākaśa* in Chān. Up. i, 9, 1 as against the claims of Bhūtākāśa (elemental ākāśa) in the Ākāśādhikaraṇa. Moreover, Ś. himself emphatically asserts under i, 3, 1 that the term Ātmā finds fulfilment of its plenary sense perfectly *(samyak) only* as applied to the Supreme B and not to any other such as the Jīvātman or Pradhāna *Ātmaśabdasca Paramātmaparigrahe samyag avakalpate na arthāntareparatve.* Yet he does not stick to this principle in refusing to rule out the claims of the Jīvātman and Pradhāna on the same ground of *Svaśabdāt.* He bypasses the Sūtrakāra's verdict by resorting to two different interpretations of the same probans *atacchabdāt,* one by which the claims of Pradhāna are ruled out because of its utter insentiency and another by which the claim of the

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Jīva (tho' not an insentient being like the Pradhāna is yet not being in full possession of the sovereign attributes of Omniscience and others of B.) is ruled out because of his being limited in the state of Bondage now, by the Upādhis of Avidyā. But this argument can cut both ways, for according to strict Advaita theory even the Supreme B's omniscience and other sovereign attributes presuppose obscuration by Avidyā which is not hostile to it, as enunciated by Ānandabodha:

Sarvajñatvam api Avidyāvattvam ākṣipati na tu pratikṣipati.

Thus, Ś's resort to two devious interpretations of the probans *atacchabdāt* as applicable to Jīvātman and Pradhāna from *two different angles* leads to a splitting of one and the same statement as two distinct propositions which involves the defect of Vākyabheda.

It goes without saying that a solemn ruling given by the Sūtrakāra on a disputed point holds true *throughout his work.* The present ruling on the use of Ātmaśabda exclusively to Brahman in the fullest and untrammelled sense of the word should therefore hold good throughout the Brahmasūtras, including the interpretation of the Sūtra *Ātmeti tu upadiśanti grāhayanti ca* towards the concluding part of the work (iv, 1, 3), which Ś. is anxious to utilise to support his Jīvabrahmaikyavāda as the Sūtrasiddhānta. This naturally calls for a legitimate objection from Madhva in the interest of complete inner self-consistency of thought on the part of the Sūtrakāra's great work:

Svaśabdāt Prāṇabhṛccaiva nokta ityeva Vedarāṭ
Ātmaśabdam yato hetum kṛtvā Jīvam nyavārayat
Yadyātmaśabdo Jīvepi katham sa vinivārayet?
(A.V. IV, 1, 3)

If the Saguṇa-Brahman is to be the subject matter of Samanvaya here as S.'s references to Sarvajñatva etc., would indicate, the present adhikaraṇa would be out of place in Pāda III according to Ś's own classification of the Pādopādhis of the Samanvaya Adhyāya, where Pāda III is devoted to the topic of the Nirviśeṣa-Brahman.

It is no use relying on the use of the term Jīva-Ātman to support the claim of the Jīvātman to be denoted by the term Ātman in the same primary sense as the Supreme Brahman. For the context in which the Jīva-Ātman is referred to as author of Cosmic Trivṛtkaraṇa in Chān. Up. (vi, 11, 1) is also that of the Supreme Paramātman and there is no loophole there as the Pratyagātman has no competence to bring about Trivṛtkaraṇa initiating Cosmic creation from the primal elements, as he himself emerges as the embodied self *as a result of this trivṛtkaraṇa.*

The attempt of the A-Siddhi to set aside this objection on the ground that Trivṛtkaraṇa, tho' it may be beyond the competence of ordinary human souls like ourselves, is quite within the competence of Hiraṇyagarbha who is also a Jīva-Ātmā, the chief Abhimāni-Devatā of Cosmic Lingaśarīra (A-Siddhi II. p. 298). Apart from being irrelevant to the point at issue here, which concerns the Jīvātman in the general sense of the term of embodied selves like ourselves, Madhusūdana seems to forget that even Hiraṇyagarbha, however exalted he may be, is still in the category of Jīvas.

That apart, his view is in open conflict with the stand taken by Śaṅkara himself in his Sūtrabhāṣya ii, 4, 20 where he raises a similar Pūrvapakṣa (objection) on the basis of the *very same text* Anena Jīvena Ātmanā anupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi (Chān. vi. 3, 2) and *comes down*

heavily on such a preposterous contention,[1] by declaring in no uncertain terms that "it is the uniform Siddhānta of all the Upaniṣads that the Supreme Parameśvara *alone* is the author of Nāmarūpavyākaraṇa by means of Trivṛtkaraṇa".

1. Parameśvara eva ca Nāmarūpavyakartā iti Sarvopaniṣat-Siddhāntaḥ. Nanu Jīvena iti viśeṣaṇāt Jīvakartṛkatvam vyākaraṇasya adhyavasitam. *Naitad evam.* Jīvena ityetad 'anupraviśya' ityanena sambadhyate. Ānantaryāt. Na "vyakaravāṇi" ityanena. Tena hi sambandhe, Vyakaravāṇi ityayam Devatāviṣaya uttamapuruṣa aupacārikaḥ kalpyeta (S. BSB ii, 4, 20).

15. SOME LESS PROMINENT 'ADVAITA SRUTIS' AND SMṚTIS REVIEWED

Before concluding this survey of the most celebrated 'Advaita Śrutis' and Mahāvākyas, we may now take a look at the less prominent ones which are also generally brought up in support of the thesis of identity both from the Śrutis and from a few Smṛtis and Purāṇas. Among these are: "Yo Asau Asau Puruṣaḥ So'ham Asmi. Yoham So asau, Pare'vyave sarva ekībhavanti, Yāvan mokṣam tu bhedas syāt Jīvasya ca Parasya ca. Muktasya tu no bhedosti bhedahetor abhāvataḥ. Dvitiyād vai bhayam bhavati. Pūrṇamadaḥ Pūrṇamidam, Kṣetrajñam capi mām viddhi sarvakṣetreṣu," etc.

(1) SO AHAM ASMI

This text is met with in Chān. Up. iv, 11, 12, 13 and in Īśa Up. (16) and Tvam vā Aham asmi Devate, Aham vai Tvam asi (Jābālā Śruti) is closely akin to this. The latter could be an expression of very close sense of intimacy of feeling and camaraderie as in "Caitro Maitraḥ Maitraś Caitraḥ, Jñānī tvātmaiva me matam" etc. We have already seen that 'Aham' and 'Asmi' are secret names of Brahman according to the Upaniṣads and have nothing to do with the first person pronoun or what 'I am' means in our ordinary language. . . .It deserves to be noted further that in the Īśa Up. "Yo Asau Asau Puruṣah So Aham Asmi", we have the expression 'Asau' *used twice* which would be otherwise superfluous, if some esoteric sense is *not* contemplated. In the Sanskrit language, 'asau' is a demonstrative pronoun (third person) and it can *also* be the locative singular of 'Asu' which means the life principle of Prāṇa or

Mukhya-Prāṇa[1] celebrated in the Chāndogya, Aitareya Āraṇyaka and Īṣa Upaniṣads. The Samvarga Vidyā and Udgītha Vidyā of the Upaniṣads are also connected with Mukhya Prāṇa who is also celebrated as Sūtrātma-Prāṇa and the chief presiding deity of the other sense organs and who has been declared in the Chan.Up. (i, 2, 7–8) as being impervious to the evil designs of the Asuras to disturb the meditations of the Devas and has been declared to be '*Asura-pāpma-aviddha*', ākhaṇāśma-sama, etc. If all that the sentence "Yosāvasau Puruṣaḥ Soham asmi" were intended to convey is that "that Person who is there is the same as Myself" it would have sufficed to say "Yo asau Puruṣah So Aham asmi" and the *second* 'Asau' would be unnecessary. There is no need to elaborate 'Every *that* Person' (asau asau Puruṣaḥ) is Myself! If 'that person' is to be understood in the sense of the Supreme Being the latter being *only One* it would be meaningless to say Every Supreme Being is Myself. The only rational way of understanding the statement would be –That Person (asau Puruṣaḥ) who is present in 'Asu' (Mukhya-Prāṇa) is the one who goes by the name of 'Aham' and 'Asmi'. We have already seen the special significance of these two terms 'Aham' and 'Asmi' as the secret names of Brahman in the discussion of the text "Aham Brahma Asmi" earlier. The Iṣa Up. (4) already refers to 'Mātariśvā' (Vāyu) offering the good works *(apah)*[2] of Jīvas to the Lord. The place of honor given to Mukhya-

1. Read: 'Sa Eṣo Asuḥ Sa Eṣa Prāṇaḥ' *(Aitareya Araṇyaka* ii, 1, 8)

2. 'apaḥ' is read by Yāska in his Nighaṇṭu as a synonym of works 'deeds' (along with *apnaḥ, damsa* etc. iti *ṣaḍvimśati Karmanāmāni*. See also the use of the Latin word 'opus' in the sense of works, *vide* 'Dhatta Indro *naryapāmsi* kartave (R.V. i, 85, 9).

Prāṇa as the most effective base (adhiṣṭhāna) for meditation on B. has been established in the Chān.Up. (1, 2, 7–8) and in the Aitareya Āraṇyaka (II, 1–4) thro' the parable of the colloquy of the deities of the senses. Such texts have therefore nothing to do with the identity of Jīva and B. Moreover these texts are given in the context of meditation (Upāsanā) and Upāsanavākyas are *not* admitted in the Advaita tradition as respresenting true facts. Hence also, they cannot be cited in support of the thesis of identity.

(2) PARE AVYAYE SARVA EKĪBHAVANTI (Mund.Up. iv, 2, 7)

This text speaks of the merger of the fifteen 'Kalās' of embodied selves at the time of liberation, in the respective original elements from which they have emerged—the presiding deities of the senses in their sources like the Sun. The second half of the verse speaks of Karmāṇi—good deeds of the enlightened ones—which had not so far borne their fruits *and* the intelligent self Jīvātmā: (Vijñānamaya ātmā) becoming one *in the* Immutable Being (pare avyaye). Note the use of the *Locative*. Apart from the locative, the text gives rise to another problem. The term 'ekībhāva' so far as the intelligent Self is concerned, according to Advaita interpretation stands for 'becoming one with' the Supreme B. Be that as it may, the same thing cannot be said of the 'Karmas' of these Jīvas which are insentients (jaḍa) and therefore 'Mithyā'. In order to solve this difficulty, 'ekībhāva' will have to be taken in two different senses, one of sublation 'nivṛtti' (in the case of the Karmas) and svarūpaikya in the case of the jivas, involving 'Vākyabheda'. Since the 'Kalās' also are taken to be liquidated by Brahmajñāna, there seems to be no need to mention the Karmas in a

separate quarter. Moreover, the term 'ekībhāva' formed with the termination 'cvi' (ī) is not consistent with the Advaita position that the identity is not a *new* acquisition, or something which did not exist before, as when Kālidāsa speaks of Indra having been paralysed by a stern look of Lord Śiva when he attempted to throw his Vajrāyudha at him: *Jaḍīkṛtas tryambakavīkṣaṇena* (Raghu. II, 42). Finally, the wording 'the Vijñānātmā' becomes one *in* the Immutable One (in the locative case ('pare avyaye) would only suggest a relation of abode and abider (ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva) between B. and the liberated self and not svarūpa-aikya, between them as desired by the Advaita. The proper wording in respect of Svarūpa-aikya would be *Pareṇa avyayena ekībhavati,* if Sanskrit grammar is to be respected.

All these difficulties could be solved, if we agree to take it that 'ekībhāva' spoken of here is not one of identity of *essence* between Jīva and B. but being together in the same place (or the world of Liberation), harmony of minds, or close resemblance in some respects. The Gita tells that the liberated souls become free from having to come under Creation or loss of status in Pralaya by attaining Sādharmya (similarity) with B. (XIV, 2). The analogy of the rivers mingling with the Sea and abiding there given in Muṇd.Up. iii, 2, 8, is also in point. We have a verse in the Mahābhārata:

Ekībhūtā tu sā senā Pāṇḍavān abhyavarṣata

"the army of the enemies becoming one started showering missiles on the Pāṇḍavas". In common parlance, we say "The cows have all become one in the shed, in the evening", "The Brahmins have become one in this village". Even in Muṇḍ.Up. iii, 2, 7 we read "The great ascetics who have achieved true knowledge of Vedānta having *reached*

the Omnipresent One, abide in the world of Brahmā till the end of their life time and become released finally, "all of them" refers to the released selves *in the plural.* Considering all this, it would be proper to understand 'Ekībhāva' in a figurative sense of 'sthānaikya'.

(3) DVITĪYĀD VAI BHAYAM BHAVATI

"Fear comes from a second being" is another text often used to discomfit the Dualist. This is reading rather too much into the text. What inspires fear is *not* the mere presence of a second individual but his being equal or stronger and more influential! A man is not afraid of a child or an ideal Guru of his Śiṣya. If it comes to that, this text can be countered by another: A lonely one is miserable *(Tasmāt ekākī na ramate).* As for "Pūrṇamadaḥ Pūrṇamidam..." according to strict Advaita tradition, 'Idam' refers to the world of name and form which is superimposed and limited and *mithyā* and as such it can never be Pūrṇa (infinite). Otherwise, there will be no sense in the Upaniṣad calling on us to pray "Asato mā sad gamaya"— The Śruti is therefore best understood to mean that all the various manifestations and Avatārs and all Antaryāmi Forms of Brahman are equally infinite as often emphasised in such texts as "Sa Yaścāyam Puruṣe Yaścāsāvāditye *Sa Ekaḥ*" (Taitt.Up. ii, 8).

(4) MUKTASYA TU NA BHEDO'STI BHEDAHETOR ABHĀVATAḤ

Vācaspati has cited this text from the Pañcarātra which purports to say:

Āmukter bheda eva syāj Jīvasya ca Parasya ca
Muktasya tu na bhedo'sti bhedahetor abhāvataḥ

Here, the appearances are no doubt deceptive. Pañcarātra Siddhānta as expounded by Rāmānuja is committed to the acceptance of Nārāyaṇa as the Supreme and both Jīvas and Acit Prakṛti as anādi and nitya. See the *Parama-Samhitā* text quoted by him—

Sa hyanādir anantaśca paramārthena niścitaḥ

There is thus no question of Pañcarātra agreeing to Jīva-Brahmaikya in Mokṣa. The difficulty disappears when we take note of the fact that the term 'Bheda' has got many meanings[1] other than of Svarūpabheda, in authenticated usages, such as discord, disharmony, difference of opinion, enmity, misunderstandings etc. We have a classical example of 'Bheda' used in the sense of discord, in a famous verse of the Vanaparva of *Mahābhārata*—

Bhavanti bhedā jñātīnām kalahāśca Vṛkodara
Prasaktāni ca vairāṇi jñātidharmo na naśyati (iii, 244, 2)

"Dissensions and enmity are bound to be there among blood relations. They should not be allowed to snap the ties of consanguinity" Again, in the story of the distribution of nectar to the Devas and Asuras by the Mohini Avatar of Viṣṇu, in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Asuras request the damsel to distribute *evenly* so that there will be no cause of discord :

Vibhajasva yathānyāyam naiva *bhedo* yathā bhavet
(VIII, 9, 7)

1. Vādirāja in his *Yuktimallikā* records a number of meanings in which the term 'Bheda' may be found used in different contexts :

Bhrame virodhe dhībhede nāśe anyonyavimiśraṇe
Asamyuktatayānyonyasthitiścāpi bhidocyate
Bhinnā senā mitrabhedaḥ kṣīranīravibhedanam
Bhinnanīratva-vān Māghe bhidurāmbhastvavāgapi
(*Bhedasaurabha*, 287–288)

Man in his ignorance is prone to forget his Maker and defy His Will, as Satan did. Most of us in our ignorance oppose our will to God's will and behave as if He were not there ! This dis-harmony is bound to persist as long as Man is not liberated. When enlightenment comes all discord and opposition to the Divine will vanishes and the human self becomes completely attuned to the Divine will, a sentiment so movingly expressed in the Lord's Prayer—"Thy will be done on earth, as it is in Heaven." The Pañcarātra text quoted by Vācaspati refers to this kind of opposition to the Divine Will in Samsāra and its cessation in Mokṣa, with the cessation of the discord. The phrase 'Bhedahetor abhāvataḥ' in the Pañcarātra verse refers to difference caused by extraneous factors. The difference between Jīva and Brahman is ontological and there is no question of its *ceasing to be*.

(5) KṢETRAJÑAM CĀPI MĀM VIDDHI SARVAKṢETREṢU (Gita, XIII, 2)

This line is also sometimes quoted in support of the identity of Pratyagātman with Paramātman. The XIII Adhyāya starts with a definition of 'Kṣetra' (the field) and the knower of the Kṣetra : Idam śarīram kṣetram ityabhidhīyate, and one who knows all about it is kṣetra-jña. The Lord says "Know Me to be the knower of the Kṣetra in all the bodies. Hence, it follows that the Lord is identical with the Jīvātman, the knower of the body. Such is the argument of the Advaita thinkers.

But this is all topsy-turvy. In the first place, the Gītācārya does not mean by 'Kṣetram' only the physical body of the Jīva, though to begin with he calls the body 'Kṣetram' (idam śarīram kṣetram). He proceeds to *define*

'Kṣetram' in such an *elaborate manner* as brings the entire Universe consisting of the fourteen Tattvas from the Mahābhūtas to Dhṛti in the extended sense enumerated by Him in XIII, 4. The knower of *such a 'Kṣetra'* in its enlarged sense, can hardly be the Jīvātman, whose knowledge of his own physical body is so very limited. Much less can the Jīvātman know about all other bodies of millions of beings, human, animal and other species. Hence, 'Kṣetrajña' in the opinion of the Gītācārya must be the Lord Himself in the full primary sense of the term. It is to establish this point that the Lord tells Arjuna that He will describe the "Kṣetra *in all its completeness*, its real knower and *His glory* and greatness :

Tat kṣetram yacca yādrk ca yadvikāri Yataśca yat
Sa ca Yo *Yatprabhāvaśca* tat samāsena me śṛṇu (XIII, 4.)

and this recital of the full definition is given in XIII, 6–7. The Lord as the 'Kṣetrajña' is referred to here as "Grasiṣṇu" devourer of all (in Pralaya) and the Controller of all Prabhaviṣṇu during the period of their life on earth. (XIII, 17.)

Nevertheless, the A-Siddhi argues against this that as the Lord's connection with the bodies of the Jīvas all over the world has *already been* established (prāgeva siddheḥ), it will be unnecessary to do so again *(paunaruktyam)*. Hence, the right way of interpreting the line "Kṣetrajñam cāpi mām viddhi sarvakṣetreṣu bhārata" should be that Krishna (Brahman) is identical with the Jīvātman who has been denoted by the term 'Kṣetrajña' as the controlling principle *(adhiṣṭhātā)* of all his respective bodies.

But the Lord's elucidation of the wider connotation of the terms 'Kṣetra' and 'Kṣetrajña' and the latter's 'Prabhāva' (majesty) as such, commences only from

(XIII, 4 and extends up to XIII, 12-19). As a matter of fact, even the terms 'Kṣetra' and 'Kṣetrajña' make their appearance in the Gita *for the first time only* in Adhyāya XIII. In the circumstances, Madhusūdana's observation *Prāgeva siddheḥ paunaruktyam* is difficult to understand. If he means by that—all that needs to be said about the vast powers of the Supreme B. has been fully established in the earlier Adhyāyas of the Gita (prior to this Adhyaya)—it may be presumed that the Lord's identity with the Jīvas in all Kṣetras has also been established earlier, say, in vi. 27; 31; vii. etc. He seems to be blowing hot and cold when he agrees that even tho' the authorities quoted by Vyāsatīrtha from the Smṛti establishing that the Lord is indeed the true Kṣetrajña[1] in virtue of His being Sarvāntaryāmi (including the Jīvas) that does *not* conflict with the present context as the word 'Kṣetrajña' is "very well established in worldly usage in the sense of Jīvātman": Smṛtau Kṣetrajña-śabdasya Sarvāntaryāmi—Sarvajña-paratve api, Prakṛte tadasambhavaḥ. Jīve suprasiddhatvāt (ii. p. 304).

As a seasoned Śāstrajña, Madhusūdana is expected to know that accepted meanings of words in popular estimation (lokapratīti) has its limitations in deciding the purport of the Scriptural texts in which they are used. Even the ruling of the Lokavedādhikaraṇa of the Pūrvamīmāmsā has a proviso : *Sati sambhave* (provided it is maintainable). And we have seen that in the light of the wider definition of

1. Kṣetrajña ātmā Puruṣaḥ Purāṇaḥ sākṣād Paranjyotir ajaḥ Pareśaḥ । Nārāyaṇo Bhagavān Vāsudevaḥ Svamāyayā ātmanyavadhīyamānaḥ ॥ *(Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, v, 11, 13)

Here, evidently, a professed 'Krishna-Bhakta' Madhusūdanā does not go to the extent of disputing the authority of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa !*

Kṣetra given by the Gita itself such an equation is *not* maintainable.

Śaṅkara himself, while resolutely maintaining in his commentary on Chan. Up. VI. 8, 7, that the term 'Ātmā' *without a prefix* is well established in the sense of the Pratyagātman, even as a term like 'cow' refers to a particular species of animals : (Ātmaśabdasya nirupapadasya Pratyagātmani Gavādiśabdavat nirūḍhatvāt), still insists that in respect of the Muṇḍaka text 'Tam evaikam jānatha Ātmānam (ii, 2, 5)' the same word Ātman, *without a prefix* used in Muṇḍ. II, 2, 5, is compatible *only* with the Supreme Being and none else : Ātmaśabdaśca Paramātma parigrahe *samyag* avakalpate. Na arthāntaraparigrahe (B.S.B, 1, 3, 1). This must be a let-down for Madhusūdana.

Moreover, Śaṅkara himself says the XV chapter of the Gita dealing with the Puruṣottama is the culmination of not only the entire Gita thought but the entire Vedārtha. How then could A-Siddhi maintain that everything worth telling about the Supreme B. has already been said even prior to Adh. XIII *(prāg eva siddheḥ)?*

We have therefore to conclude that as the Supreme Being within the Jīvātman too as his inner controller according to the Gita itself (XVIII, 61) : *Īśvāras sarvabhūtānām hṛddeśe tiṣṭhati* not to speak of what the Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa of the Bṛh.Up. has to say on the question, the Jīvātman too, in his turn, has to come within the scope and category of Kṣetram with respect to the Lord of all Kṣetras. In fact, the Bṛh.Up. itself has spoken of the Pratyagātman as the 'body' *(śarīram)* of the Antaryāmi-Brahman as : *Ya ātmani tiṣṭhan yasya ātmā śarīram.* The derivation of the word Kṣetram itself is the proof of this : Kṣīyate atra (Jīve) Bhagavatā iti kṣetram. Thus, looked at from any point of

view, the Supreme remains the Kṣetrajña in the *fullest primary sense of that term* of the entire finite reality comprising the world of matter and spirits alike. Hence, it can never be taken to be identical with the selves, who tenant their bodies, as it pleaseth Him. It must also be remembered that even the word Jñaḥ in Kṣetrajñaḥ does not *simply mean* just knowing the body. It means also that only He who knows all about a given thing and can effectively control it. Such knowledge of things inside and outside of all is beyond the capacity of the selves tenanting their bodies. The Lord alone is and can be the real 'Kṣetrajña' of the myriads of Kṣetras : *Tānyaham veda sarvāṇi na tvam vettha* (Gita IV, 5). That is the implication of the Lord's words : *Sa ca Yo yatprabhāvaśca* (XIII, 3). It is a great pity the Advaita interpretation should miss so profound a truth behind the words *Sa ca Yo yatprabhāvaśca* in this very context, calling attention to this profound truth of the unfathomable majesty of the Lord by calling Him the *Kṣetrajña in all the bodies*, as distinguished from the human self.

Vyāsatīrtha concludes his Śrutyartha-Vicāra with a brief examination of certain stray passages met with in some of the Purāṇas depicting the external world and man's dealings with it as passing shows like dreams and magical projections, using such terms as *Svapnamanoratho yathā, Mṛṣā, Asat etc.* These are not to be taken in their literal sense but as warnings not to be entangled irretrievably with worldly attractions, but to cultivate a spirit of restraint and vairāgya[1].

1. Cf. *Kupitāhiphaṇacchāyāsamīkṛtya aparam sukham Sevante yatpadam dhirāḥ* (J. *Nyāyasudhā* III)

CONCLUSION

Broadly speaking, Jīvas are subject to transmigration and are *not*, here and now, in the realisation and enjoyment of the quantum of their innate assets of true knowledge and bliss of self hood. Brahman on the other hand, as we know it from the Srutis, is ever-free, all-knowing, all-powerful inner controller of both sentient and insentient reality in creation. Its sovereign attributes are natural to it and are *not* adventitious: Svābhāvikī jñānabalakriyā ca (Śvet. Up. vi, 8). This much is accepted by the Advaita school also when it concedes that the identity of two such beings of contradictory natures is *not* possible in the primary sense of their conno-denotation:

Aikyam tayor lakṣitayor na vācyayoḥ
nigadyate anyonyaviruddhadharmiṇoḥ
Khadyotabhānvoriva rājabhṛtyayoḥ
Kūpāmburāśyoḥ paramāṇumervoḥ

(*Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* 244)

It has therefore attempted to set aside these conflicting natures from both, as 'Mithyā' (due to the play of Fontal ignorance (Avidyā). Such an explanation raises many difficult questions, whether it is B. or the individual self which is the locus (āśraya) and the object (viṣaya) of this Ignorance. With each step taken to answer it, more and more difficulties arise, until the whole problem is abandoned as insoluble (*Durghaṭatvam avidyāyā bhūṣaṇam*—Iṣṭasiddhi, i, 40)

The Dvaita School feels that it would be wiser and simpler to accept the differences between Jiva and B. as factual and fundamental and find a more viable explanation of the texts which use the language of identity in some places, in describing the closeness of their metaphysical relationship of a symbolic Bimbapratibimbabhāva (original

and image) in the sense of the Bimba being the source of reality, cognisedness and powers of functioning of the Jīvas as 'Pratibimbas', as we have had occasion to see in regard to the Śruti *Rūpam rūpam pratirūpo* babhūva in connection with the interpretation of Indro *Māyābhiḥ*. The language of oneness, even in common parlance, between individuals embraces a wide spectrum of mutual interests, closeness of relationship, inseparability, coexistence, harmony of minds, identity of tastes and temperaments, compatibility and so on. We have seen that Madhva himself has listed some of these grounds applicable to the philosophical plane:

Svātantrye ca Viśiṣṭatve sthānamatyaikyayor api
Sādṛsye caikyavāk samyak sāvakāśā yatheṣṭataḥ

Where the language of identity clashes with the basic facts of difference at the core, it has to be construed, short of oneness of essence (svarūpaikya), in other ways, in keeping with the basic differences *and not by abrogating* them. The identity texts are not rejected as of inferior status but acceptable as figurative descriptions, in conformity with the interpretive principle of Upajīvyapramāṇa-prābalya (See PART I. p. 118).

The essence of validity of one's knowledge and experience in mundane life is non-contradiction, irrespective of these experiences being of a religious or secular nature. Validity is however strictly a matter of *fact* and has nothing to do with the continued existence of the data, in the same space time setting and condition, later. If epistemology is to be worthy of its credentials, it must provide Man with an instrument of validation of his most vivid experiences of pleasure and pain and other intimate experiences. By its very nature, such an instrument must be supra-mental, to be identified with his Apperceiving Self, in the last

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analysis. This Apperceiving principle must by hypothesis be infallible, veridical and self-certifying *at all times*, in regard to its judgements. We cannot have an Apperceiver of the Apperceiver, ad infinitum. Viewed in the light of this perspective, Man's inmost experiences come under the purview of this Apperceiving Self which is most appropriately called 'Sākṣi' in Dvaita Philosophy. It is this Apperceiving self in us that is fully persuaded of the grim reality of the external world and of one's experiences of the joys and sorrows of life and the existence of other thinking selves like one's own. Its judgement in this regard cannot be disregarded as untrustworthy on the ground that it runs contrary to the oneness of the individual self and B. established as the purport of the Mahāvākyas or the unreality of the world by the other Advaita Śrutis like Nehanānāsti. For ultimately, it has to be *the same Apperceiving Self* in us which will have to certify the truth of the import of the Mahāvākya when it dawns upon us. That cannot be done without the Apperceiver *falsifying his own earlier verdict* in regard to the reality of his own poignant experiences of the joys and sorrows of life and the existence of other thinking selves besides himself. As the one and only highest ever-veridical epistemological principle of validation open to Man (niyatayāthārthya) it cannot forswear itself under any circumstances and lose its right to veracity: *Sa cet Sākṣī kvacid duṣṭaḥ katham nirṇaya īyate?*

In the circumstances, all that the Apperceiving Self can commend is to adopt a metaphorical interpretation of the language of identity between Jiva and B. without lowering the status of the Śruti. The Advaita way of dismissing the 'Bheda-Śrutis' as conveying only a Vyāvahārika-Bheda (empirical difference) cannot be accepted at its face

value, as Vyāvahārikatva by definition is the same as 'Bādhyatva' (what is subject to sublation) in terms of 'Mithyātva' in the sense of being the counterpositive of a negation *in essence* (svarūpeṇa) with reference to all the three periods of time (inclusive of the period of its so called 'appearance' as the A-Siddhi has authoritatively defined Bādha:

Svarūpeṇaiva traikālikaniṣedhapratiyogitvasya Prapañce Śuktirūpyādau ca aṅgīkārāt (A-Siddhi p, 5. See Part I p. 31). Thus, the goal of identity will nullify the survival of the separate identity of the Self or Selves in release. In an age when attempts are being made by some well-meaning scholars like Paul Hacker, Bradley Mathovsky and Rev. De Smet, to visualise Śaṅkara's Nirviśeṣa Brahman as a 'Personal Being' it would be retrogressive for any *aspirant* to Liberation to be told to court liquidation of his own personality there!

While discussing the tenability of the Advaita interpretations of the 'identity texts' Dvaita writers have placed at our disposal an impressive amount of materials of approved linguistic usages, exegetical principles and precedents from the Pūrva-Mīmāmsa and Vyākaraṇa Śāstras and have applied them systematically, probably for the first time, with close attention to the choice of particular words in the text and their nuances of thought, their etymological significance and syntactic bearings on connected words in the same passages in the context. The same meticulous attention is paid to the illustrative materials provided by some of the texts. Such studied attention to these aspects distinguishes the Dvaita interpretation of the Upaniṣads, Sūtras and the Gītā (the Prasthānatraya of Vedāntā) right from the days of Madhva, *who was a pioneer in this respect.*

Vyāsatīrtha's treatment of the 'Advaita Śrutis' adds many new dimensions to this method. We have seen (in Part I, pp. 2–3) the handsome tribute Mm. Ananthakṛṣṇa Śāstri has paid to the Herculean task attempted and achieved by Vyāsatīrtha in the early XVI century. Madhusūdana himself says he found the challenge quite tough to meet (racitā *atiyatnāt*). A large measure of the credit given to *Advaitasiddhi* for laying the foundations of Neo-Advaita within the traditional set-up itself, should go to Vyāsatīrtha, who opened the debate, in its present form and placed in the hands of those who came after him an up-to-date Agenda, as it were, for a comprehensive and exhaustive discussion of the outstanding problems of Vedānta philosophy.

The ancients have done their work thoroughly. It is now for the modern scholars to step in, gather the threads and assess the performance and contributions of the contending parties with special reference to the problem of the "Advaita interpretation" of the Upaniṣads, which has tended to predispose the minds of many from the days of Deussen and Vivekananda to the belief that the Advaita interpretation of the Upaniṣads is the last word on the subject.

The very designation of 'Mahāvākyas' given to a few texts of the Upaniṣads is arbitrary and unauthenticated by the original sources. This exaggerated importance given to them as against the overwhelming majority of what have been relegated as 'Dualistic texts' dubbed as 'Atattvāvedaka' and 'Mumukṣvajijñāsya', even tho' they have backing of consolidated human experience, reason and revelation alike has considerably devitalised Vedanta philosophy and reduced it to the position of *abject thraldom to a few texts of someone's choice !*

Dvaita philosophy has taken the lead and the lion's share in re-vitalizing the spirit of open enquiry, by restoring the balance of power and thought between the 'Advaita Śrutis' on the one hand and the majority of Śrutis left out by Advaitavāda as not so important or relevant, by showing that it is the latter which have the backing of consolidated human experience and sound reason ratified by the seal of approval of the Apperceiving Self—the one and only infallible and ever-veridical principle of validation of all knowledge and anubhava at all levels of consciousness, both mundane and super-mundane open to Man, as the Mariner's Compass on his voyage on the high seas of philosophical quest.

The delimitation of the boundaries of Sākṣyanubhava and Sākṣiprāmāṇya where they seem to clash with the deliverances of the Śruti and intersect, drawn by the Dvaita School is a great step forward in ending the tug of a war, by not allowing them to encroach on each other's domain :

Prābalyam āgamasyaiva jātyā teṣu triṣu smṛtam
Upajīvyavirodhe tu nāsyaḥ tanmānatā bhavet
Tat pratyakṣaviruddhe'rthe nāgamasyāpi mānatā
Upajīvyam akṣajam yatra, tadanyatra viparyayaḥ
[1]Laukike vyavahāre'tra Pratyakṣayopajīvyatā
Avatārādidṛṣṭau tu syād āgamasyopajīvyatā

1. The words "Laukike Vyavahāre'tra" have been explained by J. in his NS with special reference to the manner in which certain seemingly monistically-worded texts *like* 'Tattvam asi' are to be rightly construed : *Laukike* Pratyakṣādisiddha-Jīvādi-viṣaye Brahmātmakatvādibodhanaviṣaye vyavahāre Tattvamayādi āgamena kriyamāṇe, 'atra' āgame *āgamam prati* Pratyakṣasya upajīvyatā (*op. cit.* p 503 NSPress Edn.)

"In regard to the data concerning the status of Jīvas and other entities whose existence and reality are borne out by sound

Tho' among the three fundamental Pramāṇas Scripture has precedence as a rule *(jātyā)*, it is so only in matters which fall exclusively within its domain, such as the nature and attributes of B. and its relation to its metaphysical attributes, the doings of its Avatārs etc. In matters which fall within the consolidated experience of selves, their experiences of the joys and sorrows of life, the existence of the external world and of other thinking selves like themselves, it is sound tested Pratyakṣa *(parīkṣitapratyakṣa)* backed by Sākṣyanubhava (of the Apperceiver) and Śrutis as well, as limited beings, the data relating to them as established by Sākṣyanubhava remains the Upajīvya-Pramāṇa in regard to any 'identity' propositions involving them. These identity propositions cannot override the Upajīvyapramāṇa. The identity propositions must come to terms with the Facts established by their Upajīvya data by way of agreeing to a figurative identity in terms of various criteria already referred to. Such is the stand taken by the Dvaita School.

A-Siddhi has however attempted to get over the conflict of Upajīvyapramāṇa in accepting Jīva-Brahma-aikya as the purport of the Tat tvam asi text, in various ways. There are only three ways in which the identity can be established (1) by making 'Brahman' the subject of the predicated identity with the Jīva or (2) by making the Jīva the subject of the predication or (3) by making both of them the subject of the predication of identity. But in every one of these cases conflict with the Upajīvya-Pramāṇa

Pratyakṣa, where Śrutis like 'Tat tvam asi' sometimes make use of the language of 'identity' describing the Jīvas as—'Brahmātmaka' (Cf. Aitadātmyam idam sarvam) it is Pratyakṣapramāṇa ratified by Sākṣyānubhava which has got to be accepted as the Upajīvya (deciding factor) in properly construing such texts.

would be inevitable. For, the Jīva is 'given' by his Dharmigrāhaka-pramāṇa (viz. Pratyakṣa and Sākṣyānubhava) not to speak of Śrutis such as *Ātmāpyanīśaḥ sukhaduḥkhahetoḥ* (Śvet. Up. i, 2) as a limited being subject to transmigration, pleasure and pain and as different from B. (Śvet.Up. iv, 7) and ruled by B. (i, 10). The Supreme B, on the other hand, is given in the Śruti as possessed of metaphysical attributes of infinite power, intelligence: *Parā asya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate*, which are said to be intrinsic to its being *(svābhāvikī)* which rules out their being taken to be due to Upādhis and therefore unreal (Śvet.Up. vi, 8). The Bṛh. Up. too, as we have seen, speaks of the 'Śārīra-Ātman' being indwelt by the Prājna-Ātman who, according to Śaṅkara himself, is 'Parameśvara' (B.S.B. i, 3, 42). If then, in spite of these contradictory properties established by sound authorities, these two are to be *'identified'* in deference to the 'Tat Tvam asi' text, it can only be in terms of some kind of 'figurative identity' on viable grounds of mutual similarity *(tadguṇasāratva)*[1], affinity and such others which have been indicated in the earlier contexts and *not* in terms of an identity of essence *(Svarūpaikya)*.

But quoting the example of the datum of the illusory perception of shell as silver *(Idam rajatam)* and its subsequent negation 'this is *not* silver' *(nedam rajatam)* A-Siddhi argues that just as the Dualistic philosopher also recognises that in 'Nedam rajatam' the aspect of *thisness alone* (idamtva) is the actual intended 'datum' (dharmi) and *not* its being 'silver-oriented' *(rajatatvavaiśiṣṭyam)*, as the latter is later

1. "Madhva's interpretation of this particular Sūtra is quite good" V. S. Gahte, *The Vedānta* p. 243.

negated[1], even so, Brahman's omniscience, infinitude etc. or the Jīvātman's limitations need not be taken to form part of the datum of the Upajīvya-Pramāṇa: *Rajatatva-vaiśiṣṭasya-dharmitva-aprayojakatvavat, Sārvajñādi--vaiśiṣṭyasyāpi tadaprayojakatvasya prakṛte samānatvāt Viśiṣṭam na dharmi, Kimtu Brahmasvarūpamātram* (A-Siddhi, ii, 291).

This agument of A-Siddhi overlooks the fact that there is no parallelism between the two data of *Idam rajatam* which is an *illusory perception* and the *authentic* Scriptural evidence of omniscience and other sovereign attributes of B. and the limitations of the Jīvātman as 'given' in the Śrutis (Śvet. Up. i, 2 ; i, 8). The two cases of Idam Rajatam and of the distinguishing properties of Jīva and B. given by the Śrutis themselves are not on the same par or on the same wavelength or order of reality to be compared with each other. . . . Any argument based on such a flimsy comparison cannot be accepted as a valid rejoinder. It will be nothing more than a piece of sophistry *(chala)* and cannot be accepted and a Śāstrajña like Madhusūdana ought *not* to be found indulging in such cheap retort.

That apart, before we can admit the thesis of identity between Jīva and B. as the purport of the Tat Tvam asi text, it will have to be clarified if the subject of the predication of identity viz. Brahman (Tat) is presented as qualified by its essential properties of almightiness, omniscience etc. If it is so presented, conflict with Upajīvya-pramāṇa would be unavoidable. If the identity is predicated on the basis

1. Idam rajatam ityatra *Idam-amśamātram dharmi* na tu rajatatvaviśiṣṭam. Idamamśamātre rūpyatvaniṣedhenaiva iṣṭasiddheḥ. Evam ca yad upajīvyam tan na bādhyam. Idamamśasya abādhāt. Yad bādhyam rajatatvavaiśiṣṭyam na tad upajīvyam Rajatatvavaiśiṣṭasya adharmitvāt (Nym. ii, 27).

of the general attributes *(sāmānyadharma)* of both Jīva and B. being of the nature of 'consciousness' (cittvam) alone, it would only establish that 'Consciousness' is (identical with) 'Consciousness' or that the Jīva is of the nature of 'Consciousness' (Cit). But that would *not suffice* to establish the desired thesis that the "Jīva is B." (Tvam Tat) *which is what the Monist is after.* On the other hand, if the purport of the Mahāvākya is *simply* that there is no Brahman *other* than the Jīva, it would be a species of 'Atheism'. If the identity is merely on the basis of the general property of Consciousness *along with and in spite of* the existence of mutually contradictory attributes, Dvaita Philosophy will have no objection to such a broad-based and much diluted oneness based on resemblance, affinity etc., in some respects. But if the import of the Mahāvākya is to be *strictly restricted* to the point of a *bare nebulous* 'consciousness' without any further specific subjectival reference or referent, there would be no need for any Śruti text to identify the precise nature of the Upajīvya elements for the Advaita by resorting to Bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇā. Such an interpretation, then, would hardly clash with the reality of the difference between Jīva and B. or of the external world, as accepted by the Dvaita thinkers in any way, as it would leave them completely untouched and *un-contradicted*, as "bare consciousness" without a content or referent can do *no correction or contradiction.* "*Mahāvākyena bhedabhramanivṛttiśca na syāt*", as Vyāsatīrtha puts it so crisply.

Thus, the clear demarcation of the jurisdiction of Scriptural authority and the voice of reason and tested Pratyakṣa *(parīkṣita-pratyakṣa)* ratified by our Sākṣyānubhava in respect of the implementation of the principle of Upajīvya-pramāṇa-prābalya in the ascertainment of the

Tātparya of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and their considered opinion on the status and relation of the world of matter and spirits and Brahman to one another, laid down by the thinkers of the Dvaita school, marks a *long-awaited break-through* in arriving at a balanced view of Upaniṣadic philosophy *as a whole*.

From this point of view, the general reader and the specialist will find much to learn and much more to unlearn about Upaniṣadic Philosophy, by ruminating over Vyāsatīrtha's rigorous analysis, criticism, exposition and summing up of the import of the 'Mahāvākyas, and other 'Advaita-Śrutis', which form the subject matter of this volume.

|| ॐ तत् सत् ब्रह्मार्पणमस्तु ॐ ||

APPENDIX-I

INFLUENCE OF ŚRĪ MADHVĀCĀRYA ON THE JÑĀNEŚVARĪ

Sant Jñanadeva (1274–1296) the large-hearted Saint-Philosopher of Maharashtra is one of the great historical personages whose services for the rehabilitation of Hindu Society and its Dharma at a time of grave crisis and socio-political upheavals in the North due to Muslim penetration and its forebodings for the other parts of the country are entitled to a permanent place in the cultural history of the nation. The purpose of his *Jñāneśvarī* was the betterment of the spiritual status of the common unlettered folk, the yeomen, the villagers, the women and Śūdras and bring the knowledge of the Gospel of Krishna to their humble doors, in their own spoken language. Till his times, it had continued to be commented upon only in Sanskrit by eminent Acāryas. His was a daring break with tradition. It is evident from his remarks that he was imbued with and urged by a powerful motivation to do so.

It would be interesting to investigate what was the source of his inspiration to do so. One was undoubtedly the emergence of the Vira-Saiva Reformist Movement in neighbouring Karnāṭaka. There were many men and women among its authors who have enriched its literature in the spoken language of the people of Karnāṭaka. They were drawn from different strata of society. The other must have been the establishment of the Bhakti School of Vedanta, also from neighbouring state of Karnāṭaka by Śrī Madhvācārya. It was Vaiṣṇava in character and there was an important place for the worship of Viṭhala in it. Viṭhala is the *Samsthāna Pratimā* of the Pejāvar, Śīrūr and Puttige Mutts of Uḍupi, bequeathed by Madhva for worship.

Chronologically, Ācārya Madhva (1238–1317) the founder of the Dvaita system of Vedānta, was a *senior contemporary of Jñānadeva.* His System had already been launched and propagated in the Godāvari region of Maharashtra barely two decades before the birth of Jñānadeva and propagated there by the Ācārya himself and his new-found disciple from the Godāvri region and had a good following in various parts of Maharashtra then. Madhva's biography (the *Madhvavijaya)* written by the son of one of his direct disciples refers to the Ācārya's pilgrimage to Badrināth to dedicate his earliest work, the Gītā Bhāṣya to Lord Nārāyaṇa there and his subsequent visit to Vyāsāśrama from there. On his return from Vyāsāśrama, he wrote his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya on the banks of the Alakananda. On his way back home he came to the Godāvari region (Godāvaritaṭam agāt aleśadhīḥ—M.Vij. IX, 14) and visited several centres of Vedic and Śāstra lore along its course. Mention has been made here of his having been challenged to establish the soundness of his new Siddhānta before the foremost centre of those parts (Variṣṭha Samsad) where he met the towering personality of the Sadas who subsequently joined his fold and was given an ascetic name of Padmanābha Tīrtha. He wrote the earliest commentaries on Madhva's *Gītabhāṣya*, *Gītātātparya* and *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* and propagated his Darśana in those parts. From the description given in the Madhvavijaya, it would appear that this famous centre was Paiṭhan celebrated in the religious history of Maharashtra as the citadel of orthodoxy from which Jñānadev brothers were themselves required to produce their Śuddhipatra from the Brahmavṛṇda there, to be eligible for their Upanayana Samskāra, in the circumstances narrated in the life of Jñānadeva. The spread of

Madhvasiddhānta in various parts of Maharashtra, including the Godavari basin is attested by the survival of the families which had joined the fold of Madhva in those early days, in places like Puntāṁbā and Varkhed till late in the 17th century from literary evidence. The *Jñanesvari* itself was completed in 1290 A.D. at Nevase not far from Paiṭhan. The Gītābhāṣya of Madhva was his very first and earliest work, which could not have been written later than 1260, followed by his Sūtrabhāṣya a couple of years later. His other distinguished disciple was from Orissa or Andhrapradesh who received ordination from Madhva in 1264, as attested by epigraphic evidence.

In these circumstances, it cannot be denied or doubted that the author of the *Jñāneśvari* must have been well aware of the name and fame of the founder of the Dvaita Siddhānta of his times, which had gained a respectable footing in various parts of Maharashtra in his days. No doubt the philosophical outlook and ideology of Jñanadeva were different from Madhva's and were closer to Śaṅkara's, though not *wholly identical with it, as can be seen from his Amṛutānubhava.*

But that does not rule out the possibility of his having entertained a genuine appreciation of some of the insightful expositions of the basic concepts of Gītā such as Niṣkāmakarmayoga and his stand that every member of society has to achieve liberation from Samsāra only through the path of Niṣkāmakarma of which spiritual knowledge forms a vital part: Niṣkāmam jñānapūrvam tu Nivṛttamiha cocyate (See his G.B. iii, 3) on Lokesmin dvividha niṣṭhā. It is a matter of common knowledge that the Gīta insists on such Niṣkāmakarma to be performed and dedicated to the Lord of the Universe, because He is the ulimate Enjoyer of all good

Karmas dedicated to Him and their Preraka (Energiser) :– *Aham hi sarvayajñānam bhoktā ca prabhur eva ca* (ix, 24) Dvividhā api Janāḥ santi. Gṛhastādi Karmatyāgena Jñānaniṣṭhās Sanakādivat. *Tatsthā* eva Janakādivat. *Maddharmasthā eva ityarthaḥ* (M.G.B. iii, 3). The Gita also says that such a true Niṣkāmakarmayogi owes a sacred duty and an inexorable responsibility to his less fortunate fellowmen and women to set an example to them in the path of Niṣkāma Karmayoga, by way of Lokasangraha and lead the way. It goes without saying that the Leader of others should be better informed than those that are to be led by him. The *Jñāneśvarī* itself points out that in a procession of blind beggars seeking alms in the streets, the man at the head must be a man of good eyesight. Mārgi andhāsarisa puḍhe dekhnāhi cale jaise Ajñāna prakaṭāvā dharmu taise (iii, 155). Madhva's G.T. insists that the enlightened Yogi shall devote himself to the service of his less fortunate fellowmen, as sacred duty, even as a loyal citizen should pay his taxes to the duly constituted Government :

Nānājanasya Śuśrūṣā kartavyā karavan miteḥ
Yogārthinā (G.T. VI, 3)

Jñānadeva echoes the same sentiments :

Janakādikā Karmajāta asekha na saṇḍita
Mokṣasukha pāvate jāhale (iii, 52)

Je Niṣkāmatā pāvale tayāhi kartavya ase urale Lokalāgi. In contrast to these two, Śaṅkara considers that Karma-Yoga even of the Niṣkāma type *however elevated*, is inferior to Jñānayoga, which he equates with Āśrama-Sannyāsa. Niṣkāmakarmayoga is fit only for Manda or Madhyamādhikārins, *of whom Arjuna is one*. This comes out from his comment on Karmaṇyeva adhikaras te mā phaleṣu kadācana

(ii, 47) Karmaṇyeva adhikāraḥ *Te tava. Na Jñānaniṣṭhāyām* (Ś.GB). Madhva feels bound to protest against this unmerited denigration of Arjuna and the exaltation of Karmasannyāsa over Sāttvikatyāga of the element of fruits of one's actions and their active performance dedicated to the Lord of the Universe, as divine worship (Yajña).

Yastu Karmaphalatyāgī Sa Tyāgī iti me matam
(Gita xviii, 11)

In this connection, Madhva brings to light the true definition of Nivṛtta-Karma which has often been confounded with Sannyāsa-Āśrama. He quotes the authority of *Vyāsa-Smṛti* :

Niṣkāmam Jñānapūrvam tu Nivṛttam iha cocyate

This definition given by Madhva is embodied in a verse from a *Pañcarātra source* cited by Rāmānuja :

Tasmāt samyak param Brahma Vāsudevākhyam avyayam
Asmād avāpyate Śāstrād Jñānapūrveṇa karmaṇā

Reacting sharply to Śaṅkara's uncontextual denigration of Arjuna, debarring him from Jñānaniṣṭhā, Madhva assigns an edifying significance to the pronoun 'Te' referring to Arjuna, in place of the derogatory sense given to it by Śaṅkara. Madhva highlights Arjuna's role as a Jñāni fit and qualified to lead others thro' Niṣkāmakarmayoga dedicated to the Lord of the Universe, by way of Lokasangraha. His Bhāṣya here is worth quoting :

'TE' ityupalakṣaṇārtham. *Tava Jñāninopi na phalakāmanā* kartavyā. Na tvasti keśām cid, *na te iti*. Sa hi Jñani Narāmśa Indraśca. Yadi teṣām (devānām) Śuddhasattvānām Jñānam na syāt, kva anyeṣām ? Pārtha-Ārstiṣena' ityādi (Bhāg. ii, 7, 45) Jñaniganaṇāt (M.G.B.) "The pronoun 'TE' is used in a broad sense of extension of meaning to

all other Jñānins. All thinking persons are warned against lure of Sa-Kāma Karma. Arjuna is undisputably a Jñāni, an Amśa of Nara and an avatār of Indra (a Deva). Devas are constituted of the essence of Śuddhasattva, the source of Jñāna and Arjuna's name is cited in the list of great Jñanins like Ārtiṣena, Hanumān and others in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (ii, 7, 45)". *Jñāneśvari* accepts Kṛṣṇa's assurance to Arjuna that he is 'born to Daivi Sampat' and hence qualified for Mokṣa (Gita xvi, 5). He must therefore be a Jñani, only temporarily swayed by misplaced sense of values, to be awakened to play his legitimate part as a Jñāni and a leader of men and an exemplar of Niṣkāma-Karmayoga, which is the same as 'Sānkhya-Yoga' of the Gita.

All these facts brought out by Madhva in his commentary could not have failed to impress Jñānadeva, that the import of the second Pāda of the verse "Karmaṇyevādhikāras te" addressed to Arjuna is to be restricted to what has been *contextually given* and stated and *not* divorced from it and stretched beyond its province to denigrate Arjuna as *not fit for Jñānaniṣṭhā* or Jñānayoga, as has been done by Śaṅkara.

This should explain why in spite of his saying Bhāṣyakārānte vāṭa pusatu mī na pavatu ke jāyin (xviii, 1722), Jñānadeva *has not followed Śaṅkara* in regard to the import of the *second quarter of Karmaṇyevādhikāras te*. No doubt, it does not mean that Jñānadeva was a blind follower of Śaṅkara and that he reserves to himself the right to use his own judgement where commentators are divided in their opinion. But what would be wrong in conceding that in the exercise of that judgement, Jñānadeva *had also* taken into account the cogent arguments put forward by Madhva,

his senior contemporary, whose works were already in existence when he himself wrote his *Jñāneśvari* in 1290 A D.?

It cannot be seriously maintained that Jñānadeva had no knowledge of Madhva or the system of thought propagated by him. For, in his very first Mangaḷācaraṇa Ovi paying tribute to Śri Gaṇeśa, as the embodiment of all the Vidyāsthānas and assigning places to them among the limbs of Gaṇeśa and after assigning such places to the older Dualistic systems of thought like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāmkhya-Yoga, in the body of Gaṇeśa, he tells us finally that "the Dvaita and Advaita Darśanas of equal strength represent the right and the left cheek of Gaṇeśa, reaching upto the temples of the Elephant-God":

Prameyapravālasuprabha/Dvaita-advaita teci nikumbha Sarise ekavaṭati Ibhamastakāvari (i, 17). While Jñānadeva has the courtesy to refer to the Dvaita system of Madhva as of equal strength with Advaita in his Gaṇeśa-stuti, at the very outset of *Jñāneśvari*, it is disappointing to see that the invitation letter, announcing the celebration of the 700th Death Anniversary of Jñānadeva, during the session of Indian Philosophical Conference at Puṇe under international auspices, in 1996, while informing us that "Jñānadeva can be compared with great philosophers like Spinoza, Kant, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Abhinavagupta and Caitanya" it has *not* been thought fit to mention Madhva's name also along with them! Madhva and Jñānadeva are both agreed that Arjuna is "dearest to Śri Kṛṣṇa". Madhva speaks of Arjuna as an Uttama-Adhikārin and Lord's 'Priyatama', while *Jñāneśvari* refers to Arjuna as "Prince of Bhaktas" (bhaktarāju) whom the Lord embraced with joy (xviii, 1420) and "*made him like unto Himself, without breaking off their difference*":

Dvaita na moḍitā Kelā āpaṇā aise Arjunā (xviii, 1421)

*

This reminds us of the eternal unconditioned *(nirupādhika)* relationship of Pratibimba and Bimba (image and original) symbolically, between Jīvasvarūpa and Paramātman in Madhva's philosophy, resting on the resemblance of the Jiva's natural properties of Svarūpajñāna, ānanda etc. as described in the Brahmasūtra—Tadguṇasāratvāt tadvyapadeśaḥ (II, 3, 29) which according to Ghate, is "a good interpretation (p. 97) *to which one cannot object*" (V.S. Ghate, The Vedānta, p. 169).

Dr. Pendse appears to rely on correspondence of wording śabdasāmya in the interpretation of Jñāneśvari to other Bhāṣyas of the Ācāryas, as evidence of influence (p. 50 Prastāvanā to Edn. of Jñāneśvari, 1984). It is interesting to come across at least one very *striking* correspondence of wording between Jñāneśvari and Madhva's commentaries on Gita II, 70 comparing the Sthitaprajña to the calm Ocean, in spite of the rivers joining it from all directions. Here the Gita uses only the word 'āpaḥ' while Śaṅkara uses 'nadyaḥ' and Rāmānuja 'Nadeyya-āpaḥ'. Only Madhva uses the word *Sarit*:

Nahi Samudras Sarit-praveśa-apraveśa-nimittavṛddhi-
śoṣau bahutrau prāpnoti

and his G.T. reads:

Bhunjānopi hi yaḥ kāmān Maryādām na taret kvacit
Samudravat dharmamayīm nāsau Kāmī sa ucyate (ii, 70)

The Jñāneśvari reads:

Jarī Saritā ogha samasta paripūrṇa houni milata
Tarī adhiku ho nohe īṣat. Maryādā na saṇḍi
Nā tari griṣmakālī saritā śoṣuni samastā
Taisā prāpti ṛddhisiddhī tayā kṣobhu nāhī (II, 358–60)

One is bound to be struck by the choice of the word Sarit-Saritā in place of āpah of the original and nadī and nādeyya āpah of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and the verbal form Śoṣuni—Śoṣa and above all "Maryādām na taret—Maryādā na saṇḍi".

The *Jñāneśvari* is not a commentary on the Gita, in the strict technical sense of the term, as traditionally understood:

Mūlārtho varṇyate yatra padair mūlānusāribhiḥ
Svapadāni ca varṇyante Bhāṣyam Bhāṣyavido viduḥ

quoting authorities from other sources in support of its interpretations and justifying them with logical arguments, citing Pratīkas etc. It is more an impassioned discourse like a series of Sermons based *on a given text*, elaborating the ideas with popular analogies, flowery diction and vivid imagery and a good deal of eloquence, to hold public attention in a large gathering of Bhāvukas.

The question of influence of earlier traditional commentators on such a new genre of literature, which is bound to be eclectic in its outlook, has to be judged from the point of background influence with reference to its motivation for going beyond the established norms. The *Jñāneśvari* itself throws some light on this.

The Bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja on the Gita start with the advent of Kṛṣṇa on earth and the metaphysical role of the Gita. But the Bhāṣya of Madhva starts from a different angle and strikes a different note which is in keeping with the Humanistic ideal of the socio-religious regeneration of the masses by which the Jñāneśvari itself is enlivened. It begins with the advent of Vedavyāsa and his composing the great Encyclopedic Epic the Mahābhārata, for the benefit of the masses, who have no access to the study of the Vedas and the wisdom embodied in them. Both Madhva and Jñānadeva are eloquent on the part played by Vyāsa and his Mahābhārata in satisfying the

spiritual needs of the common folk, the yeomen, the villagers, the women and the Śūdras. Madhva prefaces his Bhāṣya:

Naṣṭadharmajñānalokakṛpālubhir arthito Jñānapradarśanāya Bhagavān Vyāso avatatāra. Tataśca iṣṭāniṣṭa-prāptiparihāra-Sādhana-adarśanāt, Vedārtha-ajñānācca kliśyamānānām Veda-anadhikāriṇam Strī-Śūdrādīnām Dharma-Jñāna-dvārā Mokṣo bhaved iti kṛpāluḥ Sarva-vedārtha-upabṛmhitām Mahābhāratasamhitām acīklpat.

The Jñāneśvari too follows the same trend and sings the greatness of the Mahābhārata of Vyāsa to begin with:

Bhānuceni teja dhavalale jaise trailokya dise
Taise Bhāratī suravadale abhijāta (i, 40)
Yā kāraṇāne miyā Gītārtha Marhāṭiyā kelā lokā
Yayā diṭhī cā viṣo
Pari Marhāṭi bola range kavalita pai Gitānge
(xviii, 1736)

Tene ābālasubodhe oviyecīni prabandhe
Brahmarasasusvāde akṣarī gunthili (xviii, 1742)

Concluding his Prologue, Madhva describes the Gita dove-tailed into the Epic as the "Honey of the Pārijāta of the Epic":

Tatra ca Sarva-Bhāratārthasārasangrahabhūtām Vāsu-devārjuna-Samvādarūpām Mahābhārata-Pārijāta-madhu-bhūtām Gītām upanibabandha. The Jñāneśvari follows suit with but a *slight variation of the simile:*

Ātā Bhārati-kamalaparāgu Gītākhyu prasangu
Jo Samvādalā Śrīrangu Arjunesī (i, 50)

What a striking correspondence of imagery!

Neither Śaṅkara nor Rāmānuja has referred to the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* in their writings or in the Gitābhāṣyas, for any purpose. This is in striking contrast to Madhva's

Bhāṣya on the Gita which draws ***heavily*** on the *Bhāgavata* for elucidation of Gita thought. The most notable instance is the reference to the other great Philosopher-King Priya-vrata in the Bhāgavata, while explaining the term *ādi* in Karmaṇaiva samsiddhim āsthitā Janakādayaḥ, as a great Jñani *commissioned* by the Lord Himself to return to his Kingdom from the forest and shoulder the responsibilities of Kingship, for purposes of Lokasamgraha.

Both Madhva and Jñānadeva advert to the different forms of emotional attitude taken by the Gopis, Kamsa and Śiśupāla towards the Lord and attaining Mokṣa thereby, though they differ in their ways of reconciling such un-orthodox ways with the Gita's main emphasis on Māhātmya-jñāna of the Lord to attain Him. Avajānanti mām mūḍhā mānuṣīm tanum āśritam Param Bhāvam ajānanthaḥ (ix, 11). The Jñāneśvari also refers to the anecdotes of Pūtanā, Dhruva and Ajāmiḷa from Bhāgavata.

It should thus be clear from the data presented in the foregoing pages that the subject of the possible nature and extent of influence which can be estimated to have been exerted by the personality and writings of the founder of the Dvaita system of Vedānta and his commentaries on the Gita in the work of his junior contemporary is well worth serious study and reflection with an *open mind.*

It would therfore be extremely obtuse to rule out, off hand, any possibility of *any significant influence* on the mind of the author of the Jñāneśvari of any other commentator like Madhva in the exposition of the Gita at all, and insist that the concluding words of the Jñāneśvari: *Bhāṣyakārānte vāṭa pusatu* should be *confined* solely and entirely to Śaṅkara, as has been made out in the Prastāvana of the edition of the Jñāneśvari (1984).

APPENDIX-II

VYĀSATĪRTHA AND VALLABHĀCĀRYA

My attention has been drawn to Prof. G. J. Shah's *Vallabhācārya, His Philosophy and Religion* (Pustimarga Pustakaleya, Nadiad, Gujarat (1969), which *inter alia* describes at length the details of a supposed participation of Vallabhācārya "young in years" (P. 10) in a protracted Vāda philosophical disputation on Dvaita Advaita polemics between Vyāsatīrtha and a team of irate scholars who had come to challenge him in the court of Vijayanagar. The Professor's account of the progress of the debate is highly derogatory to Vyāsatīrtha and places so distinguished a Saint-Philosopher of his times, a Master of the four Śāstras and a personality held in the highest esteem by the Kings of the second and third dynasties of Vijayanagar, according to the accounts of foreign travellers, as well, in an awkward position and a highly compromising situation from which, according to the Professor, Vyāsatīrtha was saved from ignominous defeat by the participation of Vallabhācārya in the debate as "a God-sent missionary of Vaisnavism, whose timely advent saved the Vaisnava School of Madhvācārya from defeat" (P. 18).

According to the Professor "Vallabha visited Vijayanagar when it was ruled by King Narasimha, but Krishnadevaraya was the virtual Ruler" (P. 18). Prof. Shah says, "at the conclusion of the debate, Krishnadevaraya ordered a Kanakābhiṣeka for Vallabhācārya and *that Vyāsatīrtha's biographer Somadatta has recorded this event*" (P. 19).

The actual name of Vyāsatīrtha's biographer is Somanātha as given by himself and not Somadatta.

Somanātha was a contemporary of Vyāsatīrtha and a distinguished Poet. He was a Smārta by birth and not a Vaishnava or a follower of the Madhva Sampradaya. There is absolutely no mention of Vallabhācārya's participation in the debate at Vijayanagar recorded by Somanātha and no mention of any Kanakābhiṣeka for Vallabha. Only a Kanakābhiṣeka for Vyāsatīrtha by the Rāya is mentioned.

In Appendix III of the first part of the book entitled *Advaitasiddhi Vs. Nyāyāmṛta — an upto date Re-appraisal* (1994), I have dealt with the famous debate between Vyāsatīrtha and an irate team or scholars from different parts of the country, as narrated by Somanātha himself in His *Vyāsayogicarita Campū Kāvya* (Ullasa V pp. 59-62 Text).

According to the biography, the debate lasted for *thirty days* and it was held in the court of King Narasa, in his presence and that the opposing team of scholars was led by Basavabhaṭṭa of Kalinga (P. 60). The period of Narasa is 1492–1503. There is nothing to show in Somanātha's account that the debate was about Dvaita-Advaita polemics. It was probably on the Navya Nyāya of the Gaṅgeśa School. For Vyāsatīrtha's Nyāyāmṛta on Dvaita Advaita Vicāra which had given a rude shock to the Advaitic world had not yet been written by Vyāsatīrtha in the reign of Narasa. Somanātha clearly says it was only in the reign of King Vira Narasimha (1503–09) that Vyāsatīrtha *commenced* the writing of his great works like the Nyāyāmṛta (See Page 108 of my Appendix III to Part I). Hence, it is reasonable to hold that there was no such intense provocation to Advaita circles to mobilise public opinion against the Dvaita teacher, as there *was after* the

publication of his Nyāyāmṛta, which *was* finally answered some fifty years after the demise of Vyāsatīrtha by the veteran Advaita Scholar Madhusūdana Sarasvati from far off Bengal.

Anyway, as the debate according to Somanātha took place in the reign of King Narasa and *not Narasimha (Vira Narasimha)* and as Narasa himself was a very powerful Ruler and the father of Krishnadevaraya, it is not possible to believe Prof. Shah that Krishnadevaraya was the *virtual Ruler then.*

Since Somanātha has mentioned the name of the leader of the opposing team of Basavabhaṭṭa of Kalinga, there is no reason for his *not* mentioning the name of the God-sent participant in the debate viz., Vallabhācārya, if it was a fact. There are many other details too in Prof. Shah's account which throw a legitimate doubt on the veracity of his account and its tenor. For instance, according to Prof. Shah, Krishnadevaraya introduced Vallabhācārya, the God-sent participant to the assembly. It is doubtful if Krishnadevaraya, the younger brother of Vīra Narasimha, was more than a lad at the time of this debate which probably took place about 1498 in the reign of King Narasa and there is no reason why the King himself could not have introduced the visitor. According to Prof. Shah, after Krishnadevaraya finished introducing Vallabhācārya, to the assembly, the leader of the Dvaita School (Vyāsatīrtha) "stood up" and briefly stated his view and "sat down" (P. 10). This is adding insult to injury. It seems the Professor is woefully ignorant of the etiquette which governs the relations between accredited religious heads (Pīṭhādhipatis) of Hindu religious institutions and members of the public, be they scholars, or laymen, Kings, Prime Ministers and Presidents of the country, *even now.* No Pīṭhādhipati ever *stands up* before an assembly to address it or sits down afterwards. *He remains seated throughout the proceedings.* Even more preposterous and absurd is the Professor's statement that at the conclusion of the debate, Vyāsatīrtha "requested him (Vallabhacārya) to assume responsibility as the Head of the Madhva sect" (P. 19), which Vallabha declined. Suffice it to say that Vyāsatīrtha, according to Somanātha, had a galaxy of ascetic disciples like the redoubtable Vijayīndratīrtha and others whom he could have appointed to succeed him if he wanted. He would have been the last man to make such a request to an "outsider" and a confirmed and professed "Śuddha-Advaitin" who had declared to his face (according to the Prof.) that "I differ also from the Mādhva School which maintains that the universe and the souls are different entities from Brahman" (P. 17). The entire version of the Professor is a bundle of misguided fabrications to glorify Vallabhācārya, at the expense of a celebrity like Vyāsatīrtha, which calls for legal action for amends by the Head of the Vyasaraja Mutt.

Prof. Shah naturally claims originality for Vallabha's views in regard to the relation between Brahman and the Universe and the Souls. We are told that according to Vallabha "the Universe and the souls are *manifestations* of Brahman and so they are essentially one with Him. The Universe and the Souls are not His attributes (as they are for Rāmānuja or different from B. according to Madhva or unreal 'appearances' according to Saṅkara), but 'parts'. Their relation to Him is that of a part to the whole. The

Universe represents Brahman's 'Being aspect' and the Soul 'His consciousness aspect' (P. 17).

It goes without saying that Vallabha, not being a Kevala Advaiti like Śaṅkara, the manifestations of Brahman as the universe and the souls, must be a real transformation of the being-aspect and the consciousness-aspect of B. Madhva's *Anuvyākhyāna*, while discussing various views of the nature of B's causality with regard to the world of matter and souls and disposing of the Vivarta and Parināmavādas of earlier thinkers, deals with another shade of the latter, which *anticipates* and refutes a position which is very close to Vallabha's version and finds it equally unsatisfactory.

Bhāgena parināmasśced bhāgayor bheda eva hi
Yo bhāgo avikārī syāt sa eva asmākam Īśvaraḥ (AV)

Explaining the above, Jayatīrtha writes in his Nyāyasudhā : " If you hold there are two aspects of B, one that is essentially blissful and of the nature of consciousness and the other of the nature of existence (Sat), it comes to this that it is efficient cause in the first aspect and the material cause in the second. If that be so there is no clash with logic in thus holding that B, in its aspect of 'Sat' transforms itself into the material world."

However in Vallabha's idiom, as any manifestation of B. has to be accepted as 'Real' and not an *appearance* as in Māyāvāda, the advocates of this theory will have to say if these two aspects are *identical with each other,* or partly different and partly identical. They cannot be identical as both of them will have to transform. Nor can they be "different and identical" at the same time. For at least in respect of 'identity' there will be the same nemesis. If

it is argued that the 'difference' will prevent the identity from bringing about the said nemesis, why not dispense with that identity which is so hopelessly powerless against the 'difference'?

Therefore, it must be conceded that these two aspects are entirely different from each other. It comes to this that there are two *entities*, one of which is essentially immutable and acting as the efficient cause only of the universe. The other one is liable to transformation and acts as the material cause of the world. If this be so, we who are advocates of the view that Brahman is efficient cause only of the Universe have no quarrel with you. For according to us, Brahman is that which is immutable and is the efficient cause only of the Universe. What actually transforms and acts as the material cause of the world is designated by us as "Prakṛti" or Pradhāna (matter). In the above discussion, the term "part" or "aspect" should be understood to have been used from the point of view of *the other party*. From the Siddhānta point of view the proper word would be two *entities*. This criticism covers every shade of Brahmapariṇāmavāda thro' "aspect", "modes" or "powers" (Śakti) considered as *essential and organic parts of Brahman*. And Vallabha's view falls under one of these categories.

Madhva's Influence on Vallabhācārya's Thought

The way in which Vallabha has raised the Bhāgavata Purāṇa to the position of a fourth Prasthāna besides the other three and has commented on it may be traced to the example set by Madhva, the first known Vaiṣṇava Ācārya and Sūtrabhāshyākāra to have written a Tātparya on the Bhāgavata and have drawn heavily on it right from his Gītā

Bhāṣya onwards. The distinction accepted by Vallabha between the fruits of Jñānamārga and Bhaktimārga in Mokṣa: Jñānamārga-Bhaktimārgayor anāvṛttau tulyatvepi, phala-prāptau vailakṣaṇyam (Vallabha Anubhāṣya, iv. 4.22) Mukter api Bhaktimārgīya tadīyatvam eva Jyāyaḥ. Nahi Muktānām Kaścana Bhāgavad-upayogah asti iti bhāvaḥ (iii. 4.48) rests squarely on the doctrine of Tāratamya in Mokṣa, which is a distinctive feature of Madhva thought, not found in any other school of Vedānta before him. Vallabha observes that for Jñānis God's favor and grace last only upto the time of their release. This grace and favor is showered on the Bhaktas to a *greater extent and throughout Mokṣa.* Tho' Madhva does not recognise any exclusiveness between Bhakti and Jñāna, he recognises gradation of intrinsic bliss of selfhood (svarūpānanda) among released souls. Vallabha's distinction between the fruits of Bhakti and Jñāna in Mokṣa presupposes the existence of some kind of Tāratamya in release. Lastly, Vallabha has borrowed *without acknowledgement* the Verse :

Bhrāntimūlatayā sarvasamayānām ayuktitaḥ
Na tadvirodhād vacanam Vaidikam śankyatām vrajet

from Madhva's *Aṇubhāṣya* on the Sūtras, in his own *Aṇubhāṣya* (ii. 2.11).

APPENDIX-III

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INDEX

ERRATA

Page	Line	For	Read
6	15	non-existent	not non-existent
11	31	control-	controll-
23	25	Eva	EKA
26	2	are	delete
47	18	construding	construing
51	18	antarnita nin	antaraṇita-ṇic
59	16	aiva	yaiva
66	7	eyaya	eyāya
71	13	findings	finding
74	23	Vitsavote	Vitanvate
76	30	primary	primacy
110	20	arhendriya	arthendriya
113	14	self	selves
134	23	ārtham	ārtam
141	23	who	and who